John, list
I’d add Peirce’s term of ‘pragmaticism’ - a focus on the practical consequences of a
semiosic function, ie, a process, rather than a focus on the theory.
I’d also comment that, in my view, Peircean semiosis is a function of a complex adaptive
world, where, for example, matter becomes self-organizing and where semiosis is a process
of exploratory openness enabling diversity of form [ and habits] and expansion of
networking .
That is, the DI [Dynamic Interpretant] is merely a current and local ’task closure’ and
is the normal experience of the semiosic process. But the FI [ Final Interpretant ] which
occurs less often is exploratory within its environment [ which is where the notion of
community in its definition enters] and thus, both evolution and adaptations cannot be
prestated or determined, but remain open to both Firstness and influences from the habits
from other existences/Signs. [5.477 where habits change; also 6. 262, and ‘primordial
habit-taking].
Peirce was not an a priori essentialist but an evolutionist [and not a Darwinist , ie, he
rejected total randomness as the sole means of generating adaptation] and thus, his
semiosis had to enable interactional openness to the information from other current
semiotic forms as well as chance - to enable changes in habits and phenomena.
His outline of protoplasm, evolution etc - is obviously not a focus on abstract theory -
but on pragmatic realities.
Edwina
On Jan 24, 2024, at 7:03 PM, John F Sowa
<sowa(a)bestweb.net> wrote:
Jon, Helmut, List,
I don't disagree with your analysis. But what it shows is that abstract analysis
provides zero information about any particular case.
Peirce revolutionized the field of logic, he made major contributions to methods of
reasoning, to methods of analysis and to methods of representation in lexicography,
phaneroscopy, semeiotic, and, scientific research (methodeutic). His 10 classes of signs
are important, but beyond that, he could only give a few examples, and he never showed the
value of that abstract analysis with any concrete results for any kind of application.
Fortunately, Lady Welby had an enormous influence on Peirce. She had zero interest in
those abstractions. In evaluating the importance of Peirce's late writings, it's
essential to read his letters to her. She kept him focused on reality.
It's not an accident that Peirce dropped the word 'phenomenology' and
replaced it with 'phaneroscopy', which puts more emphasis on concrete examples,
rather than formal analysis. In his last decade, his examples and methods of analysis
show a strong influence of Welby's interests and subject matter. He kept working on
EGs, but he used them to represent subjects that are more concrete than abstract -- he
kept that goal of representing images, especially stereoscopic moving images.
Although Welby did not understand EGs, I believe that she kept him focused on
representing imagery. And I believe that the importance of imagery is the reason why he
replaced the trichotomy of word oriented rheme-dicisign-arguent with the more general
trichotomy that included imagery: seme-pheme-delome.
John
From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschmidt(a)gmail.com>
Helmut, List:
HR: it is the interpreter, who does the inference ... it is the interpreter, who
receives the sign, and then forms the interpretant
As I have said before, this is true in the sense that the interpreter's mind is
another sign, which co-determines the dynamical interpretant along with the individual
sign being analyzed. That is why the same individual sign can have different dynamical
interpretants--different interpreters have different collateral experience and different
habits of interpretation. Any dynamical interpretant of an individual sign (the effect
that it actually does have) is a misinterpretation to the extent that it deviates from the
final interpretant of that sign (the effect that it ideally would have), which obviously
must be consistent with its immediate interpretant (the range of effects that it possibly
could have). The proper aim of inquiry in accordance with the normative science of logic
as semeiotic is conforming all our dynamical interpretants of signs to their final
interpretants, i.e., adopting only true beliefs such that the corresponding habits of
conduct would never be confounded by any possible future experience.
HR: The sign anyway is prescinded from the, in reality not reducible, sign triad. ...
Prescission might be seen as an error, so this is error propagation.
Again, in my view, each individual genuine triadic relation with its three individual
correlates is prescinded from the continuous process of semiosis. Prescission should not
be seen as an error--it "consists in supposing a state of things in which one element
is present without the other, the one being logically possible without the other" (EP
2:270, 1903). We can suppose an individual sign with its individual object and its
individual interpretant being present, apart from other signs with their own objects and
interpretants, because these are all entia rationis--"fictions recognized to be
fictions, and thus no longer fictions" (R 295, 1906). As an engineer, I routinely
employ prescission to create diagrams of buildings that include only their primary members
and connections, omitting everything else that is really present but incidental to their
structural behavior. Such a model is not erroneous as long as it adequately captures every
aspect that is significant for the analysis being performed
(
https://www.structuremag.org/?p=10373).
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
<http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>
<http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
<http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> /
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
On Wed, Jan 24, 2024 at 9:13 AM Helmut Raulien <H.Raulien(a)gmx.de
<mailto:H.Raulien@gmx.de>> wrote:
Jon, Cecile, List,
Jon, in your first paragraph you wrote about inference. I agree. Therefore I find it a
bit problematic to say, that the sign determines the interpretant, because the sign
doesn´t infere, it is the interpreter, who does the inference. But ok, I guess we might
say, that Peirce prescinds the semiosis from the interpreter, so, ok, the flow of
determination goes from the sign to the interpretant, because it is the interpreter, who
receives the sign, and then forms the interpretant, and, if you donot mention the
interpreter, well, then you just skip her/him/it. But I think, that this skipping is only
justified, if the interpretant is true, because then it (the interpretant) is a subset of
the final interpretant, and not a misinterpretation. But: Can we take that for granted?
Talking about precission: The sign anyway is prescinded from the, in reality not
reducible, sign triad. If we say, that something prescinded determines something else,
this determination too is prescinded. Prescission might be seen as an error, so this is
error propagation. That, i guess, is the reason, why this whole determination affair is
somehow confusing. It surely is, if we take "determination" too literally, I
mean, if we take it too muchly for real. Do you agree? You see, I have been trying very
hard to not contradict Peirce.
Best, Helmut
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