Cf: Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Relation Theory • Discussion 6
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/03/01/sign-relations-triadic-relations-r…
Re: FB | Charles S. Peirce Society
https://www.facebook.com/groups/peircesociety/posts/2551077815028195/
::: Alain Létourneau
https://www.facebook.com/groups/peircesociety/posts/2551077815028195?commen…
All,
Alain Létourneau asks if I have any thoughts
on Peirce's Rhetoric. I venture the following.
Classically speaking, rhetoric (as distinguished from dialectic)
treats forms of argument which “consider the audience” — which
take the condition of the addressee into account. But that is
just what Peirce's semiotic does in extending our theories of
signs from dyadic to triadic sign relations.
We often begin our approach to Peirce's semiotics by saying he puts the
interpreter back into the relation of signs to their objects. But even
Aristotle had already done that much. Peirce's innovation was to apply
the pragmatic maxim, clarifying the characters of interpreters in terms
of their effects — their interpretants — in the flow of semiosis.
Some reading —
Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (1995),
“Interpretation as Action • The Risk of Inquiry”,
Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15(1), 40–52.
https://www.academia.edu/57812482/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inqu…
Regards,
Jon
Cf: Zeroth Law Of Semiotics • Discussion 2
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/10/27/zeroth-law-of-semiotics-discussion…
Re: Zeroth Law Of Semiotics
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/07/30/zeroth-law-of-semiotics/
Re: FB | Charles S. Peirce Society
https://www.facebook.com/groups/peircesociety/posts/2757776511024990/
::: Joseph Harry
https://www.facebook.com/groups/peircesociety/posts/2757776511024990?commen…
<QUOTE JH:>
“Meaning is a privilege not a right” would seem to be
a meaningless proposition, since ‘privilege’ and ‘right’
are third-order evaluative, symbolic terms, while ‘meaning’
is a neutral second-order term, implying only existential
individualized dynamic activity or process. Driving (a car)
is a privilege not a right, but meaning is neither.
</QUOTE>
Dear Joseph,
That may be too literal a reading for Zero‑Aster's poetic figure.
If I read the oracle right, the contrast between “privilege” and
“right” serves merely to mark the distinction between meanings
optional and obligatory. Whether any hint of “private law” or
“law unto itself” is intended or involved is something I would
have to spend more time thinking about.
Regards,
Jon
Cf: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry • 31
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/10/14/abduction-deduction-induction-ana…
Re: Scott Aaronson ( https://scottaaronson.blog/ )
::: Explanation-Gödel and Plausibility-Gödel
( https://scottaaronson.blog/?p=6754 )
All,
A general heuristic in problem solving suggests priming the pump
with a stronger hypothesis. Applying that strategy here would
have us broaden the grounds of validity, our notion of validation,
from purely deductive proofs to more general forms of inference.
Along that line, and following a lead from Aristotle, C.S. Peirce
recognized three distinct modes of inference, called abductive,
deductive, and inductive reasoning, and that way of thinking has
even had some traction in AI from the days of Warren S. McCulloch on.
At any rate I think it helps to view our questions in that ballpark.
There’s a budget of resources and running thoughts on the matter
I keep on the following page.
• Survey of Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry
( https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/12/16/survey-of-abduction-deduction-ind… )
Regards,
Jon
Cf: Theme One Program • Exposition 5
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/06/23/theme-one-program-exposition-5/
All,
Lexical, Literal, Logical
=========================
Theme One puts cactus graphs to work in three distinct but related ways,
called their “lexical”, “literal”, and “logical” uses. Those three modes
of operation employ three distinct but overlapping subsets of the broader
species of cacti. Accordingly we find ourselves working with graphs, files,
and expressions of lexical, literal, and logical types, depending on the task
at hand.
The logical class of cacti is the broadest, encompassing the whole species
described above, of which we have already seen a typical example in its
several avatars as abstract graph, pointer data structure, and string
of characters suitable for storage in a text file.
Being a “logical cactus” is not just a matter of syntactic form —
it means being subject to meaningful interpretations as a sign of
a logical proposition. To enter the logical arena cactus expressions
must express something, a proposition true or false of something.
Fully addressing the logical, interpretive, semantic aspect of cactus graphs
normally requires a mind-boggling mass of preliminary work on the details of
their syntactic structure. Practical, pragmatic, and especially computational
considerations will eventually make that unavoidable. For the sake of the
present discussion, however, let’s put a pin in it and fast forward to the
logical substance.
Regards,
Jon
