John, list

I’d add Peirce’s term of ‘pragmaticism’ - a focus on the practical consequences of a semiosic function, ie, a process, rather than a focus on the theory.

I’d also comment that, in my view, Peircean semiosis is a function of a complex adaptive world, where, for example, matter becomes self-organizing and where semiosis is a process of exploratory openness enabling diversity of form [ and habits] and expansion of networking . 

That is, the DI [Dynamic Interpretant] is merely a current and local ’task closure’  and is the normal experience of the semiosic process. But the FI [ Final Interpretant ] which occurs less often is exploratory within its environment [ which is where the notion of community in its definition enters] and thus, both evolution and adaptations cannot be prestated or determined, but remain open to both Firstness and influences from the habits from other existences/Signs. [5.477 where habits change; also 6. 262, and ‘primordial habit-taking]. 

Peirce was not an a priori essentialist but an evolutionist [and not a Darwinist , ie, he rejected total randomness as the sole means of generating adaptation] and thus, his semiosis had to enable interactional openness to the information from other current  semiotic forms as well as chance - to enable changes in habits and phenomena. 

His outline of protoplasm, evolution etc -  is obviously not a focus on abstract theory - but on pragmatic realities.  

Edwina



On Jan 24, 2024, at 7:03 PM, John F Sowa <sowa@bestweb.net> wrote:

Jon, Helmut, List,

I don't disagree with your analysis.  But what it shows is that abstract analysis provides zero information about any particular case. 

Peirce revolutionized the field of logic, he made major contributions to methods of reasoning, to methods of analysis and to methods of representation in lexicography, phaneroscopy, semeiotic, and, scientific research (methodeutic).   His 10 classes of signs are important, but beyond that, he could only give a few examples, and he never showed the value of that abstract analysis with any concrete results for any kind of application.

Fortunately, Lady Welby had an enormous influence on Peirce.  She had zero interest in those abstractions. In evaluating the importance of Peirce's late writings, it's essential to read his letters to her.  She kept him focused on reality.

It's not an accident that Peirce dropped the word 'phenomenology' and replaced it with 'phaneroscopy', which puts more emphasis on concrete examples, rather than formal analysis.  In his last decade, his examples and methods of analysis show a strong influence of Welby's interests and subject matter.   He kept working on EGs, but he used them to represent subjects that are more concrete than abstract -- he kept that goal of representing images, especially stereoscopic moving images.   

Although Welby did not understand EGs, I believe that she kept him focused on representing imagery.    And I believe that the importance of imagery is the reason why he replaced the trichotomy of word oriented rheme-dicisign-arguent with the more general trichotomy that included imagery:  seme-pheme-delome.

John
 

From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschmidt@gmail.com>

Helmut, List:

HR: it is the interpreter, who does the inference ...  it is the interpreter, who receives the sign, and then forms the interpretant

As I have said before, this is true in the sense that the interpreter's mind is another sign, which co-determines the dynamical interpretant along with the individual sign being analyzed. That is why the same individual sign can have different dynamical interpretants--different interpreters have different collateral experience and different habits of interpretation. Any dynamical interpretant of an individual sign (the effect that it actually does have) is a misinterpretation to the extent that it deviates from the final interpretant of that sign (the effect that it ideally would have), which obviously must be consistent with its immediate interpretant (the range of effects that it possibly could have). The proper aim of inquiry in accordance with the normative science of logic as semeiotic is conforming all our dynamical interpretants of signs to their final interpretants, i.e., adopting only true beliefs such that the corresponding habits of conduct would never be confounded by any possible future experience.

HR: The sign anyway is prescinded from the, in reality not reducible, sign triad. ... Prescission might be seen as an error, so this is error propagation.

Again, in my view, each individual genuine triadic relation with its three individual correlates is prescinded from the continuous process of semiosis. Prescission should not be seen as an error--it "consists in supposing a state of things in which one element is present without the other, the one being logically possible without the other" (EP 2:270, 1903). We can suppose an individual sign with its individual object and its individual interpretant being present, apart from other signs with their own objects and interpretants, because these are all entia rationis--"fictions recognized to be fictions, and thus no longer fictions" (R 295, 1906). As an engineer, I routinely employ prescission to create diagrams of buildings that include only their primary members and connections, omitting everything else that is really present but incidental to their structural behavior. Such a model is not erroneous as long as it adequately captures every aspect that is significant for the analysis being performed (https://www.structuremag.org/?p=10373).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

On Wed, Jan 24, 2024 at 9:13 AM Helmut Raulien <H.Raulien@gmx.de> wrote:
Jon, Cecile, List,
 
Jon, in your first paragraph you wrote about inference. I agree. Therefore I find it a bit problematic to say, that the sign determines the interpretant, because the sign doesn´t infere, it is the interpreter, who does the inference. But ok, I guess we might say, that Peirce prescinds the semiosis from the interpreter, so, ok, the flow of determination goes from the sign to the interpretant, because it is the interpreter, who receives the sign, and then forms the interpretant, and, if you donot mention the interpreter, well, then you just skip her/him/it. But I think, that this skipping is only justified, if the interpretant is true, because then it (the interpretant) is a subset of the final interpretant, and not a misinterpretation. But: Can we take that for granted?
 
Talking about precission: The sign anyway is prescinded from the, in reality not reducible, sign triad. If we say, that something prescinded determines something else, this determination too is prescinded. Prescission might be seen as an error, so this is error propagation. That, i guess, is the reason, why this whole determination affair is somehow confusing. It surely is, if we take "determination" too literally, I mean, if we take it too muchly for real. Do you agree? You see, I have been trying very hard to not contradict Peirce.
 
Best, Helmut
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