Cf: Inquiry Into Inquiry • Discussion 6
Re: Mathstodon • Nicole Rust
Computations or Processes —
How do you think about the building blocks of the brain?
I keep coming back to this thread about levels, along with others
on the related issue of paradigms, as those have long been major
questions for me. I am trying to clarify my current understanding
for a blog post. It will start out a bit like this —
A certain amount of “level” language is natural in the sciences
but “level” metaphors come with hidden assumptions about higher and
lower places in hierarchies which don't always fit the case at hand.
In complex cases what look at first like parallel strata may in time
be better comprehended as intersecting domains or mutually recursive
and entangled orders of being. When that happens we can guard against
misleading imagery by speaking of domains or realms instead of levels.
To be continued …
Cf: Systems of Interpretation • 1
Questions have arisen about the different styles of diagrams
and figures used to represent triadic sign relations in Peircean
semiotics. What do they mean? Which style is best? Among the
most popular pictures some use geometric triangles while others
use the three‑pronged graphs Peirce used in his logical graphs
to represent triadic relations.
Diagrams and figures, like any signs, can serve to communicate
the intended interpretants and thus to coordinate the conduct of
interpreters toward the intended objects — but only in communities of
interpretation where the conventions of interpretation are understood.
Conventions of interpretation are by comparison far more difficult to
That brings us to the first question we have to ask about the possibility
of communication in this area, namely, what conventions of interpretation
are needed to make sense of these diagrams, figures, and graphs?
Cf: Inquiry Into Inquiry • On Initiative 3
Re: Scott Aaronson • Should GPT Exist?
My Comment —
The more fundamental problem I see here is the failure to grasp the
nature of the task at hand, and this I attribute not to a program
but to its developers.
Journalism, Research, and Scholarship are not matters of
generating probable responses to prompts or other stimuli.
What matters is producing evidentiary and logical supports
for statements. That is the task requirement the developers
of these LLM‑Bots are failing to grasp.
There is nothing new about that failure. There is a long history of attempts to
account for intelligence and indeed the workings of scientific inquiry based on
the principles of associationism, behaviorism, connectionism, and theories of
that order. But the relationship of empirical evidence, logical inference,
and scientific information is more complex and intricate than is dreamt of
in those reductive philosophies.
Note. The above comment was originally posted on March 1st
but appears to have been accidentally deleted.