Cf: Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Relation Theory • Discussion 9 https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/04/09/sign-relations-triadic-relations-… | Once, there was nothing there, nothing moving on its own, | just data and people shuffling it around. Then something | happened, and it … it knew itself. | | William Gibson • “Count Zero” | https://web.archive.org/web/20050426214714/http://stderr.org/pipermail/aris… Re: FB | Dan Everett • On the Origin of Symbols and the Descent of Signs https://www.facebook.com/dan.everett.1884/posts/286365076993646 All, Continuing a discussion on the generative power of symbols. Here’s the skinny on the big three types of signs. Despite its simplicity, or maybe because of it, the larger implications for the interpretive character of sign typing still goes widely missed. Semeiotic • Types of Signs https://oeis.org/wiki/Semeiotic#Types_of_signs There are three principal ways a sign may denote its objects. The modes of representation are often referred to as kinds, species, or types of signs but it is important to recognize they are not ontological species, that is, they are not mutually exclusive features of description, since the same thing can be a sign in several different ways. Beginning very roughly, the three main ways of being a sign can be described as follows. • An icon denotes its objects by virtue of a quality it shares with its objects. • An index denotes its objects by virtue of an existential connection it has to its objects. • A symbol denotes its objects solely by virtue of being interpreted to do so. One of Peirce’s early delineations of the three types of signs affords a useful first approach to understanding their differences and their relationships to each other. <QUOTE CSP:> In the first place there are likenesses or copies — such as statues, pictures, emblems, hieroglyphics, and the like. Such representations stand for their objects only so far as they have an actual resemblance to them — that is agree with them in some characters. The peculiarity of such representations is that they do not determine their objects — they stand for anything more or less; for they stand for whatever they resemble and they resemble everything more or less. The second kind of representations are such as are set up by a convention of men or a decree of God. Such are tallies, proper names, &c. The peculiarity of these conventional signs is that they represent no character of their objects. Likenesses denote nothing in particular; conventional signs connote nothing in particular. The third and last kind of representations are symbols or general representations. They connote attributes and so connote them as to determine what they denote. To this class belong all words and all conceptions. Most combinations of words are also symbols. A proposition, an argument, even a whole book may be, and should be, a single symbol. (Peirce 1866, Lecture 7, 467–468). </QUOTE> Reference ========= Peirce, C.S. (1866), “The Logic of Science, or, Induction and Hypothesis”, in Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Volume 1 (1857–1866), Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington & Indianapolis, IN, 1982. Lowell Lectures of 1866, 357–504. Regards, Jon

Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Relation Theory • Discussion 11 • https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2023/09/12/sign-relations-triadic-relations-… Re: Michael Shapiro • Redefining Arbitrariness in Language • https://languagelore.net/ • https://languagelore.net/2023/04/03/redefi-ning-arbitrariness-in-language/ <QUOTE MS:> The matter of arbitrariness in language is primarily associated with the work of the Swiss linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913), whose book of lectures, Cours de linguistique Générale, is widely recognized to have laid the foundations of European structural linguistics in the twentieth century. One of Saussure's most quoted positions points out that the meaning of words is arbitrary, in that, for instance, the word “arbre” in French and its equivalent “tree” in English have nothing to do “naturally” with the object they signify. Any other sequence of sounds could in theory designate the same object. These are just the words French and English happen to have inherited from their history. </QUOTE> I prefer to think of the word “arbitrary” as reminding us how every aspect of a sign's functioning is relative to an arbiter, a judge, an interpreter. That brings semiology more into harmony with Peirce's semiotics — if only Saussure had realized how it embeds all dyadic sign relations within the fold of triadic sign relations! Regards, Jon