8 Feb
2024
8 Feb
'24
6:32 p.m.
I have examined more writings about interpretants by Peirce scholars, and the version by
Short (excerpts below) is typical. It's also consistent with the Stanford article by
Atkin.
As Short writes, Peirce was "groping" for a definitive statement about
interpretants, but he never developed a complete theory with precise definitions that
remained consistent from one MS to another..
In a note to Gary R, I apologized for saying "RIP". I now retract that apology.
Peirce never had a coherent theory of interpretants He did make a three-way distinction,
but he never stated reliable definitions that anybody else can use with confidence.
The last paragraph quoted below is as good as any and better than most. Note Peirce's
own words: "The Normal Interpretant is the Genuine Interpretant, embracing all that
the sign could reveal concerning the Object to a sufficiently penetrating mind..."
That is too vague for guiding research on the many issues that Peirce discussed in the
many MSS where he mentioned the word interpretant. And it can only be used by
"sufficiently penetrating minds". I assume that he regarded his own mind as
sufficiently penetrating. But even he couldn't say anything more definitive.
John
_______________
Excerpts from Peirce’s Theory of Signs by T. L. Short, Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Chapter 7, Objects and Interpretants, p. 178
In the 1900s, Peirce introduced several divisions of object and interpretant. That was in
an article, notebooks, letters, drafts of letters, and uncompleted manuscripts. He was
groping his way and never came to a definite, clearly articulated conclusion. Much of
this effort was directed toward providing principles for a sign taxonomy, developed in
those same years.
We can see in that taxonomy (chapters 8 and 9) that he needed two quite different
trichotomies of interpretant. One, following from the teleological structure of
semeiosis, pertains to each sign: the immediate interpretant is a potentiality in which
consists the sign’s interpretability; the dynamic interpretant is any interpretant
actually formed (from zero to many); and the final interpretant is another potentiality,
the ideal interpretant of that sign for the interpretative purpose. The other trichotomy
is an application of Peirce’s phaneroscopy and distinguishes among signs: an emotional
interpretant is a feeling or 1st; an energetic interpretant is an action or 2nd; and a
logical interpretant is a 3rd, being a thought or other general sign or a habit formed or
modified. An immediate interpretant may be either emotional, energetic, or logical, and
so also dynamic and final interpretants may be of any category, actually or potentially.
A sign’s final interpretant, for example, is that potential feeling or potential action or
potential thought, habit-change, and so on, that would best satisfy the purpose of
interpreting that sign.
The distinction between interpretants that are ultimate and those that are themselves
signs, mentioned earlier (chapter 2, section 10, chapter 6, sections 6–9), is made within
the class of logical interpretants and is [p 179] different from the two trichotomous
divisions of interpretant, despite Peirce’s own occasional interchange of the similar
terms ‘final’ and ‘ultimate’. Thus, an interpretant may be final without being ultimate,
and conversely.
Because of Peirce’s many changes of conception (especially of the final interpretant) and
terminology, there has been much uncertainty about his divisions of interpretant and, in
particular, a tendency among Peirce’s commentators to conflate distinct divisions
(especially identifying the ultimate, the final, and the logical interpretants). To find
our way out of these dark woods, we need to attend, first, to the different ways the
respective divisions are defined. They do not compete; they are made on entirely
different grounds. Second, we need to attend to the uses Peirce made of those divisions.
Both trichotomies are required in his sign taxonomy, while ultimate interpretants are
required to complete the account of significance (as in the preceding chapter)....
[p 180] 1. Much Groping, No Conclusion
Before attempting a systematic exposition, let us review Peirce’s struggle with the
divisions of the interpretant. There is only one place, that I have found, where he named
the emotional, energetic, and logical interpretants. That was in the 1907 MS318
(primarily at 5.474–5), wherein he wished to focus on just the one type of interpretant
named ‘logical’. For that purpose, it was convenient to label the three alternatives.
Nevertheless, the trichotomy is clearly invoked, without benefit of labels, in other
places and, especially, where the immediate/dynamic/final trichotomy is also invoked....
[p 181] None of the divisions is formally labeled here, but later in the same letter
Peirce referred to immediate and dynamic objects and to immediate, dynamic, and
‘signified’ interpretants (8.335–9), leaving poor Lady Welby to guess which label goes
with which definition. Notice that the language used to describe the two objects, ‘[as]
represented’ and ‘in itself’, is duplicated in describing two of the three interpretants,
but with much less clarity of meaning. Is it really the interpretant that is represented
or to be understood? And what determines how it is meant to be understood? Finally, what
does ‘in itself’ mean when applied to interpretants? But 1904 is only the beginning of
Peirce’s work on these distinctions.
The same kind of evidence for Peirce’s having intended two distinct trichotomies of
interpretant may be found in his ‘Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism’, in the 1906
Monist. Here, he first stated the emotional/energetic/logical trichotomy without labeling
it as such and then, in the same paragraph, presented (for the first and only time in a
published article) the other trichotomy, formally labeled....
[p 182] Whether the conception of the final interpretant was improved is another question;
Peirce’s self-confessed ‘mist’ seems real. There is much evidence, in unpublished
manuscripts between 1904 and 1908, of a prolonged struggle with this idea. In the October
8, 1905, entry in Peirce’s ‘Logic Notebook’ (MS339), the final interpretant is first named
‘significant’, but later in the same day, and in what appears to be one continuous act of
writing, it is named ‘representative’ and is defined as representing the sign in respect
to being a ‘Rheme [term], Proposition, [or] Argument’. The next day, ‘ the Representative
Interpretant is that which correctly represents the sign to be a Sign of its Object’. The
entry for October 12 is to like effect. In the ‘Logic Notebook’ we witness Peirce
thinking aloud, as it were. He himself, in his entry of March 23, 1867, wrote, ‘Here I
write but never after read what I have written for what I write is done in the process of
forming a conception’.
The entry for April 2, 1906, is more helpful. Now the final interpretant is named
‘normal’:
The Normal Interpretant is the Genuine Interpretant, embracing all that the sign could
reveal concerning the Object to a sufficiently penetrating mind, being more than any
possible mind, however penetrating, could conclude from it, since there is no end to the
distinct conclusions that could be drawn concerning the Object from any Sign. The Dynamic
Interpretant is just what is drawn from the Sign by a given Individual Interpreter. The
Immediate Interpretant is the interpretant represented, explicitly or implicitly, in the
sign itself....
8 Feb
8 Feb
8:55 p.m.
New subject: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, as analyzed and discussed by T. L. Short
John, list
I disagree with your view that Peirce never had a coherent theory of the interpretants’. I
find his outlines clear and coherent and are all through his writings- in that it is
logical and obvious that the triad includes not merely a single interpretant but several -
and these several are basic and functional. That is- the notion of not merely one but
three Interpretants is, I feel, basic to the Peircena semiosis.
[Note- I never refer to my own papers - but can refer readers to Robert Marty’s papers on
the functioning of the interpretant - including the triad of Interpretants which leads to
28 classes , . See also a nice paper by Philip Rose on ‘Inference as Growth’ which sees
the O-R-I triad as” ‘illative’, a relation of inferential growth”,..ie, an irreducible
triad of IF-THEN.
It is this growth in meaning that is effected by the fact of three interpreters [ see
5.475] where the first effect of the information/data of the Object as mediated by the
Representamen, the internal Emotional Interpretant …can/might be followed by a more
external actualization “an exertion upon the Inner World” …and then..on to the ‘logical
inerpretant…possibly but not necessary, the mental
Just to read in Peirce:
“5.397 And what, then, is belief? …We have seen that it has three properties: First, it is
something that we are aware of; second, it appeases the irritation of doubt; and third, it
involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action, or, say for short, a habit”.
To me - this outlines the Interpretants. See also 8.315.
And his descriptions of attaining Clearness of our ideas - includes this concept of the
development of clarity through the Interpretants.
I admit that his many terms for this process can be confusing, but my point is, the
concept of three Interpretants - the Immediate internal individual first reaction; the
next external individual reaction of an action and the possible next one of the
development of a habit….are basic to the Peirdean semiosis - and, I feel, articulated
throughout his work. .
Edwina
On Feb 8, 2024, at 12:32 PM, John F Sowa
<sowa(a)bestweb.net> wrote:
I have examined more writings about interpretants by Peirce scholars, and the version by
Short (excerpts below) is typical. It's also consistent with the Stanford article by
Atkin.
As Short writes, Peirce was "groping" for a definitive statement about
interpretants, but he never developed a complete theory with precise definitions that
remained consistent from one MS to another..
In a note to Gary R, I apologized for saying "RIP". I now retract that
apology. Peirce never had a coherent theory of interpretants He did make a three-way
distinction, but he never stated reliable definitions that anybody else can use with
confidence.
The last paragraph quoted below is as good as any and better than most. Note
Peirce's own words: "The Normal Interpretant is the Genuine Interpretant,
embracing all that the sign could reveal concerning the Object to a sufficiently
penetrating mind..."
That is too vague for guiding research on the many issues that Peirce discussed in the
many MSS where he mentioned the word interpretant. And it can only be used by
"sufficiently penetrating minds". I assume that he regarded his own mind as
sufficiently penetrating. But even he couldn't say anything more definitive.
John
_______________
Excerpts from Peirce’s Theory of Signs by T. L. Short, Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Chapter 7, Objects and Interpretants, p. 178
In the 1900s, Peirce introduced several divisions of object and interpretant. That was
in an article, notebooks, letters, drafts of letters, and uncompleted manuscripts. He was
groping his way and never came to a definite, clearly articulated conclusion. Much of
this effort was directed toward providing principles for a sign taxonomy, developed in
those same years.
We can see in that taxonomy (chapters 8 and 9) that he needed two quite different
trichotomies of interpretant. One, following from the teleological structure of
semeiosis, pertains to each sign: the immediate interpretant is a potentiality in which
consists the sign’s interpretability; the dynamic interpretant is any interpretant
actually formed (from zero to many); and the final interpretant is another potentiality,
the ideal interpretant of that sign for the interpretative purpose. The other trichotomy
is an application of Peirce’s phaneroscopy and distinguishes among signs: an emotional
interpretant is a feeling or 1st; an energetic interpretant is an action or 2nd; and a
logical interpretant is a 3rd, being a thought or other general sign or a habit formed or
modified. An immediate interpretant may be either emotional, energetic, or logical, and
so also dynamic and final interpretants may be of any category, actually or potentially.
A sign’s final interpretant, for example, is that potential feeling or potential action or
potential thought, habit-change, and so on, that would best satisfy the purpose of
interpreting that sign.
The distinction between interpretants that are ultimate and those that are themselves
signs, mentioned earlier (chapter 2, section 10, chapter 6, sections 6–9), is made within
the class of logical interpretants and is [p 179] different from the two trichotomous
divisions of interpretant, despite Peirce’s own occasional interchange of the similar
terms ‘final’ and ‘ultimate’. Thus, an interpretant may be final without being ultimate,
and conversely.
Because of Peirce’s many changes of conception (especially of the final interpretant) and
terminology, there has been much uncertainty about his divisions of interpretant and, in
particular, a tendency among Peirce’s commentators to conflate distinct divisions
(especially identifying the ultimate, the final, and the logical interpretants). To find
our way out of these dark woods, we need to attend, first, to the different ways the
respective divisions are defined. They do not compete; they are made on entirely
different grounds. Second, we need to attend to the uses Peirce made of those divisions.
Both trichotomies are required in his sign taxonomy, while ultimate interpretants are
required to complete the account of significance (as in the preceding chapter)....
[p 180] 1. Much Groping, No Conclusion
Before attempting a systematic exposition, let us review Peirce’s struggle with the
divisions of the interpretant. There is only one place, that I have found, where he named
the emotional, energetic, and logical interpretants. That was in the 1907 MS318
(primarily at 5.474–5), wherein he wished to focus on just the one type of interpretant
named ‘logical’. For that purpose, it was convenient to label the three alternatives.
Nevertheless, the trichotomy is clearly invoked, without benefit of labels, in other
places and, especially, where the immediate/dynamic/final trichotomy is also invoked....
[p 181] None of the divisions is formally labeled here, but later in the same letter
Peirce referred to immediate and dynamic objects and to immediate, dynamic, and
‘signified’ interpretants (8.335–9), leaving poor Lady Welby to guess which label goes
with which definition. Notice that the language used to describe the two objects, ‘[as]
represented’ and ‘in itself’, is duplicated in describing two of the three interpretants,
but with much less clarity of meaning. Is it really the interpretant that is represented
or to be understood? And what determines how it is meant to be understood? Finally, what
does ‘in itself’ mean when applied to interpretants? But 1904 is only the beginning of
Peirce’s work on these distinctions.
The same kind of evidence for Peirce’s having intended two distinct trichotomies of
interpretant may be found in his ‘Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism’, in the 1906
Monist. Here, he first stated the emotional/energetic/logical trichotomy without labeling
it as such and then, in the same paragraph, presented (for the first and only time in a
published article) the other trichotomy, formally labeled....
[p 182] Whether the conception of the final interpretant was improved is another
question; Peirce’s self-confessed ‘mist’ seems real. There is much evidence, in
unpublished manuscripts between 1904 and 1908, of a prolonged struggle with this idea. In
the October 8, 1905, entry in Peirce’s ‘Logic Notebook’ (MS339), the final interpretant is
first named ‘significant’, but later in the same day, and in what appears to be one
continuous act of writing, it is named ‘representative’ and is defined as representing the
sign in respect to being a ‘Rheme [term], Proposition, [or] Argument’. The next day, ‘
the Representative Interpretant is that which correctly represents the sign to be a Sign
of its Object’. The entry for October 12 is to like effect. In the ‘Logic Notebook’ we
witness Peirce thinking aloud, as it were. He himself, in his entry of March 23, 1867,
wrote, ‘Here I write but never after read what I have written for what I write is done in
the process of forming a conception’.
The entry for April 2, 1906, is more helpful. Now the final interpretant is named
‘normal’:
The Normal Interpretant is the Genuine Interpretant, embracing all that the sign could
reveal concerning the Object to a sufficiently penetrating mind, being more than any
possible mind, however penetrating, could conclude from it, since there is no end to the
distinct conclusions that could be drawn concerning the Object from any Sign. The Dynamic
Interpretant is just what is drawn from the Sign by a given Individual Interpreter. The
Immediate Interpretant is the interpretant represented, explicitly or implicitly, in the
sign itself....
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at
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9 Feb
9 Feb
12:21 a.m.
Edwina,
I was just copying what Short said. If you don't have it, I'll send you the PDF
of his entire book.
All Peirce scholars agree that Peirce had settled on three kinds of interpretants. I
don't deny that. But there is no information about how anybody can determine how the
utterer can express the content of the phaneron as a linguistic sign, and how the listener
can interpret the uttered sign. The critical issue for both of them is the context which
may be much more difficult to determine than the words in the utterance.
In a previous note, I recommended the 70 page article by Keith Devlin, "Confronting
context effects in intelligence analysis". You don't have to read the whole
thing because the early examples show why context is so overwhelmingly important in
determining the interpretant. Just look below for an example from page 9 of
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228579637_Confronting_context_effe…
Just one example like that undermines everything Peirce wrote about determining the
interpretant. And examples like that can be repeated endlessly. Devlin's article is
one source, but any detailed analysis of language in context will turn up endless numbers
of examples.
John
______________________________________________
From: "Edwina Taborsky" <edwina.taborsky(a)gmail.com>
John, list
I disagree with your view that Peirce never had a coherent theory of the interpretants’. I
find his outlines clear and coherent and are all through his writings- in that it is
logical and obvious that the triad includes not merely a single interpretant but several -
and these several are basic and functional. That is- the notion of not merely one but
three Interpretants is, I feel, basic to the Peircena semiosis....
_________________________________________________________
Example from page 9 of "Confronting context effects in intelligence analysis" by
Keith Devlin. The actual sentences that were spoken are in BOLD. And the context is in
italics. Without the context, it's impossible to determine the interpretant of the
sentence.
HUSBAND: Dana succeeded in putting a penny in a parking meter today without
being picked up.
This afternoon as I was bringing Dana, our four-year-old son, home from the
nursery school, he succeeded in reaching high enough to put a penny in a parking
meter when we parked in a meter zone, whereas before he has always had to be
picked up to reach that high.
WIFE: Did you take him to the record store?
Since he put a penny in a meter that means that you stopped while he was with
you. I know that you stopped at the record store either on the way to get him or
on the way back. Was it on the way back, so that he was with you or did you stop
there on the way to get him and somewhere else on the way back.
HUSBAND: No, to the shoe repair shop.
No, I stopped at the record store on the way to get him and stopped at the shoe
repair shop on the way home when he was with me.
WIFE: What for?
I know of one reason why you might have stopped at the shoe repair shop. Why did
you in fact?
HUSBAND: I got some new shoe laces for my shoes.
As you will remember I broke a shoe lace on one of my brown Oxfords the other
day so I stopped to get some new laces.
WIFE: Your loafers need new heels badly.
Something else you could have gotten that I was thinking of. You could have taken
in your black loafers which need heels badly. You’d better get them taken care of
pretty soon.
A number of things are obvious about this particular exercise. First, the original
conversation is remarkably everyday and mundane, and concerns an extremely
restricted domain of family activity. Second, the degree of detail given in the
subsequent
‘explanations’ or ‘elaborations’ of what each person said seems quite arbitrary.
It is easy to imagine repeating the exercise over again, this time providing still
further
explanation. And then it could be repeated a third time. Then a fourth. And so on,
and so on, and so on. Apart from boredom or frustration, there does not seem to be
any obvious stopping point.
12:57 a.m.
New subject: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, as analyzed and discussed by T. L. Short
John
I don't see what linguistic understanding of words has to do with the interpretants.
The utterer’s Object [his words] can only carry his reality [phaneron] within the words he
knows. - and as Peirce said - [can’t recall the reference] if the Object is unknown, then,
the words used to describe it are open to interpretation; and if the utterer doesn’t have
the words to describe the phaneron…this is a problem. AND the context for the meaning of
the words is held within the knowledge base [ the Represenamen]. This is also a problem -
what if the utterer has no context for this phaneron???In a constructive intreating -
presumably, the listener shares some of this contextual knowledge base and so, can to a
certain extent, understand the Utterer. If he doesn’t share this knowledge base - then-
the resultant interpretation is quite different from the utterer’s intended meaning.
We all know how such an interaction is open to misunderstanding. And to my knowledge, no
scholar has ever been able to reduce the capacity for misunderstanding these verbal
interactions. That’s because of so many issues: the different knowledge bases held within
the representamens; the multiple meanings of words and the reliance on linguistic context,
word order, intonation …
I don’t see what these issues have to do with the three interpretants.
My view of the interpretants refers to a situation where data/information is moved from
the Object via the Representamen’s knowledge base ---and the Interpretant's function
is to clarify the nature of the input data…from its first internal reaction…moving on to a
reaction to that input…and maybe, sometime…if these interactions are operative within a
community - to the development of a habit-of-dealing with this input. So, an animal will
develop a thick coat of fur to deal with long term cooling temperatures and this behaviour
will be common to all members of the local species.
As for linguistics - I’m not a follower of that discipline- and so, can only refer to
Bakhtin’s ‘dialogic’ emphasis on context enabling linguistic changes.
Edwina
On Feb 8, 2024, at 6:21 PM, John F Sowa
<sowa(a)bestweb.net> wrote:
Edwina,
I was just copying what Short said. If you don't have it, I'll send you the PDF
of his entire book.
All Peirce scholars agree that Peirce had settled on three kinds of interpretants. I
don't deny that. But there is no information about how anybody can determine how the
utterer can express the content of the phaneron as a linguistic sign, and how the listener
can interpret the uttered sign. The critical issue for both of them is the context which
may be much more difficult to determine than the words in the utterance.
In a previous note, I recommended the 70 page article by Keith Devlin, "Confronting
context effects in intelligence analysis". You don't have to read the whole
thing because the early examples show why context is so overwhelmingly important in
determining the interpretant. Just look below for an example from page 9 of
<https://duckduckgo.com/?q=%22Confronting+context+effects+in+intelligence+analysis%22+by+Keith+Devlin.&t=opera&ia=web>
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228579637_Confronting_context_effe…
Just one example like that undermines everything Peirce wrote about determining the
interpretant. And examples like that can be repeated endlessly. Devlin's article is
one source, but any detailed analysis of language in context will turn up endless numbers
of examples.
John
______________________________________________
From: "Edwina Taborsky" " style="box-sizing: border-box; color:
rgb(0, 102, 147); text-decoration: underline; user-select:
auto;"><edwina.taborsky(a)gmail.com> <mailto:<edwina.taborsky@gmail.com
target=>
John, list
I disagree with your view that Peirce never had a coherent theory of the interpretants’.
I find his outlines clear and coherent and are all through his writings- in that it is
logical and obvious that the triad includes not merely a single interpretant but several -
and these several are basic and functional. That is- the notion of not merely one but
three Interpretants is, I feel, basic to the Peircena semiosis....
_________________________________________________________
Example from page 9 of "Confronting context effects in intelligence analysis"
by Keith Devlin. The actual sentences that were spoken are in BOLD. And the context is
in italics. Without the context, it's impossible to determine the interpretant of
the sentence.
HUSBAND: Dana succeeded in putting a penny in a parking meter today without
being picked up.
This afternoon as I was bringing Dana, our four-year-old son, home from the
nursery school, he succeeded in reaching high enough to put a penny in a parking
meter when we parked in a meter zone, whereas before he has always had to be
picked up to reach that high.
WIFE: Did you take him to the record store?
Since he put a penny in a meter that means that you stopped while he was with
you. I know that you stopped at the record store either on the way to get him or
on the way back. Was it on the way back, so that he was with you or did you stop
there on the way to get him and somewhere else on the way back.
HUSBAND: No, to the shoe repair shop.
No, I stopped at the record store on the way to get him and stopped at the shoe
repair shop on the way home when he was with me.
WIFE: What for?
I know of one reason why you might have stopped at the shoe repair shop. Why did
you in fact?
HUSBAND: I got some new shoe laces for my shoes.
As you will remember I broke a shoe lace on one of my brown Oxfords the other
day so I stopped to get some new laces.
WIFE: Your loafers need new heels badly.
Something else you could have gotten that I was thinking of. You could have taken
in your black loafers which need heels badly. You’d better get them taken care of
pretty soon.
A number of things are obvious about this particular exercise. First, the original
conversation is remarkably everyday and mundane, and concerns an extremely
restricted domain of family activity. Second, the degree of detail given in the
subsequent
‘explanations’ or ‘elaborations’ of what each person said seems quite arbitrary.
It is easy to imagine repeating the exercise over again, this time providing still
further
explanation. And then it could be repeated a third time. Then a fourth. And so on,
and so on, and so on. Apart from boredom or frustration, there does not seem to be
any obvious stopping point.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at
https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at
https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY
ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L(a)list.iupui.edu .
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► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by
him and Ben Udell.
7:46 p.m.
Edwina, List,
As a logician and mathematician, Peirce understood the methods of precise reasoning in
lengthy deductions. But as a linguist and engineer, he also understood the issues of
continuity or synechism.
In ordinary language, every word has a broad range of meanings. The senses listed in a
dictionary are a small finite set of the the continuum. Peirce understood that very well
in his work for the Century dictionary and Baldwin's dictionary.
I have quoted and cited professional lexicographers, who admit "I don't believe
in word senses." Lady Welby said something very similar, and Peirce agreed.
You don't need to know or apply any linguistic theory to realize that the issues are
so complex that trying to build a theory on top of Peirce's three words is extremely
difficult. As Short said, Peirce was "groping".
I'm not saying that Peirce's writings on the subject are wrong. But I am claiming
that if Peirce himself couldn't develop a solid coherent theory, I don't trust
anybody else's attempts.
Question: Can anybody find a practical version of interpretant theory that is written for
anybody other than Peirce scholars? In short, can it be used for any practical purpose?
What kind of applications would be possible?
I mean USEFUL applications that do something practical that could not be done as well or
better without a theory of interpretants. I have written a lot about applications of
Peirce's theories in computer science, computational linguistics, and artificial
intelligence. But I have never found a use for interpretants. Many other authors have
found important applications of Peirce's ideas and theories and cited them in their
publications. But I have never seen anybody who mentioned interpretants. Can anybody
find any published examples? By anybody for any practical purpose?
That reminds me of the parody: "This theory is so perfectly general that no
practical application is possible".
John
----------------------------------------
,From: "Edwina Taborsky" <edwina.taborsky(a)gmail.com>
John
I don't see what linguistic understanding of words has to do with the interpretants.
The utterer’s Object [his words] can only carry his reality [phaneron] within the words he
knows. - and as Peirce said - [can’t recall the reference] if the Object is unknown, then,
the words used to describe it are open to interpretation; and if the utterer doesn’t have
the words to describe the phaneron…this is a problem. AND the context for the meaning of
the words is held within the knowledge base [ the Represenamen]. This is also a problem -
what if the utterer has no context for this phaneron???In a constructive intreating -
presumably, the listener shares some of this contextual knowledge base and so, can to a
certain extent, understand the Utterer. If he doesn’t share this knowledge base - then-
the resultant interpretation is quite different from the utterer’s intended meaning.
We all know how such an interaction is open to misunderstanding. And to my knowledge, no
scholar has ever been able to reduce the capacity for misunderstanding these verbal
interactions. That’s because of so many issues: the different knowledge bases held within
the representamens; the multiple meanings of words and the reliance on linguistic context,
word order, intonation …
I don’t see what these issues have to do with the three interpretants.
My view of the interpretants refers to a situation where data/information is moved from
the Object via the Representamen’s knowledge base ---and the Interpretant's function
is to clarify the nature of the input data…from its first internal reaction…moving on to a
reaction to that input…and maybe, sometime…if these interactions are operative within a
community - to the development of a habit-of-dealing with this input. So, an animal will
develop a thick coat of fur to deal with long term cooling temperatures and this behaviour
will be common to all members of the local species.
As for linguistics - I’m not a follower of that discipline- and so, can only refer to
Bakhtin’s ‘dialogic’ emphasis on context enabling linguistic changes.
Edwina
9:14 p.m.
New subject: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, as analyzed and discussed by T. L. Short
John, list
I continue to either misunderstand or object - I don’t know which term I should use - to
your rejection of the role of the Interpretants. I simply don’t see how the semiosic
process can function - and it IS a function - without the necessary role of the
Interpretants. How can you have a semiosic triadic function without the third relation -
the relation that provides meaning to the original stimulus? That third relation, the
meaning[s] is provided by the Interpretant Relations. And I emphasize the plural ecrus
the simple one-node site [ the single interpretant or signified] such as is found in
Saussure or ….is simply not enough to explain the complexity of the development of
information.
If you consider the semiosic process - we can see that there are a number of different
‘cuts’, that divides the experience into different zones of semiotic processes.
The first cut’ so to speak, is simple: ontological - the separation of external and
internal [ See Atmanspacher, H. 1999. ‘Cartesian Cut, Heisenberg Cut and the Concept of
Complexity’, In: The Quest for a unified Theory of Information. Eds. W. Hofkirchner. ;
125-147.
Matsumo, K [Resurrection of the Cartesian Physics. Same edition; p 31-44. ]
This simply separates the sign-vehicle which stores the habits of the representamen from
the external world - as Peirce has written, such that the Immediate Object and the
Immediate Intnerpretant are internal to this ‘cut’….and the Dynamic Object and Dynamic
Interpretant and Final Interpretant are external.
Obviously - an internal experience of an incoming data - is not as complex as one that is
externalized.
But - as you can see in Robert Marty’s outline of the 28 classes of signs [which are
hexadic forms, ie, including the two Object Relations and Three Interpretant Relations]
that the Internal or Immediate Interpretant can be in any of the three categories - as
related to the other Relations in the semiotic triad.
The next Interpretant is external to the sign-vehicle - the Dynamic - and inserts a
‘visible’ or objectively knowable and measurable reaction - and moves it into common
observance. This is the basis of most of our interactions with the world. BUT -
medically, psychologically, and informationally- this external meaning is intimately
connected to the data produced within the internal Immediate Interpretant. After all- the
Dynamic relies for its ‘base’ on that Immediate input.
And the final - as I’ve said before …brings in communal values and habit generation.
That is- there are obviously THREE sites/nodes where information is processed, from the
internal and possibly isolate form, to the externally reactive and available-to-others …to
the development of habits of dealing with this original input data. Information
development requires this complexity.
My point is that all three developments from the original object-input are vital aspects
of the path of informational development, where data moves into information within both
the individual and the community.
Again - I am either misunderstanding your point or being dumb..… but I consider the three
- ie- all three - Interpretants to be vital in the generation of all matter and life. How
else is a community to interact with each other, without the observation of the constantly
produced Dynamic Interpretants? How else are habits to develop within this community
except by the absorption of these Dynamic Interpretants within the Final Interpretant?
Edwina
On Feb 9, 2024, at 1:46 PM, John F Sowa
<sowa(a)bestweb.net> wrote:
Edwina, List,
As a logician and mathematician, Peirce understood the methods of precise reasoning in
lengthy deductions. But as a linguist and engineer, he also understood the issues of
continuity or synechism.
In ordinary language, every word has a broad range of meanings. The senses listed in a
dictionary are a small finite set of the the continuum. Peirce understood that very well
in his work for the Century dictionary and Baldwin's dictionary.
I have quoted and cited professional lexicographers, who admit "I don't believe
in word senses." Lady Welby said something very similar, and Peirce agreed.
You don't need to know or apply any linguistic theory to realize that the issues are
so complex that trying to build a theory on top of Peirce's three words is extremely
difficult. As Short said, Peirce was "groping".
I'm not saying that Peirce's writings on the subject are wrong. But I am
claiming that if Peirce himself couldn't develop a solid coherent theory, I don't
trust anybody else's attempts.
Question: Can anybody find a practical version of interpretant theory that is written
for anybody other than Peirce scholars? In short, can it be used for any practical
purpose? What kind of applications would be possible?
I mean USEFUL applications that do something practical that could not be done as well or
better without a theory of interpretants. I have written a lot about applications of
Peirce's theories in computer science, computational linguistics, and artificial
intelligence. But I have never found a use for interpretants. Many other authors have
found important applications of Peirce's ideas and theories and cited them in their
publications. But I have never seen anybody who mentioned interpretants. Can anybody
find any published examples? By anybody for any practical purpose?
That reminds me of the parody: "This theory is so perfectly general that no
practical application is possible".
John
,From: "Edwina Taborsky" <edwina.taborsky(a)gmail.com>
John
I don't see what linguistic understanding of words has to do with the interpretants.
The utterer’s Object [his words] can only carry his reality [phaneron] within the words
he knows. - and as Peirce said - [can’t recall the reference] if the Object is unknown,
then, the words used to describe it are open to interpretation; and if the utterer doesn’t
have the words to describe the phaneron…this is a problem. AND the context for the meaning
of the words is held within the knowledge base [ the Represenamen]. This is also a problem
- what if the utterer has no context for this phaneron???In a constructive intreating -
presumably, the listener shares some of this contextual knowledge base and so, can to a
certain extent, understand the Utterer. If he doesn’t share this knowledge base - then-
the resultant interpretation is quite different from the utterer’s intended meaning.
We all know how such an interaction is open to misunderstanding. And to my knowledge, no
scholar has ever been able to reduce the capacity for misunderstanding these verbal
interactions. That’s because of so many issues: the different knowledge bases held within
the representamens; the multiple meanings of words and the reliance on linguistic context,
word order, intonation …
I don’t see what these issues have to do with the three interpretants.
My view of the interpretants refers to a situation where data/information is moved from
the Object via the Representamen’s knowledge base ---and the Interpretant's function
is to clarify the nature of the input data…from its first internal reaction…moving on to a
reaction to that input…and maybe, sometime…if these interactions are operative within a
community - to the development of a habit-of-dealing with this input. So, an animal will
develop a thick coat of fur to deal with long term cooling temperatures and this behaviour
will be common to all members of the local species.
As for linguistics - I’m not a follower of that discipline- and so, can only refer to
Bakhtin’s ‘dialogic’ emphasis on context enabling linguistic changes.
Edwina
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11:41 p.m.
New subject: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, as analyzed and discussed by T. L. Short
Edwina, List,
I am not denying the fact that interpretants, as defined by Peirce, exist, and I am not
denying that Peirce's 3-way distinction is good.
But you said that you had not studied the kinds of details that the linguists observe and
specify.
My claim is that any theory that does not dig deeply into those details is useless. And
by "those", I mean every kind of detail that is studied and analyzed by EVERY
ONE of the cognitive sciences: philosophy, psychology, linguistics, artificial
intelligence, neuroscience, and anthropology.
Any serious theory of interpretants must include ALL POSSIBLE INFLUENCES from any and
every branch of cognitive science. The kind of generic theory that Peirce attempted is
too weak to make any specific predictions in any particular case.
I believe that Lady Welby had a good intuitive sense of the need for considering every
possible influence, but she did not have the formal training in math & logic that
Peirce had. If you examine the development of Peirce's ideas in the decade after he
began their correspondence (from 1903 to the end), you can see how Peirce was moving away
from more abstract universal definitions to a more concrete focus on details.
The first step was a move from a phenomenology based on Kant's abstractions to a
phaneroscopy that paid more attention to Welby's focus on concrete details. But that
shift made the task far more complex. It's essential to focus on the concrete details
of every method of observation.
That is why Peirce was groping. He could no longer make broad generalizations, and every
attempt to state a generalization forced him to consider how it would affect every detail
of every branch,
John
----------------------------------------
From: "Edwina Taborsky" <taborsky(a)primus.ca>
John, list
I continue to either misunderstand or object - I don’t know which term I should use - to
your rejection of the role of the Interpretants. I simply don’t see how the semiosic
process can function - and it IS a function - without the necessary role of the
Interpretants. How can you have a semiosic triadic function without the third relation -
the relation that provides meaning to the original stimulus? That third relation, the
meaning[s] is provided by the Interpretant Relations. And I emphasize the plural ecrus
the simple one-node site [ the single interpretant or signified] such as is found in
Saussure or ….is simply not enough to explain the complexity of the development of
information.
If you consider the semiosic process - we can see that there are a number of different
‘cuts’, that divides the experience into different zones of semiotic processes.
The first cut’ so to speak, is simple: ontological - the separation of external and
internal [ See Atmanspacher, H. 1999. ‘Cartesian Cut, Heisenberg Cut and the Concept of
Complexity’, In: The Quest for a unified Theory of Information. Eds. W. Hofkirchner. ;
125-147.
Matsumo, K [Resurrection of the Cartesian Physics. Same edition; p 31-44. ]
This simply separates the sign-vehicle which stores the habits of the representamen from
the external world - as Peirce has written, such that the Immediate Object and the
Immediate Intnerpretant are internal to this ‘cut’….and the Dynamic Object and Dynamic
Interpretant and Final Interpretant are external.
Obviously - an internal experience of an incoming data - is not as complex as one that is
externalized.
But - as you can see in Robert Marty’s outline of the 28 classes of signs [which are
hexadic forms, ie, including the two Object Relations and Three Interpretant Relations]
that the Internal or Immediate Interpretant can be in any of the three categories - as
related to the other Relations in the semiotic triad.
The next Interpretant is external to the sign-vehicle - the Dynamic - and inserts a
‘visible’ or objectively knowable and measurable reaction - and moves it into common
observance. This is the basis of most of our interactions with the world. BUT -
medically, psychologically, and informationally- this external meaning is intimately
connected to the data produced within the internal Immediate Interpretant. After all- the
Dynamic relies for its ‘base’ on that Immediate input.
And the final - as I’ve said before …brings in communal values and habit generation.
That is- there are obviously THREE sites/nodes where information is processed, from the
internal and possibly isolate form, to the externally reactive and available-to-others …to
the development of habits of dealing with this original input data. Information
development requires this complexity.
My point is that all three developments from the original object-input are vital aspects
of the path of informational development, where data moves into information within both
the individual and the community.
Again - I am either misunderstanding your point or being dumb..… but I consider the three
- ie- all three - Interpretants to be vital in the generation of all matter and life. How
else is a community to interact with each other, without the observation of the constantly
produced Dynamic Interpretants? How else are habits to develop within this community
except by the absorption of these Dynamic Interpretants within the Final Interpretant?
Edwina
282
days inactive
283
days old
6 comments
3 participants
participants (3)
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Edwina Taborsky -
Edwina Taborsky -
John F Sowa