Tom, Jerry, and Helmut, The fact that I put Semeiotic at the center means that I assume a Peircean foundation. I don't believe that it's possible to show the full implications of that Venn diagram and its interrelationships without a framework such as Peirce's or something very similar. Tom G> . I can go along with your categorizations, but only if "reality" refers to the reality of Secondness, or more specifically to the dynamic object. Otherwise - if for instance "reality" refers, or also refers, to the reality of Thirdness as in what the scientific community is fated to agree upon - it seems to me we'll have a lot of disambiguating to do with regard to these categories. By reality, I mean what Peirce defined: Everything that exists independently of whatever we may think of it. That includes the laws of nature that govern the universe. Without those laws, there would be chaos. We couldn't exist, and neither could our thoughts or language. Mathematics is also independent of whatever we may say about it. Mathematicians discover new kinds of structures. Since different mathematicians frequently converge on equivalent structures, it is reasonable to say that those structures are independent of what anybody might think or say about them Jerry LRC> What is the syntax of your suggestions? The three original labels are nouns: Reality, Thought, and Language. I chose nouns or noun phrases for the intersections. The NP "perception and action" includes all the aspects of reality that are perceived as thoughts or generated by thoughts that trigger changes to reality. The noun "semantics" refers to those aspects of reality that serve as the referents of words, phrases, and sentences. The noun "imagination" refers to those referents of language that happen to be referents of thoughts that have not yet been related to reality and might never be relatable to reality. But I have to admit that the semantics of language, as it is normally used, can and does refer to imaginary things. The NP 'semeiotic"" refers to everything that Peirce calls formal semeiotic. That includes everything might be represented by a sign, including all the formal terms discussed in his theory of signs. Helmut> isn´t language a subset of thought, meaning, nothing can be said that hasn´t been a thought first? It's true that the referents of the linguistic signs are a subset of thought signs. But I was responding to the problem that Beziau posed in https://sites.google.com/view/reality-thought-language/mixed-zones . Perhaps we should discuss the issues that Jerry raised in initial response to that diagram. The three labels on that diagram, lreality, thought, and language,refer to three very different kinds of things. That would imply that all the intersections would be empty. In my interpretation, I assumed that the word 'reality' refers to everything that Peirce might call real in any sense. The word 'language' includes all the things that language might refer to. And the word 'thought refers to anything that might be thought. John