1 Feb
2024
1 Feb
'24
12:37 a.m.
I rarely comment on discussions of interpretants, because nobody, not even Peirce, had a
complete, coherent, and decisive theory of interpretants. Perhaps some Peirce scholars
have developed theories that go beyond what Peirce wrote. That is possible, but nobody can
claim that their theories are what Peirce himself had intended.
On these issues, I recommend the article by Albert Atkin in the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, first version in 2006 and major update in 2022:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/
Atkin has a thorough list of references for anybody who intends to study this topic. See
below for some quotations from the end of the article that show how incomplete,
indefinite, and uncertain Peirce's own writings happen to be.
I don't want to discourage anybody from discussing interpretants. But since Peirce
himself was uncertain and indecisive, nobody can claim that their interpretation is what
Peirce had intended.
John
_______________
As is common with all of Peirce’s work in philosophy, various changes in terminology and
subtleties with accompanying neologisms occur from one piece of work to the next. His work
on interpretants is no different. At various points in his final accounts of signs, Peirce
describes the division of interpretants as being: immediate, dynamic and final; or as
emotional, energetic, and logical; or as naïve, rogate and normal; or as intentional,
effective and communicational; or even destinate, effective and explicit. As Liszka (1990,
20) notes, “the received view in Peirce scholarship suggests that the divisions of
interpretant into immediate, dynamic, and final are archetypal, all other divisions being
relatively synonymous with these categories.” There are, however, some dissenters from
this view.
In discussing the interpretant, Peirce describes one of the trichotomies above as
follows:
In all cases [the Interpretant] includes feelings; for there must, at least, be a sense of
comprehending the meaning of the sign. If it includes more than mere feeling, it must
evoke some kind of effort. It may include something besides, which, for the present, may
be vaguely called “thought”. I term these three kinds of interpretant the “emotional”, the
“energetic”, and the “logical” interpretants. (EP2. 409). . .
Peirce describes the dynamic interpretant as deriving its character from action (CP8 .315
1904), but later says, “action cannot be a logical interpretant” (CP5 .491 1906). This
seems to make the two inconsistent. (See Liszka (1990, 21) for more on the problems with
Fitzgerald’s claim). Moreover, this inconsistency seems to suggest a problem for Short’s
view since his account also suggests that the dynamic interpretant should include the
logical interpretant as a subdivision (Short 1981, 213). Short, however, claims textual
support for his own view from instances where Peirce mentions the
emotional/energetic/logical trichotomy alongside the apparently separate claim that signs
have three interpretants. (Short sites (CP8 .333 1904) and (CP4 .536 1906). Short takes
this as suggesting that the two should be treated as different and distinct trichotomies.
(Short 2004, 235).
How far the textual evidence on the matter will prove decisive is unclear, especially
given the fragmentary nature of Peirce’s final work on signs. However, one or two things
militate in favor of the “received view”. First, Peirce is notorious for experimenting
with terminology, especially when trying to pin down his own ideas, or describe the same
phenomenon from different angles. Second, it is unclear why trichotomies like the
intentional/effectual/communicational should count as terminological experiments whilst
the emotional/energetic/logical counts as a distinct division. And finally, there is
little provision in Peirce’s projected sixty-six classes of signs for the kind of
additional classifications imposed by further subdivisions of the interpretant. (For more
on this discussion see, Liszka 1990 and 1996; Fitzgerald 1966; Lalor 1997; Short 1981,
1996, and 2004).
1 Feb
1 Feb
2:54 p.m.
New subject: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants
John, list
Regardless of the terminology, which I acknowledge obscures the analysis, I think that one
can conclude that Peirce’s view is that there are three Interpretants. One is Individual
Internal; the next is Individual External, and the last one is Collective External. And-
each of these three ’nodes’ can be in any one of the three modal categories.
That’s how I see it.
Edwina
On Jan 31, 2024, at 6:37 PM, John F Sowa
<sowa(a)bestweb.net> wrote:
I rarely comment on discussions of interpretants, because nobody, not even Peirce, had a
complete, coherent, and decisive theory of interpretants. Perhaps some Peirce scholars
have developed theories that go beyond what Peirce wrote. That is possible, but nobody can
claim that their theories are what Peirce himself had intended.
On these issues, I recommend the article by Albert Atkin in the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, first version in 2006 and major update in 2022:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/
Atkin has a thorough list of references for anybody who intends to study this topic. See
below for some quotations from the end of the article that show how incomplete,
indefinite, and uncertain Peirce's own writings happen to be.
I don't want to discourage anybody from discussing interpretants. But since Peirce
himself was uncertain and indecisive, nobody can claim that their interpretation is what
Peirce had intended.
John
_______________
As is common with all of Peirce’s work in philosophy, various changes in terminology and
subtleties with accompanying neologisms occur from one piece of work to the next. His work
on interpretants is no different. At various points in his final accounts of signs, Peirce
describes the division of interpretants as being: immediate, dynamic and final; or as
emotional, energetic, and logical; or as naïve, rogate and normal; or as intentional,
effective and communicational; or even destinate, effective and explicit. As Liszka (1990,
20) notes, “the received view in Peirce scholarship suggests that the divisions of
interpretant into immediate, dynamic, and final are archetypal, all other divisions being
relatively synonymous with these categories.” There are, however, some dissenters from
this view.
In discussing the interpretant, Peirce describes one of the trichotomies above as
follows:
In all cases [the Interpretant] includes feelings; for there must, at least, be a sense
of comprehending the meaning of the sign. If it includes more than mere feeling, it must
evoke some kind of effort. It may include something besides, which, for the present, may
be vaguely called “thought”. I term these three kinds of interpretant the “emotional”, the
“energetic”, and the “logical” interpretants. (EP2. 409)
. . .
Peirce describes the dynamic interpretant as deriving its character from action (CP8 .315
1904), but later says, “action cannot be a logical interpretant” (CP5 .491 1906). This
seems to make the two inconsistent. (See Liszka (1990, 21) for more on the problems with
Fitzgerald’s claim). Moreover, this inconsistency seems to suggest a problem for Short’s
view since his account also suggests that the dynamic interpretant should include the
logical interpretant as a subdivision (Short 1981, 213). Short, however, claims textual
support for his own view from instances where Peirce mentions the
emotional/energetic/logical trichotomy alongside the apparently separate claim that signs
have three interpretants. (Short sites (CP8 .333 1904) and (CP4 .536 1906). Short takes
this as suggesting that the two should be treated as different and distinct trichotomies.
(Short 2004, 235).
How far the textual evidence on the matter will prove decisive is unclear, especially
given the fragmentary nature of Peirce’s final work on signs. However, one or two things
militate in favor of the “received view”. First, Peirce is notorious for experimenting
with terminology, especially when trying to pin down his own ideas, or describe the same
phenomenon from different angles. Second, it is unclear why trichotomies like the
intentional/effectual/communicational should count as terminological experiments whilst
the emotional/energetic/logical counts as a distinct division. And finally, there is
little provision in Peirce’s projected sixty-six classes of signs for the kind of
additional classifications imposed by further subdivisions of the interpretant. (For more
on this discussion see, Liszka 1990 and 1996; Fitzgerald 1966; Lalor 1997; Short 1981,
1996, and 2004).
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at
https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at
https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY
ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L(a)list.iupui.edu .
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to list(a)list.iupui.edu with
UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by
him and Ben Udell.
2 Feb
2 Feb
10:30 p.m.
New subject: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants
Edwina, Jon AS, Jon A, Helmut, List,
Peirce made immense contributions to 21st century research in all the branches of
cognitive science. But he never found any informative or useful applications of his
writings on interpretants. He was struggling with the ideas up to the end.
Peirce scholars never built any extensions to his writings on interpretants because Peirce
himself was unable to produce a useful system. He couldn't convince anybody, not even
himself. See the end of this note for the citation and quotations from the Stanford
article. Conclusion: Neither Peirce nor anybody else ever developed the theory to make
useful predictions about anything.
In short, I wouldn't say that Peirce's writings on interpretants are wrong -- just
that they are so vague that nobody has been able to use them to do or say anything
useful.
Recommendation: Let his writings on interpretants rest in peace (RIP), and focus on the
great body of work that is at the forefront of the latest developments in cognitive
science.
John
----------------------------------------
From: "Edwina Taborsky" <edwina.taborsky(a)gmail.com>
John, list
Regardless of the terminology, which I acknowledge obscures the analysis, I think that one
can conclude that Peirce’s view is that there are three Interpretants. One is Individual
Internal; the next is Individual External, and the last one is Collective External. And-
each of these three ’nodes’ can be in any one of the three modal categories.
That’s how I see it.
Edwina
On Jan 31, 2024, at 6:37 PM, John F Sowa <sowa(a)bestweb.net> wrote:
I rarely comment on discussions of interpretants, because nobody, not even Peirce, had a
complete, coherent, and decisive theory of interpretants. Perhaps some Peirce scholars
have developed theories that go beyond what Peirce wrote. That is possible, but nobody can
claim that their theories are what Peirce himself had intended.
On these issues, I recommend the article by Albert Atkin in the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, first version in 2006 and major update in 2022:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/
Atkin has a thorough list of references for anybody who intends to study this topic. See
below for some quotations from the end of the article that show how incomplete,
indefinite, and uncertain Peirce's own writings happen to be.
I don't want to discourage anybody from discussing interpretants. But since Peirce
himself was uncertain and indecisive, nobody can claim that their interpretation is what
Peirce had intended.
John
_______________
As is common with all of Peirce’s work in philosophy, various changes in terminology and
subtleties with accompanying neologisms occur from one piece of work to the next. His work
on interpretants is no different. At various points in his final accounts of signs, Peirce
describes the division of interpretants as being: immediate, dynamic and final; or as
emotional, energetic, and logical; or as naïve, rogate and normal; or as intentional,
effective and communicational; or even destinate, effective and explicit. As Liszka (1990,
20) notes, “the received view in Peirce scholarship suggests that the divisions of
interpretant into immediate, dynamic, and final are archetypal, all other divisions being
relatively synonymous with these categories.” There are, however, some dissenters from
this view.
In discussing the interpretant, Peirce describes one of the trichotomies above as
follows:
In all cases [the Interpretant] includes feelings; for there must, at least, be a sense of
comprehending the meaning of the sign. If it includes more than mere feeling, it must
evoke some kind of effort. It may include something besides, which, for the present, may
be vaguely called “thought”. I term these three kinds of interpretant the “emotional”, the
“energetic”, and the “logical” interpretants. (EP2. 409). . .
Peirce describes the dynamic interpretant as deriving its character from action (CP8 .315
1904), but later says, “action cannot be a logical interpretant” (CP5 .491 1906). This
seems to make the two inconsistent. (See Liszka (1990, 21) for more on the problems with
Fitzgerald’s claim). Moreover, this inconsistency seems to suggest a problem for Short’s
view since his account also suggests that the dynamic interpretant should include the
logical interpretant as a subdivision (Short 1981, 213). Short, however, claims textual
support for his own view from instances where Peirce mentions the
emotional/energetic/logical trichotomy alongside the apparently separate claim that signs
have three interpretants. (Short sites (CP8 .333 1904) and (CP4 .536 1906). Short takes
this as suggesting that the two should be treated as different and distinct trichotomies.
(Short 2004, 235).
How far the textual evidence on the matter will prove decisive is unclear, especially
given the fragmentary nature of Peirce’s final work on signs. However, one or two things
militate in favor of the “received view”. First, Peirce is notorious for experimenting
with terminology, especially when trying to pin down his own ideas, or describe the same
phenomenon from different angles. Second, it is unclear why trichotomies like the
intentional/effectual/communicational should count as terminological experiments whilst
the emotional/energetic/logical counts as a distinct division. And finally, there is
little provision in Peirce’s projected sixty-six classes of signs for the kind of
additional classifications imposed by further subdivisions of the interpretant. (For more
on this discussion see, Liszka 1990 and 1996; Fitzgerald 1966; Lalor 1997; Short 1981,
1996, and 2004).
11 p.m.
New subject: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants
John, list
I wouldn’t say that the Interpretants are a muddled uselessness.I think they play a vital
role. I think, however, that attempting to find exact and singular meanings of terms is
not very functional.
I use Peirce primarily for analysis of both biological and societal systems -
I find him extremely perceptive, above all, with his analysis of the Categories- The
reality of ‘modes of Being’ is extremely difficult to find in other scientific or
philosophical outlines - ie - Most analyses of ‘matter’ view it as almost inert ‘stuff’
and focuses more on mechanical interactions or puzzles over quantum ‘weirdness’. But - to
outline concepts of ‘feeling’ [ and even protoplasm feels]; the concept of reaction - and
- the concept of habit formation - all three categories found as universal - I personally
find this very functional in explaining both biological systems and societal systems. .
Then - I find his focus on the multiple nodal sites of the semiotic process to be useful;
and I view semiotic processes as operative in all of matter, both physical and biological
and in societal systems. That is, I full yagree with Peirce’s view that the whole universe
is composed of signs [plural]; and indeed, is a vast semiosic process.
So- I find the hexadic semiosic process very useful: that is, the interactional
information functionality of an external relation of the sign vehicle to its environment
[ which relation becomes the Dynamic Object]. And then, the internal nature of the dats
from this DO - which is commonly quite different from the ‘full nature’ of the DO - ie,
the Immediate Object. Then, the Representamen as mediation. Accepting the input data and
analyzing it.
And then- the three Interpretants - with the Internal Interpretant as the individual’s
local subjective reaction; the external - or Dynamic Interpretent as the Individual’s more
objective reaction…and finally - the acknowledgment by Peirce that there could be a
commonly developed interpretation of these stimuli. That is - the role of the individual
within the community.
And of course, all of these ’nodes’ can also function within the three categories, which
increases the complexity of the semiosic function.
- I DO see a very vital role for the Interpretants. ..in enabling deviation from the data
of the Dynamic Object - and enabling adaptation of the sign vehicle and the development of
new Habits [held within the representamen of the sign-vehicle. ]. That is - the fact
that there are three interepetants, moving from the immediate local perception of the
input data , to an external objective result [ does the effect of the input data as
expressed...have any functional result? ..and then..on to the larger collective result -
does this function to CHANGE THE HABITS OF THE REPRESENTAMEN?
Edwina
On Feb 2, 2024, at 4:30 PM, John F Sowa
<sowa(a)bestweb.net> wrote:
Edwina, Jon AS, Jon A, Helmut, List,
Peirce made immense contributions to 21st century research in all the branches of
cognitive science. But he never found any informative or useful applications of his
writings on interpretants. He was struggling with the ideas up to the end.
Peirce scholars never built any extensions to his writings on interpretants because
Peirce himself was unable to produce a useful system. He couldn't convince anybody,
not even himself. See the end of this note for the citation and quotations from the
Stanford article. Conclusion: Neither Peirce nor anybody else ever developed the theory
to make useful predictions about anything.
In short, I wouldn't say that Peirce's writings on interpretants are wrong --
just that they are so vague that nobody has been able to use them to do or say anything
useful.
Recommendation: Let his writings on interpretants rest in peace (RIP), and focus on the
great body of work that is at the forefront of the latest developments in cognitive
science.
John
From: "Edwina Taborsky" <edwina.taborsky(a)gmail.com>
John, list
Regardless of the terminology, which I acknowledge obscures the analysis, I think that
one can conclude that Peirce’s view is that there are three Interpretants. One is
Individual Internal; the next is Individual External, and the last one is Collective
External. And- each of these three ’nodes’ can be in any one of the three modal
categories.
That’s how I see it.
Edwina
On Jan 31, 2024, at 6:37 PM, John F Sowa
<sowa(a)bestweb.net> wrote:
I rarely comment on discussions of interpretants, because nobody, not even Peirce, had a
complete, coherent, and decisive theory of interpretants. Perhaps some Peirce scholars
have developed theories that go beyond what Peirce wrote. That is possible, but nobody can
claim that their theories are what Peirce himself had intended.
On these issues, I recommend the article by Albert Atkin in the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, first version in 2006 and major update in 2022:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/
Atkin has a thorough list of references for anybody who intends to study this topic. See
below for some quotations from the end of the article that show how incomplete,
indefinite, and uncertain Peirce's own writings happen to be.
I don't want to discourage anybody from discussing interpretants. But since Peirce
himself was uncertain and indecisive, nobody can claim that their interpretation is what
Peirce had intended.
John
_______________
As is common with all of Peirce’s work in philosophy, various changes in terminology and
subtleties with accompanying neologisms occur from one piece of work to the next. His work
on interpretants is no different. At various points in his final accounts of signs, Peirce
describes the division of interpretants as being: immediate, dynamic and final; or as
emotional, energetic, and logical; or as naïve, rogate and normal; or as intentional,
effective and communicational; or even destinate, effective and explicit. As Liszka (1990,
20) notes, “the received view in Peirce scholarship suggests that the divisions of
interpretant into immediate, dynamic, and final are archetypal, all other divisions being
relatively synonymous with these categories.” There are, however, some dissenters from
this view.
In discussing the interpretant, Peirce describes one of the trichotomies above as
follows:
In all cases [the Interpretant] includes feelings; for there must, at least, be a sense
of comprehending the meaning of the sign. If it includes more than mere feeling, it must
evoke some kind of effort. It may include something besides, which, for the present, may
be vaguely called “thought”. I term these three kinds of interpretant the “emotional”, the
“energetic”, and the “logical” interpretants. (EP2. 409)
. . .
Peirce describes the dynamic interpretant as deriving its character from action (CP8 .315
1904), but later says, “action cannot be a logical interpretant” (CP5 .491 1906). This
seems to make the two inconsistent. (See Liszka (1990, 21) for more on the problems with
Fitzgerald’s claim). Moreover, this inconsistency seems to suggest a problem for Short’s
view since his account also suggests that the dynamic interpretant should include the
logical interpretant as a subdivision (Short 1981, 213). Short, however, claims textual
support for his own view from instances where Peirce mentions the
emotional/energetic/logical trichotomy alongside the apparently separate claim that signs
have three interpretants. (Short sites (CP8 .333 1904) and (CP4 .536 1906). Short takes
this as suggesting that the two should be treated as different and distinct trichotomies.
(Short 2004, 235).
How far the textual evidence on the matter will prove decisive is unclear, especially
given the fragmentary nature of Peirce’s final work on signs. However, one or two things
militate in favor of the “received view”. First, Peirce is notorious for experimenting
with terminology, especially when trying to pin down his own ideas, or describe the same
phenomenon from different angles. Second, it is unclear why trichotomies like the
intentional/effectual/communicational should count as terminological experiments whilst
the emotional/energetic/logical counts as a distinct division. And finally, there is
little provision in Peirce’s projected sixty-six classes of signs for the kind of
additional classifications imposed by further subdivisions of the interpretant. (For more
on this discussion see, Liszka 1990 and 1996; Fitzgerald 1966; Lalor 1997; Short 1981,
1996, and 2004).
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at
https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at
https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY
ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L(a)list.iupui.edu .
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to list(a)list.iupui.edu with
UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by
him and Ben Udell.
11:22 p.m.
New subject: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants
Edwina,
I strongly agree with you that Peirce's analyses of those subjects are extremely
valuable. I also believe that his analyses are at the forefront of 21st C cognitive
science in those areas. That is a conclusion of my recent article, of which I recently
sent the completed Section 7 to these lists.
But in his important analyses of those subjects, I have not seen him show how his theory
of interpretants aided him in the discovery and formulation of his commentary.
Can you (or any other reader of P-List) find any important (or just useful) example of an
insight in which Peirce's theory of interpretants helped discover that insight?
John
----------------------------------------
From: "Edwina Taborsky" <edwina.taborsky(a)gmail.com>
Sent: 2/2/24 5:01 PM
To: John F Sowa <sowa(a)bestweb.net>
Cc: Peirce List <peirce-l(a)list.iupui.edu>du>, CG <cg(a)lists.iccs-conference.org>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants
John, list
I wouldn’t say that the Interpretants are a muddled uselessness.I think they play a vital
role. I think, however, that attempting to find exact and singular meanings of terms is
not very functional.
I use Peirce primarily for analysis of both biological and societal systems -
I find him extremely perceptive, above all, with his analysis of the Categories- The
reality of ‘modes of Being’ is extremely difficult to find in other scientific or
philosophical outlines - ie - Most analyses of ‘matter’ view it as almost inert ‘stuff’
and focuses more on mechanical interactions or puzzles over quantum ‘weirdness’. But - to
outline concepts of ‘feeling’ [ and even protoplasm feels]; the concept of reaction - and
- the concept of habit formation - all three categories found as universal - I personally
find this very functional in explaining both biological systems and societal systems. .
Then - I find his focus on the multiple nodal sites of the semiotic process to be useful;
and I view semiotic processes as operative in all of matter, both physical and biological
and in societal systems. That is, I full yagree with Peirce’s view that the whole universe
is composed of signs [plural]; and indeed, is a vast semiosic process.
So- I find the hexadic semiosic process very useful: that is, the interactional
information functionality of an external relation of the sign vehicle to its environment
[ which relation becomes the Dynamic Object]. And then, the internal nature of the dats
from this DO - which is commonly quite different from the ‘full nature’ of the DO - ie,
the Immediate Object. Then, the Representamen as mediation. Accepting the input data and
analyzing it.
And then- the three Interpretants - with the Internal Interpretant as the individual’s
local subjective reaction; the external - or Dynamic Interpretent as the Individual’s more
objective reaction…and finally - the acknowledgment by Peirce that there could be a
commonly developed interpretation of these stimuli. That is - the role of the individual
within the community.
And of course, all of these ’nodes’ can also function within the three categories, which
increases the complexity of the semiosic function.
- I DO see a very vital role for the Interpretants. ..in enabling deviation from the data
of the Dynamic Object - and enabling adaptation of the sign vehicle and the development of
new Habits [held within the representamen of the sign-vehicle. ]. That is - the fact
that there are three interepetants, moving from the immediate local perception of the
input data , to an external objective result [ does the effect of the input data as
expressed...have any functional result? ..and then..on to the larger collective result -
does this function to CHANGE THE HABITS OF THE REPRESENTAMEN?
Edwina
On Feb 2, 2024, at 4:30 PM, John F Sowa <sowa(a)bestweb.net> wrote:
Edwina, Jon AS, Jon A, Helmut, List,
Peirce made immense contributions to 21st century research in all the branches of
cognitive science. But he never found any informative or useful applications of his
writings on interpretants. He was struggling with the ideas up to the end.
Peirce scholars never built any extensions to his writings on interpretants because Peirce
himself was unable to produce a useful system. He couldn't convince anybody, not even
himself. See the end of this note for the citation and quotations from the Stanford
article. Conclusion: Neither Peirce nor anybody else ever developed the theory to make
useful predictions about anything.
In short, I wouldn't say that Peirce's writings on interpretants are wrong -- just
that they are so vague that nobody has been able to use them to do or say anything
useful.
Recommendation: Let his writings on interpretants rest in peace (RIP), and focus on the
great body of work that is at the forefront of the latest developments in cognitive
science.
John
----------------------------------------
From: "Edwina Taborsky" <edwina.taborsky(a)gmail.com>
John, list
Regardless of the terminology, which I acknowledge obscures the analysis, I think that one
can conclude that Peirce’s view is that there are three Interpretants. One is Individual
Internal; the next is Individual External, and the last one is Collective External. And-
each of these three ’nodes’ can be in any one of the three modal categories.
That’s how I see it.
Edwina
On Jan 31, 2024, at 6:37 PM, John F Sowa <sowa(a)bestweb.net> wrote:
I rarely comment on discussions of interpretants, because nobody, not even Peirce, had a
complete, coherent, and decisive theory of interpretants. Perhaps some Peirce scholars
have developed theories that go beyond what Peirce wrote. That is possible, but nobody can
claim that their theories are what Peirce himself had intended.
On these issues, I recommend the article by Albert Atkin in the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, first version in 2006 and major update in 2022:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/
Atkin has a thorough list of references for anybody who intends to study this topic. See
below for some quotations from the end of the article that show how incomplete,
indefinite, and uncertain Peirce's own writings happen to be.
I don't want to discourage anybody from discussing interpretants. But since Peirce
himself was uncertain and indecisive, nobody can claim that their interpretation is what
Peirce had intended.
John
_______________
As is common with all of Peirce’s work in philosophy, various changes in terminology and
subtleties with accompanying neologisms occur from one piece of work to the next. His work
on interpretants is no different. At various points in his final accounts of signs, Peirce
describes the division of interpretants as being: immediate, dynamic and final; or as
emotional, energetic, and logical; or as naïve, rogate and normal; or as intentional,
effective and communicational; or even destinate, effective and explicit. As Liszka (1990,
20) notes, “the received view in Peirce scholarship suggests that the divisions of
interpretant into immediate, dynamic, and final are archetypal, all other divisions being
relatively synonymous with these categories.” There are, however, some dissenters from
this view.
In discussing the interpretant, Peirce describes one of the trichotomies above as
follows:
In all cases [the Interpretant] includes feelings; for there must, at least, be a sense of
comprehending the meaning of the sign. If it includes more than mere feeling, it must
evoke some kind of effort. It may include something besides, which, for the present, may
be vaguely called “thought”. I term these three kinds of interpretant the “emotional”, the
“energetic”, and the “logical” interpretants. (EP2. 409). . .
Peirce describes the dynamic interpretant as deriving its character from action (CP8 .315
1904), but later says, “action cannot be a logical interpretant” (CP5 .491 1906). This
seems to make the two inconsistent. (See Liszka (1990, 21) for more on the problems with
Fitzgerald’s claim). Moreover, this inconsistency seems to suggest a problem for Short’s
view since his account also suggests that the dynamic interpretant should include the
logical interpretant as a subdivision (Short 1981, 213). Short, however, claims textual
support for his own view from instances where Peirce mentions the
emotional/energetic/logical trichotomy alongside the apparently separate claim that signs
have three interpretants. (Short sites (CP8 .333 1904) and (CP4 .536 1906). Short takes
this as suggesting that the two should be treated as different and distinct trichotomies.
(Short 2004, 235).
How far the textual evidence on the matter will prove decisive is unclear, especially
given the fragmentary nature of Peirce’s final work on signs. However, one or two things
militate in favor of the “received view”. First, Peirce is notorious for experimenting
with terminology, especially when trying to pin down his own ideas, or describe the same
phenomenon from different angles. Second, it is unclear why trichotomies like the
intentional/effectual/communicational should count as terminological experiments whilst
the emotional/energetic/logical counts as a distinct division. And finally, there is
little provision in Peirce’s projected sixty-six classes of signs for the kind of
additional classifications imposed by further subdivisions of the interpretant. (For more
on this discussion see, Liszka 1990 and 1996; Fitzgerald 1966; Lalor 1997; Short 1981,
1996, and 2004).
3 Feb
3 Feb
1:05 a.m.
New subject: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants
John, list
1] I don’t know what you mean by ‘His Commentary’…in your sentence
But in his important analyses of those subjects, I
have not seen him show how his theory of interpretants aided him in the discovery and
formulation of his commentary.
2] And I don’t know what you mean by ’that insight’ in your sentence:
Can you (or any other reader of P-List) find any
important (or just useful) example of an insight in which Peirce's theory of
interpretants helped discover that insight?
3] I briefly outlined why I think that the the hexadic semosic process is capable of
generative development of matter and mind. That is,
3-a] the reality of two object relations, with one, the DO, being input from an external
source, and the other, the IO, being the input that the sign-vehicle is equipped to accept
as input [ a dog can smell better than a human; an owl can see better; a…etc etc]…
Along with the reality that input from multiple DOs might be happening at the same time..
3-b; the reality that the mediative process, theRepresentamen GROWS in its mediative
capacity by learning, by exposure, by..even, chance [ see Peirce’s three methods of
evolution: tychasm, anancasm, agapasm]
3c- the reality of THREE Interpretant relations -
with one being strictly a local, subjective, individual result..[the II] - an action that
generates a potentiality for change;
and the more complex next one [DI] being individual but external to the individual, which
moves the result of the original DO, IO input it into an actual existentially…that affects
OTHER sign-vehicles
….and the next one [FI] being the communal non-local non-individual generality where new
laws are developed.
That is - my view is that this whole process enables adaptive complexity to develop. An
example could be where a bird tries to eat a seed, which has a hard shell [DO]; and what
little it can extract from this shell [ IO] …is processed by its digestive system
[Representamen in a mode of 3ns, 2ns and 1ns] , which, possibly lacking in nutrients from
this small amount produces only a small nutrition result, [II] , but this small result
forces the bird’s body to develop a stronger digestion [to digest shells[ and even, these
chemicals act to strengthen its beak…[DI]..and this reaction becomes common among the
local bird population [FI].
My point is that both the number of interactions that take place - and that includes all
three interpretant which I think are vital - , along with the capacities of the three
categorical modes - are basic to complex adaptive systems.
Edwina
> On Feb 2, 2024, at 5:22 PM, John F Sowa <sowa(a)bestweb.net> wrote:
>
> Edwina,
>
> I strongly agree with you that Peirce's analyses of those subjects are extremely
valuable. I also believe that his analyses are at the forefront of 21st C cognitive
science in those areas. That is a conclusion of my recent article, of which I recently
sent the completed Section 7 to these lists.
>
But in his important analyses of those subjects, I
have not seen him show how his theory of interpretants aided him in the discovery and
formulation of his commentary.
>
Can you (or any other reader of P-List) find any
important (or just useful) example of an insight in which Peirce's theory of
interpretants helped discover that insight?
>
> John
>
>
> From: "Edwina Taborsky" <edwina.taborsky(a)gmail.com>
> Sent: 2/2/24 5:01 PM
> To: John F Sowa <sowa(a)bestweb.net>
> Cc: Peirce List <peirce-l(a)list.iupui.edu>du>, CG
<cg(a)lists.iccs-conference.org>
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants
>
> John, list
>
> I wouldn’t say that the Interpretants are a muddled uselessness.I think they play a
vital role. I think, however, that attempting to find exact and singular meanings of
terms is not very functional.
>
> I use Peirce primarily for analysis of both biological and societal systems -
>
> I find him extremely perceptive, above all, with his analysis of the Categories- The
reality of ‘modes of Being’ is extremely difficult to find in other scientific or
philosophical outlines - ie - Most analyses of ‘matter’ view it as almost inert ‘stuff’
and focuses more on mechanical interactions or puzzles over quantum ‘weirdness’. But - to
outline concepts of ‘feeling’ [ and even protoplasm feels]; the concept of reaction - and
- the concept of habit formation - all three categories found as universal - I personally
find this very functional in explaining both biological systems and societal systems. .
>
> Then - I find his focus on the multiple nodal sites of the semiotic process to be
useful; and I view semiotic processes as operative in all of matter, both physical and
biological and in societal systems. That is, I full yagree with Peirce’s view that the
whole universe is composed of signs [plural]; and indeed, is a vast semiosic process.
>
> So- I find the hexadic semiosic process very useful: that is, the interactional
information functionality of an external relation of the sign vehicle to its environment
[ which relation becomes the Dynamic Object]. And then, the internal nature of the dats
from this DO - which is commonly quite different from the ‘full nature’ of the DO - ie,
the Immediate Object. Then, the Representamen as mediation. Accepting the input data and
analyzing it.
>
> And then- the three Interpretants - with the Internal Interpretant as the
individual’s local subjective reaction; the external - or Dynamic Interpretent as the
Individual’s more objective reaction…and finally - the acknowledgment by Peirce that there
could be a commonly developed interpretation of these stimuli. That is - the role of the
individual within the community.
>
> And of course, all of these ’nodes’ can also function within the three categories,
which increases the complexity of the semiosic function.
>
> - I DO see a very vital role for the Interpretants. ..in enabling deviation from the
data of the Dynamic Object - and enabling adaptation of the sign vehicle and the
development of new Habits [held within the representamen of the sign-vehicle. ]. That is
- the fact that there are three interepetants, moving from the immediate local perception
of the input data , to an external objective result [ does the effect of the input data as
expressed...have any functional result? ..and then..on to the larger collective result -
does this function to CHANGE THE HABITS OF THE REPRESENTAMEN?
>
> Edwina
>
>> On Feb 2, 2024, at 4:30 PM, John F Sowa <sowa(a)bestweb.net> wrote:
>>
>> Edwina, Jon AS, Jon A, Helmut, List,
>>
>> Peirce made immense contributions to 21st century research in all the branches of
cognitive science. But he never found any informative or useful applications of his
writings on interpretants. He was struggling with the ideas up to the end.
>>
>> Peirce scholars never built any extensions to his writings on interpretants
because Peirce himself was unable to produce a useful system. He couldn't convince
anybody, not even himself. See the end of this note for the citation and quotations from
the Stanford article. Conclusion: Neither Peirce nor anybody else ever developed the
theory to make useful predictions about anything.
>>
>> In short, I wouldn't say that Peirce's writings on interpretants are
wrong -- just that they are so vague that nobody has been able to use them to do or say
anything useful.
>>
>> Recommendation: Let his writings on interpretants rest in peace (RIP), and focus
on the great body of work that is at the forefront of the latest developments in
cognitive science.
>>
>> John
>>
>>
>> From: "Edwina Taborsky" <edwina.taborsky(a)gmail.com>
>>
>> John, list
>>
>> Regardless of the terminology, which I acknowledge obscures the analysis, I think
that one can conclude that Peirce’s view is that there are three Interpretants. One is
Individual Internal; the next is Individual External, and the last one is Collective
External. And- each of these three ’nodes’ can be in any one of the three modal
categories.
>>
>> That’s how I see it.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>> On Jan 31, 2024, at 6:37 PM, John F Sowa <sowa(a)bestweb.net> wrote:
>>>
>>> I rarely comment on discussions of interpretants, because nobody, not even
Peirce, had a complete, coherent, and decisive theory of interpretants. Perhaps some
Peirce scholars have developed theories that go beyond what Peirce wrote. That is
possible, but nobody can claim that their theories are what Peirce himself had intended.
>>>
>>> On these issues, I recommend the article by Albert Atkin in the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first version in 2006 and major update in 2022:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/
>>>
>>> Atkin has a thorough list of references for anybody who intends to study this
topic. See below for some quotations from the end of the article that show how
incomplete, indefinite, and uncertain Peirce's own writings happen to be.
>>>
>>> I don't want to discourage anybody from discussing interpretants. But
since Peirce himself was uncertain and indecisive, nobody can claim that their
interpretation is what Peirce had intended.
>>>
>>> John
>>> _______________
>>>
>>> As is common with all of Peirce’s work in philosophy, various changes in
terminology and subtleties with accompanying neologisms occur from one piece of work to
the next. His work on interpretants is no different. At various points in his final
accounts of signs, Peirce describes the division of interpretants as being: immediate,
dynamic and final; or as emotional, energetic, and logical; or as naïve, rogate and
normal; or as intentional, effective and communicational; or even destinate, effective and
explicit. As Liszka (1990, 20) notes, “the received view in Peirce scholarship suggests
that the divisions of interpretant into immediate, dynamic, and final are archetypal, all
other divisions being relatively synonymous with these categories.” There are, however,
some dissenters from this view.
>>>
>>> In discussing the interpretant, Peirce describes one of the trichotomies
above as follows:
>>>
>>> In all cases [the Interpretant] includes feelings; for there must, at least,
be a sense of comprehending the meaning of the sign. If it includes more than mere
feeling, it must evoke some kind of effort. It may include something besides, which, for
the present, may be vaguely called “thought”. I term these three kinds of interpretant the
“emotional”, the “energetic”, and the “logical” interpretants. (EP2. 409)
>>> . . .
>>>
>>> Peirce describes the dynamic interpretant as deriving its character from
action (CP8 .315 1904), but later says, “action cannot be a logical interpretant” (CP5
.491 1906). This seems to make the two inconsistent. (See Liszka (1990, 21) for more on
the problems with Fitzgerald’s claim). Moreover, this inconsistency seems to suggest a
problem for Short’s view since his account also suggests that the dynamic interpretant
should include the logical interpretant as a subdivision (Short 1981, 213). Short,
however, claims textual support for his own view from instances where Peirce mentions the
emotional/energetic/logical trichotomy alongside the apparently separate claim that signs
have three interpretants. (Short sites (CP8 .333 1904) and (CP4 .536 1906). Short takes
this as suggesting that the two should be treated as different and distinct trichotomies.
(Short 2004, 235).
>>>
>>> How far the textual evidence on the matter will prove decisive is unclear,
especially given the fragmentary nature of Peirce’s final work on signs. However, one or
two things militate in favor of the “received view”. First, Peirce is notorious for
experimenting with terminology, especially when trying to pin down his own ideas, or
describe the same phenomenon from different angles. Second, it is unclear why trichotomies
like the intentional/effectual/communicational should count as terminological experiments
whilst the emotional/energetic/logical counts as a distinct division. And finally, there
is little provision in Peirce’s projected sixty-six classes of signs for the kind of
additional classifications imposed by further subdivisions of the interpretant. (For more
on this discussion see, Liszka 1990 and 1996; Fitzgerald 1966; Lalor 1997; Short 1981,
1996, and 2004).
>>>
>>>
>
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at
> https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at
> https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to
REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L(a)list.iupui.edu .
> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to list(a)list.iupui.edu with
UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed
by him and Ben Udell.
1:46 p.m.
New subject: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants
Again, if I might continue with the importance of the hexadic semiosic process, in that it
enables complex adaptation…within interaction
That is - the reality of two Object relations, the Dynamic and the Immediate acknowledges
that not all off the input data from the external interaction will be accepted by the
capacity of the sign -vehicle and its representamen. And indeed, some of this data might
be changed /affected by other input happening at the same time.
Then - the three Interpretants are vital.
The first one, the Immediate, confines the reaction to the internal experience of the
individual. It goes no further. I think this is important - if we think of a disease - it
would confine the infection to one individual. If we think of another situation - it would
confine the sensation of the experience to one individual [ rather than mob hysteria].
The next one, the Dynamic, is important - since it produces an external response to the
input data and brings in local ‘observers’, so to speak, who treat this external
Interfpretant as a Sign in itself. //something that they might react to. .
The last one, the Final - moves the response to a general, common one.
An example would be a sound heard by an individual in a group of monkeys. This one
individual might only feel a subjective internal response [Immediae Interpretant] and
other than that - continue gathering fruit]. But - it might instead, produce an external
result [ the monkey would scream]. This would act as its own triadic Sign to the other
monkeys….who would recognize it as an Alarm. Over time - this particular sound by the
monkey is understood, always, as an Alarm.
That is - I think the function of the three Interpretants, nuanced as they are, is vital.
Edwina
On Feb 2, 2024, at 7:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky
<taborsky(a)primus.ca> wrote:
John, list
1] I don’t know what you mean by ‘His Commentary’…in your sentence
But in his important analyses of those subjects,
I have not seen him show how his theory of interpretants aided him in the discovery and
formulation of his commentary.
2] And I don’t know what you mean by ’that insight’ in your sentence:
Can you (or any other reader of P-List) find any
important (or just useful) example of an insight in which Peirce's theory of
interpretants helped discover that insight?
3] I briefly outlined why I think that the the hexadic semosic process is capable of
generative development of matter and mind. That is,
3-a] the reality of two object relations, with one, the DO, being input from an external
source, and the other, the IO, being the input that the sign-vehicle is equipped to accept
as input [ a dog can smell better than a human; an owl can see better; a…etc etc]…
Along with the reality that input from multiple DOs might be happening at the same
time..
3-b; the reality that the mediative process, theRepresentamen GROWS in its mediative
capacity by learning, by exposure, by..even, chance [ see Peirce’s three methods of
evolution: tychasm, anancasm, agapasm]
3c- the reality of THREE Interpretant relations -
with one being strictly a local, subjective, individual result..[the II] - an action that
generates a potentiality for change;
and the more complex next one [DI] being individual but external to the individual,
which moves the result of the original DO, IO input it into an actual existentially…that
affects OTHER sign-vehicles
….and the next one [FI] being the communal non-local non-individual generality where new
laws are developed.
That is - my view is that this whole process enables adaptive complexity to develop. An
example could be where a bird tries to eat a seed, which has a hard shell [DO]; and what
little it can extract from this shell [ IO] …is processed by its digestive system
[Representamen in a mode of 3ns, 2ns and 1ns] , which, possibly lacking in nutrients from
this small amount produces only a small nutrition result, [II] , but this small result
forces the bird’s body to develop a stronger digestion [to digest shells[ and even, these
chemicals act to strengthen its beak…[DI]..and this reaction becomes common among the
local bird population [FI].
My point is that both the number of interactions that take place - and that includes all
three interpretant which I think are vital - , along with the capacities of the three
categorical modes - are basic to complex adaptive systems.
Edwina
> On Feb 2, 2024, at 5:22 PM, John F Sowa <sowa(a)bestweb.net
<mailto:sowa@bestweb.net>> wrote:
>
> Edwina,
>
> I strongly agree with you that Peirce's analyses of those subjects are extremely
valuable. I also believe that his analyses are at the forefront of 21st C cognitive
science in those areas. That is a conclusion of my recent article, of which I recently
sent the completed Section 7 to these lists.
>
But in his important analyses of those subjects,
I have not seen him show how his theory of interpretants aided him in the discovery and
formulation of his commentary.
>
Can you (or any other reader of P-List) find any
important (or just useful) example of an insight in which Peirce's theory of
interpretants helped discover that insight?
>
> John
>
>
> From: "Edwina Taborsky" <edwina.taborsky(a)gmail.com>
> Sent: 2/2/24 5:01 PM
> To: John F Sowa <sowa(a)bestweb.net>
> Cc: Peirce List <peirce-l(a)list.iupui.edu>du>, CG
<cg(a)lists.iccs-conference.org>
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants
>
> John, list
>
> I wouldn’t say that the Interpretants are a muddled uselessness.I think they play a
vital role. I think, however, that attempting to find exact and singular meanings of
terms is not very functional.
>
> I use Peirce primarily for analysis of both biological and societal systems -
>
> I find him extremely perceptive, above all, with his analysis of the Categories- The
reality of ‘modes of Being’ is extremely difficult to find in other scientific or
philosophical outlines - ie - Most analyses of ‘matter’ view it as almost inert ‘stuff’
and focuses more on mechanical interactions or puzzles over quantum ‘weirdness’. But - to
outline concepts of ‘feeling’ [ and even protoplasm feels]; the concept of reaction - and
- the concept of habit formation - all three categories found as universal - I personally
find this very functional in explaining both biological systems and societal systems. .
>
> Then - I find his focus on the multiple nodal sites of the semiotic process to be
useful; and I view semiotic processes as operative in all of matter, both physical and
biological and in societal systems. That is, I full yagree with Peirce’s view that the
whole universe is composed of signs [plural]; and indeed, is a vast semiosic process.
>
> So- I find the hexadic semiosic process very useful: that is, the interactional
information functionality of an external relation of the sign vehicle to its environment
[ which relation becomes the Dynamic Object]. And then, the internal nature of the dats
from this DO - which is commonly quite different from the ‘full nature’ of the DO - ie,
the Immediate Object. Then, the Representamen as mediation. Accepting the input data and
analyzing it.
>
> And then- the three Interpretants - with the Internal Interpretant as the
individual’s local subjective reaction; the external - or Dynamic Interpretent as the
Individual’s more objective reaction…and finally - the acknowledgment by Peirce that there
could be a commonly developed interpretation of these stimuli. That is - the role of the
individual within the community.
>
> And of course, all of these ’nodes’ can also function within the three categories,
which increases the complexity of the semiosic function.
>
> - I DO see a very vital role for the Interpretants. ..in enabling deviation from the
data of the Dynamic Object - and enabling adaptation of the sign vehicle and the
development of new Habits [held within the representamen of the sign-vehicle. ]. That is
- the fact that there are three interepetants, moving from the immediate local perception
of the input data , to an external objective result [ does the effect of the input data as
expressed...have any functional result? ..and then..on to the larger collective result -
does this function to CHANGE THE HABITS OF THE REPRESENTAMEN?
>
> Edwina
>
>> On Feb 2, 2024, at 4:30 PM, John F Sowa <sowa(a)bestweb.net> wrote:
>>
>> Edwina, Jon AS, Jon A, Helmut, List,
>>
>> Peirce made immense contributions to 21st century research in all the branches of
cognitive science. But he never found any informative or useful applications of his
writings on interpretants. He was struggling with the ideas up to the end.
>>
>> Peirce scholars never built any extensions to his writings on interpretants
because Peirce himself was unable to produce a useful system. He couldn't convince
anybody, not even himself. See the end of this note for the citation and quotations from
the Stanford article. Conclusion: Neither Peirce nor anybody else ever developed the
theory to make useful predictions about anything.
>>
>> In short, I wouldn't say that Peirce's writings on interpretants are
wrong -- just that they are so vague that nobody has been able to use them to do or say
anything useful.
>>
>> Recommendation: Let his writings on interpretants rest in peace (RIP), and focus
on the great body of work that is at the forefront of the latest developments in
cognitive science.
>>
>> John
>>
>>
>> From: "Edwina Taborsky" <edwina.taborsky(a)gmail.com>
>>
>> John, list
>>
>> Regardless of the terminology, which I acknowledge obscures the analysis, I think
that one can conclude that Peirce’s view is that there are three Interpretants. One is
Individual Internal; the next is Individual External, and the last one is Collective
External. And- each of these three ’nodes’ can be in any one of the three modal
categories.
>>
>> That’s how I see it.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>> On Jan 31, 2024, at 6:37 PM, John F Sowa <sowa(a)bestweb.net> wrote:
>>>
>>> I rarely comment on discussions of interpretants, because nobody, not even
Peirce, had a complete, coherent, and decisive theory of interpretants. Perhaps some
Peirce scholars have developed theories that go beyond what Peirce wrote. That is
possible, but nobody can claim that their theories are what Peirce himself had intended.
>>>
>>> On these issues, I recommend the article by Albert Atkin in the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first version in 2006 and major update in 2022:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/
>>>
>>> Atkin has a thorough list of references for anybody who intends to study this
topic. See below for some quotations from the end of the article that show how
incomplete, indefinite, and uncertain Peirce's own writings happen to be.
>>>
>>> I don't want to discourage anybody from discussing interpretants. But
since Peirce himself was uncertain and indecisive, nobody can claim that their
interpretation is what Peirce had intended.
>>>
>>> John
>>> _______________
>>>
>>> As is common with all of Peirce’s work in philosophy, various changes in
terminology and subtleties with accompanying neologisms occur from one piece of work to
the next. His work on interpretants is no different. At various points in his final
accounts of signs, Peirce describes the division of interpretants as being: immediate,
dynamic and final; or as emotional, energetic, and logical; or as naïve, rogate and
normal; or as intentional, effective and communicational; or even destinate, effective and
explicit. As Liszka (1990, 20) notes, “the received view in Peirce scholarship suggests
that the divisions of interpretant into immediate, dynamic, and final are archetypal, all
other divisions being relatively synonymous with these categories.” There are, however,
some dissenters from this view.
>>>
>>> In discussing the interpretant, Peirce describes one of the trichotomies
above as follows:
>>>
>>> In all cases [the Interpretant] includes feelings; for there must, at least,
be a sense of comprehending the meaning of the sign. If it includes more than mere
feeling, it must evoke some kind of effort. It may include something besides, which, for
the present, may be vaguely called “thought”. I term these three kinds of interpretant the
“emotional”, the “energetic”, and the “logical” interpretants. (EP2. 409)
>>> . . .
>>>
>>> Peirce describes the dynamic interpretant as deriving its character from
action (CP8 .315 1904), but later says, “action cannot be a logical interpretant” (CP5
.491 1906). This seems to make the two inconsistent. (See Liszka (1990, 21) for more on
the problems with Fitzgerald’s claim). Moreover, this inconsistency seems to suggest a
problem for Short’s view since his account also suggests that the dynamic interpretant
should include the logical interpretant as a subdivision (Short 1981, 213). Short,
however, claims textual support for his own view from instances where Peirce mentions the
emotional/energetic/logical trichotomy alongside the apparently separate claim that signs
have three interpretants. (Short sites (CP8 .333 1904) and (CP4 .536 1906). Short takes
this as suggesting that the two should be treated as different and distinct trichotomies.
(Short 2004, 235).
>>>
>>> How far the textual evidence on the matter will prove decisive is unclear,
especially given the fragmentary nature of Peirce’s final work on signs. However, one or
two things militate in favor of the “received view”. First, Peirce is notorious for
experimenting with terminology, especially when trying to pin down his own ideas, or
describe the same phenomenon from different angles. Second, it is unclear why trichotomies
like the intentional/effectual/communicational should count as terminological experiments
whilst the emotional/energetic/logical counts as a distinct division. And finally, there
is little provision in Peirce’s projected sixty-six classes of signs for the kind of
additional classifications imposed by further subdivisions of the interpretant. (For more
on this discussion see, Liszka 1990 and 1996; Fitzgerald 1966; Lalor 1997; Short 1981,
1996, and 2004).
>>>
>>>
>
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at
> https://cspeirce.com <https://cspeirce.com/> and, just as well, at
> https://www.cspeirce.com <https://www.cspeirce.com/> . It'll take a while
to repair / update all the links!
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to
REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L(a)list.iupui.edu
<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> .
> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to list(a)list.iupui.edu
<mailto:list@list.iupui.edu> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the
message and nothing in the body. More at
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed
by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at
https://cspeirce.com <https://cspeirce.com/> and, just as well, at
https://www.cspeirce.com <https://www.cspeirce.com/> . It'll take a while to
repair / update all the links!
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY
ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L(a)list.iupui.edu
<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> .
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to list(a)list.iupui.edu
<mailto:list@list.iupui.edu> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the
message and nothing in the body. More at
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by
him and Ben Udell.
105
days inactive
108
days old
6 comments
3 participants
participants (3)
-
Edwina Taborsky -
Edwina Taborsky -
John F Sowa