Interpreter and Interpretant • Discussion 4
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https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/02/06/interpreter-and-interpretant-disc…
Re: Interpreter and Interpretant • Selection 4
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https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/01/31/interpreter-and-interpretant-sele…
Figure 2. Dewey's “Sign of Rain” Example
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https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/04/deweys-sign-of-rain-…
Re: Conceptual Graphs • Tom Gollier
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https://lists.cs.uni-kassel.de/hyperkitty/list/cg@lists.iccs-conference.org…
Tom,
Another discussion coming to mind is one we had on this subject
in 2016. Once again I'll save a measure of strain on my brain
by repeating that here and picking up from that point.
Re: Peirce List • Tom Gollier
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https://web.archive.org/web/20160316200003/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane…
I know we've discussed the various meanings of the word “object”
which make sense in Peirce's semiotics and pragmatism generally,
so let me just link to a recent comment I found in my search for
previous mentions.
Objects, Objectives, Objectivity
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https://web.archive.org/web/20160316184001/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane…
I am constantly reminded of the following line from Peirce.
“No longer wondered what I would do in life but defined my object.”
— C.S. Peirce (1861), “My Life, written for the Class-Book” (CE 1, 3)
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https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/03/16/ab(duction-deduction-induction-an…
The question of Objects, Objectives, and Objectivity is a persistent one.
The Latin-rooted English “object” springs from deeper roots in
the Greek “pragma”. It was a personal revelation to me on first
looking into Liddell and Scott and reading all the meanings and
ramifications of that vast pragmatic semantic complex.
It is especially the senses of the word “object” referring
to aims and purposes, in other words, intentional objects and
objects of intention, that we are likely to miss if we don't
remind ourselves of their pertinence to pragmatic thinking.
Keeping that variety of meanings in mind, a few more words
may help to clarify the reading from last time ...
1. There are of course the usual run of behaviorist, causal,
stimulus-response theories of “signal processing” and
“verbal behavior” that have enjoyed their popularity and
never-say-die revivals from the days of Charles Morris
to B.F. Skinner, but Peirce's semiotics includes them as
degenerate species of the more solid genre he had in mind.
2. Peirce's definition of a triadic sign relation is cast at such
a level of generality that nothing in it prevents a sign relation
L ⊆ O × S × I from having intentional objects in its object domain O.
3. To say that coolness is a sign of rain is a perfectly natural
statement in English and I think it would be a more troubling
narrowness to exclude it from sense.
4. Semiotic objects are any objects of discussion or thought.
It should be obvious that we talk and think about future,
imaginary, intentional, or “virtual” objects all the time.
5. The fact that coolness might be a sign of many other things
is exactly what calls for our peripatetic hero to abduce a
hypothesis (rain?), to deduce a prediction (dark clouds?),
and to test the prediction against further observations
(look up!). All of those features are why we chose Dewey's
story as an illustration of a full-blown inquiry.
Reference —
It helps to read “object” in a fuller sense than we often do in
billiard-ball philosophies, as a lot gets lost in the translation
from the Greek “pragma” from which pragmatism naturally takes its cue.
For a sample of that fuller sense see the following lexicon entry.
πρᾶγμα • Liddell and Scott (1925/1940), A Greek-English Lexicon
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https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0057…
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https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/
Regards,
Jon