28 Nov
2021
28 Nov
'21
12:48 a.m.
Edwina, would you please send your messages to the List without adding your
address? When I "reply to" it gives me only your address, and when I
"reply to all" it still sends to you, with the list as a "cc."
We seem to be "talking past one another"? I completely agree with
your point about Peirce's theory of the continuity between Mind and Matter
in evolving habits. And that other forms of life probably benefit from
what *we can recognize and formulate* as "the capacity for that pragmatic
result of an If-Then choice" — but without the crucial capability to
represent, examine, and criticize this process that humans have.
We cannot account for the intelligent capability to create symbolic
tools that allow us to examine and correct our habits without (as you say)
"the capacity for symbolic semiosis" (analyzable in terms of sign, object,
interpretant) — and then we can identify the grades of clarity, which we
need in order to deal with *metaphysical issues*. Here is a sample of
Peirce's late (never published) view.
Excerpt from MS 498 (1906):
By real, I always mean that which is such as it is whatever you or I or any
generation of men may opine or otherwise think that it is. There must not
be any confusion between reality and existential,— that is real which is as
it is no matter what one may think about it, the existential is that which
is as it is whatever one may think about anything. No doubt there are
grades of reality, meaning that objects of signs may yield with more or
less resistance to opinion or representation. According to the definition,
absolute resistance is essential to reality. But an approach to reality,
something that is not in the slightest of the nature of a pretense is found
wherever an object of thought is sufficiently obstinate to enable us to
say, it has not those characters but it does have these, there is already a
lesson in logic. Namely, that one may lay down the very best of
definitions, going to the very heart of things; and yet there will be, as
it were, a little living mouse of a quasi exception which will find or make
a hole to get in when all seemed hermetically closed. This mouse will not
be a mere pest to be got rid of and forgotten. It will be a fellow being
to be remembered and to be appraised. [pp. 32-33]
Without those grades of clarity, how can account for art or science, which
give us the power of hypothetical ideas to study *as if* they were real —
for improved clarity in semiosis? Here is Peirce's partially published
early account.
Excerpt from 1893 "A Guess at the Riddle"
CP 1.383 … The work of the poet or novelist is not so utterly different
from that of the scientific man. The artist introduces a fiction; but it is
not an arbitrary one; it exhibits affinities to which the mind accords a
certain approval in pronouncing them beautiful, which if it is not exactly
the same as saying that the synthesis is true, is something of the same
general kind. The geometer draws a diagram, which if not exactly a fiction,
is at least a creation, and by means of observation of that diagram he is
able to synthesize and show relations between elements which before seemed
to have no necessary connection. The realities compel us to put some things
into very close relation and others less so, in a highly complicated, and
in the [to?] sense itself unintelligible manner; but it is the genius of
the mind, that takes up all these hints of sense, adds immensely to them,
makes them precise, and shows them in intelligible form in the intuitions
of space and time. Intuition is the regarding of the abstract in a concrete
form, by the realistic hypostatization of relations; that is the one sole
method of valuable thought. Very shallow is the prevalent notion that this
is something to be avoided. You might as well say at once that reasoning is
to be avoided because it has led to so much error; quite in the same
philistine line of thought would that be; and so well in accord with the
spirit of nominalism that I wonder some one does not put it forward. The
true precept is not to abstain from hypostatization, but to do it*
intelligently*. . . . [“Some manuscript pages seem to be missing here.”]
To effectively use our tools for improved semiosis (and to create new
ones), we must reach the 4th grade of clarity (the capability *to examine
how* they improve semiosis)? Here is my early study of some detail
involved.
*The Place of Images in a World of Text*
http://conceptualgraphs.org/revelator/web/papers/keelerchum.pdf
(Might be easier to read here.)
https://www.academia.edu/16036312/The_Place_of_Images_in_a_World_of_Text
On page 10, after examining J.J. Gibson's theory of perception, I ask:
"Could combining Peirce's and Gibson's metatheories give us a basis for the
semiotic study of computer-mediation tool development?" See what you think
— don't we need theory beyond what explains semiosis in general?
Meanwhile, see what's happening in AI research!
*Generated images from text*
https://venturebeat.com/2021/11/22/nvidias-latest-ai-tech-translates-text-i…
That's enough for this week!
Mary
On Fri, Nov 26, 2021 at 5:09 PM Edwina Taborsky <taborsky(a)primus.ca> wrote:
Mary - just remove my personal name from the list of
Reply All in the
post. Just send it to the CG list - and it will go to both my emails.
I am not dealing with the grades of clarity -which can be comparable to
the Interpretants. [see How to Make Our Ideas Clear and 8.185]. I am not
sure if we can conclude that only humans are capable of this 'third grade'.
Certainly, only humans have, I think, the capacity for symbolic semiosis.
But I do think that the biological realm does have the capacity for
that pragmatic result of an If-Then choice. I don't see how adaptation or
evolution could function without such a process.
And I certainly do consider that we humans, with our symbolic capacity
[within 3ns] , can stray very far from reality [2ns] and live within the
disasters of 'magical thinking' [see Robert Marty's Lattice for how this
can happen]. Was it the White Queen who said that she had 'believed as many
as six impossible things before breakfast'.
I am referring to Thirdness, the cognitive mode of being that develops
habits of organization, as a mental process that is found within all
'matter' - including the physico-chemical, biological and human. As such,
this suggests to me that the semiosic mental process of habit-formation or
model-formation can operate within an indexical manner, i.e., via direct
sensate relations. But, Thirdness -as-Secondness remains a mental or
logical process.
See David Chalmers - panpsychism and panprotopsychism. And of course,
Peirce's famous 4.551 comment
"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work
of bees, of crystals and throughout the purely physical world".
Edwina
On Fri 26/11/21 6:38 PM , Mary Keeler mkeeler(a)uw.edu sent:
Edwina, I can't seem to easily change the "reply" to send only to the list
— would you please set it up in the form you prefer (right now it includes
your two addresses)?
Let me just say, here, that Peirce developed his "grades of clarity" to
distinguish between human intelligence as being capable of the 3rd gradel,
where we are able to reflect on our reasoning. No other animals have this
ability, and it gives us the chance to improve our habits very
responsively. However, some anthropologists are beginning to say that we
are too adaptive: we keep doing foolish things and then just adapting to
the consequences!
But that's why we need to develop reflective foresight (at even the 4rd
grade of clarity), as Stango explains here, to improve our methods (or
tools) for reasoning!
Stango, M. (2015): “The Pragmatic Maxim and the Normative Sciences:
Peirce’s Problematical ‘Fourth’ Grade of Clarity,” Transactions of the
Charles S. Peirce Society: 51 (1) 34-56.
Mary
On Fri, Nov 26, 2021 at 2:55 PM Edwina Taborsky <taborsky(a)primus.ca>
wrote:
No- I don't need three copies; just send
posts to the CG list.
As for 'self-corrective control - I consider that the triadic semiosic
process is what enables this action. A dyadic process excludes
MIND-as-mediation. Once you consider that Mind and Matter are correlates,
then, any material action becomes also subject to mental action.
I'm not terribly interested in the human cognitive process, which
proceeds largely with the use of symbolic mental mediation. I'm interested
in the physico-chemical and biological cognitive processes - which proceed
with the use of indexical mental mediation.
That is, these systems can be considered as 'sentient' which means that
they are capable of feeling/sensing/perceiving their environment. They do
this within the triadic semiosic process, which sets up a mediating
analytic process to understand the input data. I refer to this whole
process as a function, where f[x]=y, with 'f' understood as
mediation. Mediation operates as both a set of evolving [yes, evolving]
habits-of-organization AND also includes a number of possible habits. The
possible follows the logical path of IF-THEN...ie IF I take this action,
THEN, such and such MIGHT occur. The organism can anticipate results of
its behaviour. This cognitive process of anticipation reduces RISK - where,
if an organism took a certain action without anticipatory thought - it
might be disastrous. Anticipation is a vital semiotic process and my point
is that an organism will have, in its knowledge base, not merely a
'normal default template' but also, in the more complex organisms, a number
of learned optional possibilities. This organism can therefore react to
input sensate data by CHOOSING to follow, not its normative habits, but to
take one of the optional paths.
I consider that Thirdness-as-Secondness is THE vital cognitive mode that
enables this indexical 'feeling out' of the environment and the analytic
gathering of new possibilities.
Learning is a pragmatic observation of the results of these actions -
Edwina
On Fri 26/11/21 5:02 PM , Mary Keeler mkeeler(a)uw.edu sent:
Edwina, do you want to receive 3 copies?
Good: "All existential entities learn by experience" — and Peiirce's
theory of logic and method are to explain how learning by experience
(intelligence) can be more efficient (which entails effectiveness).
That is, how self-corrective control can improve learning by experience!
Can we figure out a way to demonstrate this improvement? Here is a
passage from Discovering the Future in the Past (pp. 35-41):
While other pragmatists, like Veblen, seek “a complete accounting of the
socio-historical origins of human conduct” (or an empirical theory) Peirce
is concerned with how inquiry determines the future, and his pragmatic (or
normative) theory of logic explains how our natural cognitive urge to
conceptualize and form habits of thought, which conveniently "automates
behavior" in routines and tools, must be checked by our discriminating
sensory capability, through pragmatic conduct that continually conceives
and tests these ideas for validity and reliability by observing their
implications in experience, to establish self-critical control ("The
highest quality of mind involves a great readiness to take habits, and a
great readiness to lose them" [CP 6.613 (1893)].) Successful collaboration
requires the conscious commitment of researchers to self-critical conduct,
and creative cooperation is possible only with the stability provided by
progressive coordination of outcomes, representing improvement. Compare
this with Griffin and Veblen’s defense of the method of tenacity: “the form
of group solidarity in any peaceful, workmanlike community.”
Peirce conceived his theory to explain not a mechanistic “workmanlike
community” but a community of inquiry, where “one's purpose lies in the
line of novelty, invention, generalization, theory—in a word, improvement
of the situation … instinct and the rule of thumb manifestly cease to be
applicable” [CP 2.178 (1902)]. His pragmatic theory of research defines
“habits of thinking” as beliefs, and distinguishes believing from
reasoning, the self-corrective thinking required in learning to improve
habits of thought. He clarifies the roles of belief and reasoning:
The best plan, then, on the whole, is to base our conduct as much as
possible on Instinct, but when we do reason to reason with severely
scientific logic. ... Where reasoning of any difficulty is to be done
concerning positive facts, that is to say, not mere mathematical deduction,
the aid that logic affords is most important. [CP 2.178 (1902)]
. . .
Peirce advanced his theory of logic as semeotic to explain that
capability we so easily take for granted in its routine and pervasive
operation: learning by experience through communication [see CP 2.227, from
a manuscript fragment (c. 1897)]. Especially in science, we have been able
to develop methods that improve (or economize) the natural trial-and-error
procedure of learning by experience. Peirce formulated his pragmatic method
of logic for refining scientific learning procedures, and he even created a
graphical notation tool, Existential Graphs (EG), as a "topology of logic"
for observing and demonstrating how the improvement of learning can occur
through the process of dialogic reasoning. He concluded that the essence
of successful learning of any sort is due not primarily to the
sophistication of its measuring instruments or its investigational
techniques, although those are essential. Careful observation and
ingenious conceptualization generate knowledge only to the extent that they
are collaboratively validated by those engaged in learning.
Peirce explains three qualities, "Caution, Breadth, and Incomplexity," as
the economic considerations in the intricate evaluation among hypotheses.
In respect to caution, the game of twenty questions is instructive. ...
The secret of the business lies in the caution which breaks a hypothesis up
into its smallest logical components, and only risks one of them at a
time. What a world of futile controversy and of confused experimentation
might have been saved if this principle had guided investigations into the
theory of light! Correlative to the quality of caution is that of
breadth. For when we break the hypothesis into elementary parts, we may,
and should, inquire how far the same explanation accounts for the same
phenomenon when it appears in other subjects. [CP 7.220-21 (1901)]
He further explains how an incomplex and even rough hypothesis can be
more robust and do what a more elaborate one would fail to do [see CP 7.222
(1901)]. And he often identifies incomplexity with the dialogic purpose of
his EG in “the central problem of logic, [which is] to say whether one
given thought is truly, i.e., is adapted to be, a development of a given
other or not" [CP 4.9 (1906)].
To avoid advocacy, inquiry should proceed only from claims that can be
subjected to careful scrutiny of their reasons (as evidence), and inquirers
should rely on a "multitude and variety" of many claims and reasons that
can be conceptually articulated, rather than the apparent conclusiveness of
any one claim. As Peirce explains, reasoning in inquiry should not form a
"chain of inferences" (which is no stronger than its weakest link) but
rather a cable, "whose fibers may be ever so slender, provided they are
sufficiently numerous and intimately connected" [CP 5.3 (1902); and see
Haack 2009]. The minutest details formulated as claims and reasons can
collectively turn out to be crucial contributions in constructing strong
arguments. Although this process of inquiry cannot be fully automated,
technology augmentation can perform functions of representation,
bookkeeping, and logical articulation that are tedious and error-prone for
humans, which can be used to clarify and reveal hidden conceptual
complexities in modeling and simulation [see Skagestad].
To grasp or understand a concept is to have practical mastery of
inferences in a network involving that concept—and its evolving
application. Fully grasping complex inferential networks of conditional
relations is a significant challenge for inquirers, especially in
collaborative inquiry. Asserting a responsible claim requires
understanding at least some of its consequences, and realizing what other
claims it relates to and what other evidence relates to it. As in playing
a game, researchers develop strategies in formulating conjectures that can
justify other conjectures, which can be justified by still other
conjectures and preclude alternative hypotheses. In this complex
reasoning, logical argumentation resembles a game in which researchers
economically construct valid inferential articulation—or conceptual content
[see Keeler (2004) and (2005); and see Appendix G, for a scenario of
players].
Randall Dipert concludes that Peirce made “some of the very few profound
contributions in the history of philosophy to the big picture of what logic
is, and of the normative dimension of all thought” [(1995): 318]. While a
“workmanlike community” can be theoretically represented and analyzed by
the usual mechanical (empirical) theories of science, when logic is
understood as a general theory of the meaning of signs in deliberate
thinking, then pragmaticism as its method should give us the “power of
self-controlled thinking” and “self-observation” for “strategic thinking
and planning” [see Pietarinen (2012): 179]. We can create habits of
self-control to serve some objective, but this capability to predict the
future and conduct ourselves toward that aim (of what we determine could or
should be) cannot be explained by empirical theory (of what is). In his
Economics of Science, James Wible describes, in the broadest sense,
Peirce’s contribution to the economics of science: “Peirce rejected the
mechanism that flourished in physics and other disciplines during his
lifetime. Peirce was an evolutionary indeterminist. Like the mainstream
economists, Peirce saw optimization theory as a useful tool of economic
analysis. For Peirce optimization took place in the context of a more
general evolutionary view of the world, … with an economy of research as an
integral part of the conception of scientific inference” [(1998): 82].
Wible finds Peirce’s theory consistent with Michael Polanyi’s “Republic of
Science is a Society of Explorers,” who join to move towards achievements
that are unknown to any of them [143].
. . .
And finally (from the Conclusions, p. 60)
Without the socially-conducted, belief-evaluation capability provided by
inquiry, we automatically (or unconsciously) assume our limited sample of
beliefs. And these limited belief-samples can become even more
unconsciously adopted when we use tools that have automated them as habits
of conduct! Any good tools must be carefully designed to automate effective
habits (habits that improve efforts to reach some goal), and designers of
tools to improve inquiry must be able to evaluate what habits can and
should be automated for that purpose. Arthur Burks explains how
mathematics serves as a tool for clarifying and evaluating deductive
reasoning: “When, for example, a logician tests a sorites, or chains of
reasoning, he is doing essentially what a mathematician does when he
deduces a theorem from some postulates” [188]. Similarly, normative
science is conceived to serve as a tool for evaluating inquiry, giving us
the power to observe, clarify, and test ideas as hypotheses in experiments
toward improvement. As Peirce says: "the entire meaning of a hypothesis
lies in its conditional experiential predictions," to the extent that its
predictions are true, the hypothesis is true [CP 1.29 (1869); emphasis
added]. Normative logic can be used to analyze how to economize (or
optimize) our socially-based inquiry (or learning) by mapping means-ends
relations to keep track of what tools we need in relation to what purpose
or goals we determine they must serve.
Not only must intelligence be social, it must be self-controlled
(critical), to improve learning by experience.
Mary
On Fri, Nov 26, 2021 at 12:08 PM Edwina Taborsky <taborsky(a)primus.ca>
wrote:
Mary- yes, I'm receiving three copies - but
two are sent to two
different email addresses.
As for 'learning by experience', my view is that ALL existential
entities learn by experience. I include not merely the inorganic but the
full organic realm; that is, I don't accept random mutation as the basis
for adaptation and evolution but consider that both are semiosic actions
within complex adaptive systems.
That is - Mind and Matter are correlates - and as such, a biological
organism has a proto-consciousness and interacts with its environment in a
pragmatic [intelligent] manner.
Edwina
On Fri 26/11/21 1:45 PM , Mary Keeler mkeeler(a)uw.edu sent:
Edwina, thanks for pursuing this significant realm of study.
As complexity grows, coordination and collaboration become more
significant, especially for "intelligence capable of learning by
experience" (as Peirce defines us). You observe:
How does mediation differentiate between valid and invalid conclusions?
Induction is one method....But, entropic rejection of data as 'noise' is
another....Both can lead to problems.
Peirce's theory of inquiry proposes abduction, deduction, and induction
as the stages required for effective inquiry (or learning) — and these are
to be repeated indefinitely.
Humans are well equipped (with perception) for guessing, and we can test
those possibilities by induction. But to resolve many possibilities into a
good guess (worth testing), we need deduction.
You might think of this as "reducing noise." The idea is to find testable
hypotheses, and to test them in order of how easy they are to test (a
process of "reducing noise").
That is just where logical formulation and the deduction of computers
can help. And graphical logic could help humans observe this process.
But of course I agree with your broader applicability of Peirce's
framework!
Mary
P.S. Are you receiving 3 copies of the notes I send to the List?
On Thu, Nov 25, 2021 at 6:48 AM Edwina Taborsky <taborsky(a)primus.ca>
wrote:
Mary- further to your extension of the concept of
CAS [complex adaptive
systems] to CAR [complex adaptive reasoning] - I certainly agree and
consider such a framework to be a basic semiosic triadic process.
That is, complex systems are self-organized in order to be adaptive
[aka pragmatic], and this requires a method for such pragmatic activity.
This method is the triadic reasoning process, where, given input sensate
data, the System can reference this input to its mediative analytic system
[Peirce's Representamen/sign] wich acts as an If-Then analytic process.
That is, this nodal site holds generalities and input sensate data is
referenced to these generalities to produce a conclusion.
I think the triadic method is a vital morphology in the development of
CAS ..
On another note, the mediative nodal site holds multiple
possibilities for use to analyze input data. A simple system will have very
few of these possibilities and therefore, a limited conclusion. This,
frankly, provides the larger system with stability -you can't have atoms
and molecules changing their format every two minutes]. A more
complex system provides many more possibilities - but this can be
problematic....How does mediation differentiate between valid and invalid
conclusions? Induction is one method....But, entropic rejection of data as
'noise' is another....Both can lead to problems..
Edwina
On Wed 24/11/21 7:04 PM , Mary Keeler mkeeler(a)uw.edu sent:
[Let's see if this goes to the list?]
Thank you, Edwina, I have similar interests and agree with your
conclusion about the applicability of the Peircean framework.
I met John Holland before he died, and explained my extension of his
CAS to CAR, leading to the idea of the "game of pragmatism" — which he
called "a flight simulator for the mind"!
Here are a couple of papers that might help to explain (see more at the
Revelator site, below)?
Complex Adaptive Reasoning:
Knowledge Emergence in the Revelator Game
http://conceptualgraphs.org/revelator/web/papers/keelerkcap09.pdf
Games of Inquiry
for Collaborative Concept Structuring
<http://conceptualgraphs.org/revelator/web/papers/iccs05.pdf>
http://conceptualgraphs.org/revelator/web/papers/iccs05.pdf
Revelator: Game of Complex Adaptive Reasoning
http://conceptualgraphs.org/revelator/web/research/Papers.php
If pragmatism is essentially the scientific method, and we need that
method for experimenting with ideas in order to develop Normative
Science as the study of habit-change, then that game might give us a
collaborative way to proceed? It could (and should) incorporate graphical
logic so that players can keep track of the development of effective
arguments.
Here are just a few paragraphs from Peirce in support of this idea
(selected from many more).
Mary
CP Vol 8 (1891)
Chapter 6: To Christine Ladd-Franklin, On Cosmology†1
316. My work in philosophy has consisted in an accurate analysis of
concepts, showing what is and what is not essential to the subject of
analysis. Particularly, in logic, my motive for studying the algebra of the
subject, has been the desire to find out with accuracy what are the
essential ingredients of reasoning in general and of its principal kinds.
To make a powerful calculus has not been my care.
317. I may mention that my chief avocation in the last ten years has
been to develop my cosmology.†2 This theory is that the evolution of the
world is hyperbolic, that is, proceeds from one state of things in the
infinite past, to a different state of things in the infinite future. The
state of things in the infinite past is chaos, tohu bohu, the nothingness
of which consists in the total absence of regularity. The state of things
in the infinite future is death, the nothingness of which consists in the
complete triumph of law and absence of all spontaneity.†3 Between these, we
have on our side a state of things in which there is some absolute
spontaneity counter to all law, and some degree of conformity to law, which
is constantly on the increase owing to the growth of habit. The tendency to
form habits or tendency to generalize, is something which grows by its own
action, by the habit of taking habits itself growing. Its first germs arose
from pure chance. There were slight tendencies to obey rules that had been
followed, and these tendencies were rules which were more and more obeyed
by their own action. There were also slight tendencies to do otherwise than
previously, and these destroyed themselves. To be sure, they would
sometimes be strengthened by the opposite tendency, but the stronger they
became the more they would tend to destroy themselves. As to the part of
time on the further side of eternity which leads back from the infinite
future to the infinite past, it evidently proceeds by contraries.
318. I believe the law of habit to be purely psychical. But then I
suppose matter is merely mind deadened by the development of habit. While
every physical process can be reversed without violation of the law of
mechanics, the law of habit forbids such reversal. Accordingly, time may
have been evolved by the action of habit. At first sight, it seems absurd
or mysterious to speak of time being evolved, for evolution presupposes
time. But after all, this is no serious objection, and nothing can be
simpler. Time consists in a regularity in the relations of interacting
feelings. The first chaos consisted in an infinite multitude of
unrelated feelings. As there was no continuity about them, it was, as it
were, a powder of feelings. It was worse than that, for of particles of
powder some are nearer together, others farther apart, while these feelings
had no relations, for relations are general. Now you must not ask me what
happened first. This would be as absurd as to ask what is the smallest
finite number. But springing away from the infinitely distant past to a
very very distant past, we find already evolution had been going on for an
infinitely long time. But this "time" is only our way of saying that
something had been going on. There was no real time so far as there was no
regularity, but there is no more falsity in using the language of time than
in saying that a quantity is zero. In this chaos of feelings, bits of
similitude had appeared, been swallowed up again. Had reappeared by chance.
A slight tendency to generalization had here and there lighted up and been
quenched. Had reappeared, had strengthened itself. Like had begun to
produce like. Then even pairs of unlike feelings had begun to have
similars, and then these had begun to generalize. And thus relations of
contiguity, that is connections other than similarities, had sprung up. All
this went on in ways I cannot now detail till the feelings were so bound
together that a passable approximation to a real time was established. It
is not to be supposed that the ideally perfect time has even yet been
realized. There are no doubt occasional lacunae and derailments.†4
Supposing matter to be but mind under the slavery of inveterate habit,
the law of mind still applies to it. According to that law, consciousness
subsides as habit becomes established, and is excited again at the breaking
up of habit. But the highest quality of mind involves a great readiness to
take habits, and a great readiness to lose them [(CP 6.613) 1893].
Pragmatism is the principle that every theoretical judgment expressible
in a sentence in the indicative mood is a confused form of thought whose
only meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency to enforce a
corresponding practical maxim expressible as a conditional sentence having
its apodosis in the imperative mood [CP 5.18, Lecture 1, “Pragmatism: The
Normative Sciences” (1903)].
CP Vol. 5
What Pragmatism Is [First of three Monist articles, 1905]
1. Experimentalist’s View of Assertion
. . .
412. … The laboratory life did not prevent the writer (who here and in
what follows simply exemplifies the experimentalist type) from becoming
interested in methods of thinking; and when he came to read metaphysics,
although much of it seemed to him loosely reasoned and determined by
accidental prepossessions, yet in the writings of some philosophers,
especially Kant, Berkeley, and Spinoza, he sometimes came upon strains of
thought that recalled the ways of thinking of the laboratory, so that he
felt he might trust to them; all of which has been true of other
laboratory-men.
Endeavoring, as a man of that type naturally would, to formulate what
he so approved, he framed the theory that a conception, that is, the
rational purport of a word or other expression, lies exclusively in its
conceivable bearing upon the conduct of life; so that, since obviously
nothing that might not result from experiment can have any direct bearing
upon conduct, if one can define accurately all the conceivable experimental
phenomena which the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply, one
will have therein a complete definition of the concept, and there is
absolutely nothing more in it. For this doctrine he invented the name
pragmatism. Some of his friends wished him to call it practicism or
practicalism (perhaps on the ground that {praktikos} is better Greek than
{pragmatikos}. But for one who had learned philosophy out of Kant, as the
writer, along with nineteen out of every twenty experimentalists who have
turned to philosophy, had done, and who still thought in Kantian terms most
readily, praktisch and pragmatisch were as far apart as the two poles, the
former belonging in a region of thought where no mind of the
experimentalist type can ever make sure of solid ground under his feet, the
latter expressing relation to some definite human purpose. Now quite the
most striking feature of the new theory was its recognition of an
inseparable connection between rational cognition and rational purpose; and
that consideration it was which determined the preference for the name
pragmatism.
---------------------
He explains pragmatism as a method that helps us to know what we think,
the meaning of which is interpreted as our willingness to act on that
thought—in terms of its conceived consequences.
Modern science, with its microscopes and telescopes, with its chemistry
and electricity, and with its entirely new appliances of life, has put us
into quite another world; almost as much so as if it had transported our
race to another planet. Some of the old beliefs have no application except
in extended senses, and in such extended senses they are sometimes
dubitable and subject to just criticism. It is above all the normative
sciences (esthetics, ethics, and logic) that men are in dire need of having
severely criticized, in their relation to the new world created by
science. Unfortunately, this need is as unconscious as it is great. [CP
5.513 (c.1905) "Consequences of Critical Common-Sensism"]
“Pragmatism is not a system of philosophy. It is only a method of
thinking ...” (CP 8.206, c. 1905).
On Mon, Nov 22, 2021 at 9:08 AM Edwina Taborsky <taborsky(a)primus.ca>
wrote:
> With the opening of this new site for the open and
> exploratory discussion of, among other things, the use of Peirce in the
> analysis of the modern world, I'd like to outline, briefly, my interests in
> this area.
>
> I consider that the triadic semiosis is both a continuous process in
> the generation of matter on this planet - and- can also be understood as
> the morphological form of discrete entities. That is, a cell is both a
> triadic semiosic unit and an active process of the semiosic processing of
> matter...connected and networked to other semiosic units/processes. I
> consider this outline well-documented within Peircean texts.
>
> This view also goes along with my understanding that Peirce's
> 'objective idealism' is a view that neither Mind nor Matter are primordial
> but that both are co-evolving correlates. {See 6.24 and other texts].
>
> And as such - I am interested in examining the world as a Complex
> Adaptive System, which means that both variety and stability are correlates
> in this generative, adaptive, 'far-from-equilibrium' world - with no final
> state.
>
> These are major areas of my interest, which means that I consider that
> the Peircean framework is applicable to the physic-chemical, biological and
> societal/conceptual realms.
>
> Edwina Taborsky
>
>
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