Barry> Landgrebe and I have been working on a BFO physics Ontology and on
a mathematics Ontology, separate from BFO.
I'm glad to hear that you're finally developing an ontology for
mathematics and that it's independent of the current BFO.
Since it's impossible to do modern physics without a huge amount of
mathematics, I suggest that you combine your math ontology with BFO in
order to support physics.
There are three ways to combine an ontology of actual entities with a math
ontology:
1. Platonic: The mathematical forms are really real, and the physical
stuff is a degenerate approximation to reality.
2. Aristotelian: The physical entities are the real existents and the
forms exist only when they are embodied in physical stuff.
3. Peirce's update to Aristotle: All mathematical forms exist as real
possibilities, which may be used to describe or characterize anything that
exists in actuality or in any kind of imagined, planned, intended, hoped,
feared, described, communicated, or hypothesized aspect of reality.
Peirce's version implies that pure mathematicians can talk and act like
Platonists (which they frequently do), but applied mathematicians can focus
on the actual universe while having an infinite book of mathematical forms
to use as they wish when they're doing any kind of engineering, virtual
reality, or plans for future things that do not yet exist.
Option 3 also supports every kind of pattern on paper, in anyone's
imagination, implicit in any spoken or written language or notation,
implicit in anybody's knowledge, or implicit in any data structures in any
computer or collection of computers anywhere in the universe.
In short, Peirce's option #3 supports common sense, the most advanced
sciences, and every form of artistic endeavor in any culture in the world
-- or even in any alien life anywhere in the universe.
I recommend it,
John