Thanks, Jon,for this succinct - and I consider very accurate outline of the Sign. The key,
as you point out, is that the Sign is not a ’thing-in-itself’- the error so many make-
but is a triadic set of relations. ….”sign hood is a role in a triadic relation, a role
….[I repeat, a ROLE…not a thing]…within a relational triad….that ‘predicate with three
places’[or three nodes, as I prefer]
Therefore- as you point out, it’s not a dyadic correspondence- again, the Saussurian error
so many make. Nor is it linear causal determinism.
Edwina Taborsky
On Jun 30, 2022, at 11:30 AM, Jon Awbrey
<jawbrey(a)att.net> wrote:
Cf: Sign Relations • Definition
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/06/30/sign-relations-definition-2/
All,
One of Peirce's clearest and most complete definitions of a sign
is one he gives in the context of providing a definition for logic,
and so it is informative to view it in that setting.
<QUOTE CSP:>
Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic. A definition of a sign will be
given which no more refers to human thought than does the definition of a line
as the place which a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time.
Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign
determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence with something,
C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C. It is from this definition,
together with a definition of “formal”, that I deduce mathematically the principles
of logic.
I also make a historical review of all the definitions and conceptions of logic,
and show, not merely that my definition is no novelty, but that my non-psychological
conception of logic has virtually been quite generally held, though not generally
recognized. (C.S. Peirce, NEM 4, 20–21).
</QUOTE>
In the general discussion of diverse theories of signs, the question frequently
arises whether signhood is an absolute, essential, indelible, or ontological
property of a thing, or whether it is a relational, interpretive, and mutable
role a thing can be said to have only within a particular context of relationships.
Peirce's definition of a sign defines it in relation to its object and
its interpretant sign, and thus defines signhood in relative terms, by
means of a predicate with three places. In this definition, signhood
is a role in a triadic relation, a role a thing bears or plays in a given
context of relationships — it is not an absolute, non-relative property of
a thing-in-itself, a status it maintains independently of all relationships
to other things.
Some of the terms Peirce uses in his definition of a sign
may need to be elaborated for the contemporary reader.
• Correspondence. From the way Peirce uses this term throughout his work it is
clear he means what he elsewhere calls a “triple correspondence”, in short, just
another way of referring to the whole triadic sign relation itself. In particular,
his use of this term should not be taken to imply a dyadic correspondence, as in
the varieties of “mirror image” correspondence between realities and representations
bandied about in contemporary controversies about “correspondence theories of truth”.
• Determination. Peirce's concept of determination is broader in several ways
than the sense of the word referring to strictly deterministic causal-temporal
processes. First, and especially in this context, he uses a more general concept
of determination, what is known as formal or informational determination, as we use
in geometry when we say “two points determine a line”, rather than the more special
cases of causal or temporal determinisms. Second, he characteristically allows for
the broader concept of determination in measure, that is, an order of determinism
admitting a full spectrum of more and less determined relationships.
• Non-psychological. Peirce's “non-psychological conception of logic” must be
distinguished from any variety of anti-psychologism. He was quite interested in
matters of psychology and had much of import to say about them. But logic and
psychology operate on different planes of study even when they happen to view
the same data, as logic is a normative science where psychology is a descriptive
science. Thus they have distinct aims, methods, and rationales.
Reference
• Charles S. Peirce (1902), “Parts of Carnegie Application” (L 75),
in Carolyn Eisele (ed., 1976), The New Elements of Mathematics by
Charles S. Peirce, vol. 4, 13–73.
Online (
https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/bycsp/L75/l75.htm ) .
Resources
• Semeiotic (
https://oeis.org/wiki/Semeiotic )
• Logic Syllabus (
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/logic-syllabus/ )
• Sign Relations (
https://oeis.org/wiki/Sign_relation )
• Triadic Relations (
https://oeis.org/wiki/Triadic_relation )
• Relation Theory (
https://oeis.org/wiki/Relation_theory )
Document History
See OEIS Wiki • Sign Relation • Document History
https://oeis.org/wiki/Sign_relation#Document_history
Regards,
Jon
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