Azamat> I have an impression that many big problems in science and
technology could be solved by recognizing Data as a Prime Ontological
Category
Yes, of course. That is absolutely true!!!! The failure to recognize and
emphasize that point is the primary reason why the ISO standard for
ontology is hopelessly obsolete.
But instead of the word "Data", I recommend the more general word "Signs".
That term includes every kind of language, logic, patterns, notations,
books, documents, web pages, representations, images, diagrams, virtual
reality... independent of any media, substrate, or equipment on which the
signs may be stored, displayed, processed, or transmitted.
In fact, an ontology that does not include signs as a fundamental category
is incapable of representing or talking about itself. Every theory of
mathematics and logic is a formal system of signs that are related by
formal signs called axioms and rules of inference.
For an ontology that has a two-way split at the top (Signs and Physics),
see slide 30 of http://www.jfsowa.com/talks/patolog4.pdf
Those are the slides for day 4 of a short course on Patterns of Logic and
Ontology. For the slides of the other days, see patlog1, 2, 3, and 5.
John
Ed,
I used the verb 'give' as an example of an obligatory triad: any act of giving must have three participants. The mapping to three dyadic relations is a purely syntactic transformation that replaces the verb "give" with a gerund 'giving' and three linguistic dyads. But the node labeled 'giving" (in any notation, linear or graphic) still has three links. If you delete any of those three, the semantics is incomplete.
As another example, consider the sentence "I dropped the box on the floor". The verb 'drop' happens to have three connections, but only two are obligatory. You can replace that sentence with two semantically complete sentences: "I dropped the box" and "the box landed on the floor."
In that example, each sentence, by itself, is syntactically and semantically complete. The verb 'give' is semantically an obligatory triad; there must always be three participants. But the verb 'drop' only requires two participants for a complete sentence. The verb 'land' only requires one -- the sentence "The plane landed" only has one participant for the verb to make a syntactically and semantically complete sentence.
C. S. Peirce observed that relations that express intentions (by humans or other sentient beings) require a third participant who has or had the intention that caused or explained the dyadic relation that links the other two.
For example, an act of giving may be performed by sending a package in the mail. But the package is not gift unless it contains a card that explains why it was sent. That obligatory Thirdness is essential to show the intention.
John
----------------------------------------
From: "Edward Barkmeyer" <ebarkmeyer(a)thematix.com>
John's last paragraph:
JFS> For example, "A gives B to C" my be replaced by three dyads and a monad: "Giving(X) and Agent(X,A) and Patient(X,B) and Recipient(X,C)". In this translation of an obligatory triad to a monad and three dyads, the act of giving X has three parts that must occur at the same time.. You can't perform the different dyads in separable actions.
This is the standard dyadic form for the description of an arbitrary 'event'/'situation'. The event is an instance of some class of events/situations, which is usually a separate monadic predicate. In John's example, Giving(X). Each of the 'roles' in the event (active or passive) is a dyadic predicate of the form <role>(<event>, <participant>). And, not coincidentally, this is exactly the 5th normal form rendering of a complex relation (which is a DBMS representation of a 'situation').
Cf: C.S. Peirce • On the Definition of Logic
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/06/01/c-s-peirce-on-the-definition-of-l…
Selections from C.S. Peirce, “Carnegie Application” (1902)
<QUOTE CSP>
No. 12. On the Definition of Logic
Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic. A definition of a sign will be given
which no more refers to human thought than does the definition of a line as the place
which a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time. Namely, a sign is
something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign determined or created
by it, into the same sort of correspondence with something, C, its object, as that
in which itself stands to C. It is from this definition, together with a definition
of “formal”, that I deduce mathematically the principles of logic. I also make a
historical review of all the definitions and conceptions of logic, and show, not
merely that my definition is no novelty, but that my non-psychological conception
of logic has virtually been quite generally held, though not generally recognized.
(NEM 4, 20–21).
No. 12. On the Definition of Logic [Earlier Draft]
Logic is formal semiotic. A sign is something, A, which brings something, B,
its interpretant sign, determined or created by it, into the same sort of
correspondence (or a lower implied sort) with something, C, its object,
as that in which itself stands to C. This definition no more involves
any reference to human thought than does the definition of a line as
the place within which a particle lies during a lapse of time.
It is from this definition that I deduce the principles of logic
by mathematical reasoning, and by mathematical reasoning that,
I aver, will support criticism of Weierstrassian severity, and
that is perfectly evident. The word “formal” in the definition
is also defined. (NEM 4, 54).
</QUOTE>
Reference
=========
Charles S. Peirce (1902), “Parts of Carnegie Application” (L 75), published in
Carolyn Eisele (ed., 1976), The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce,
vol. 4, 13–73. Online ( https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/bycsp/L75/l75.htm ).
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon, list
A few comments on your outline of the Sign. I think one has to be
careful not to set up a Saussurian linguistic dyad.
I refer you to Robert Marty's '76 definitions of the Sign' - which
are quotes from Peirce's work. I'll refer to several of them:
"Genuine mediation is the character of a Sign. A sign is anything
which is related to a Second thing, its Object, in respect to a
Quality, in such a way as to bring a Third thing, its Interpretant,
into relation to the same Object.....1902. 2.92
And '"A definition of a sign will be given which no more refers to
human though that does the definition of a line as the place which a
particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time. 1902. NEW IV
pp 20-2
And 'Every sign stands for an object independent of itself, but it
can only be a sign of that object in so far as that object is itself
of the nature of a sign or thought. 1903. CP 1-53
"A sign is plainly a species of medium of communication' 1905. MS283
p 125
"Signs ...are triadic" 1909 6.344
"A sign is an object which stands for another to some mind"
I have several points.
First - Peirce uses both the term 'Representamen' for this mediative
process - as well as the term 'sign'. Second- He also understands the
'sign' as a complete triadic process such that this irreducible triad
can be considered an existential entity. That is, the full triad, the
Sign, has three correlates or relational parts: ;that in itself, that
with the object; and that with the interpretant.
A full active triad, in my view, can be understood in many ways: I'd
consider a cell as a full active triad, and thus, as both a Sign [the
triad] and engaged in that triadic mediative process using the
internal representamen/sign to carry out this mediation.
Edwina
On Wed 01/12/21 11:45 AM , Jon Awbrey jawbrey(a)att.net sent:
Cf: Triadic Relations • 3
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2021/11/08/triadic-relations-3/ [1]
Examples from Semiotics
=======================
The study of signs — the full variety of significant forms of
expression —
in relation to all the affairs signs are significant “of”, and
in relation
to all the beings signs are significant “to”, is known as
“semiotics” or the
theory of signs. As described, semiotics treats of a 3-place
relation among
signs, their objects, and their interpreters.
The term “semiosis” refers to any activity or process involving
signs.
Studies of semiosis focusing on its abstract form are not concerned
with every concrete detail of the entities acting as signs, as
objects,
or as agents of semiosis, but only with the most salient patterns of
relationship among those three roles. In particular, the formal
theory
of signs does not consider all the properties of the interpretive
agent
but only the more striking features of the impressions signs make on
a
representative interpreter. From a formal point of view this
impactor
influence may be treated as just another sign, called the
“interpretant
sign”, or the “interpretant” for short. A triadic relation of
this type,
among objects, signs, and interpretants, is called a “sign
relation”.
For example, consider the aspects of sign use involved when two
people,
say Ann and Bob, use their own proper names, “Ann” and
“Bob”, along with
the pronouns, “I” and “you”, to refer to themselves and each
other. For
brevity, these four signs may be abbreviated to the set {“A”,
“B”, “i”, “u”}.
The abstract consideration of how A and B use this set of signs
leads to the
contemplation of a pair of triadic relations, the sign relations L_A
and L_B,
reflecting the differential use of these signs by A and B,
respectively.
Each of the sign relations L_A and L_B consists of eight triples of
the form
(x, y, z), where the “object” x belongs to the “object
domain” O = {A, B},
the “sign” y belongs to the “sign domain” S, the
“interpretant sign” z
belongs to the “interpretant domain” I, and where it happens in
this case
that S = I = {“A”, “B”, “i”, “u”}. The union S ∪
I is often referred to
as the “syntactic domain”, but in this case S = I = S ∪ I.
The set-up so far is summarized as follows:
• L_A, L_B ⊆ O × S × I
• O = {A, B}
• S = {“A”, “B”, “i”, “u”}
• I = {“A”, “B”, “i”, “u”}
The relation L_A is the following set of eight triples in O × S ×
I.
• { (A, “A”, “A”), (A, “A”, “i”), (A, “i”,
“A”), (A, “i”, “i”),
(B, “B”, “B”), (B, “B”, “u”), (B, “u”,
“B”), (B, “u”, “u”) }
The triples in L_A represent the way interpreter A uses signs.
For example, the presence of (B, “u”, “B”) in L_A says A
uses “B”
to mean the same thing A uses “u” to mean, namely, B.
The relation L_B is the following set of eight triples in O × S ×
I.
• { (A, “A”, “A”), (A, “A”, “u”), (A, “u”,
“A”), (A, “u”, “u”),
(B, “B”, “B”), (B, “B”, “i”), (B, “i”,
“B”), (B, “i”, “i”) }
The triples in L_B represent the way interpreter B uses signs.
For example, the presence of (B, “i”, “B”) in L_B says B
uses “B”
to mean the same thing B uses “i” to mean, namely, B.
The triples in the relations L_A and L_B are conveniently arranged
in the form of relational data tables, as shown below.
Table A. L_A = Sign Relation of Interpreter A
https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2020/05/sign-relation-la-int…
[2]
Table B. L_B = Sign Relation of Interpreter B
https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2020/05/sign-relation-lb-int…
[3]
Resources
=========
Survey of Relation Theory
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2021/11/08/survey-of-relation-theory-5/
[4]
Survey of Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2019/10/29/survey-of-semiotics-semiosis-sign…
[5]
Regards,
Jon
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Cf: Triadic Relations • 1
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2021/11/07/triadic-relations-1/
| Of triadic Being the multitude of forms is so terrific that
| I have usually shrunk from the task of enumerating them;
| and for the present purpose such an enumeration would be
| worse than superfluous: it would be a great inconvenience.
|
| C.S. Peirce, Collected Papers, CP 6.347
( https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/06/14/c-s-peirce-of-triadic-being/ )
All,
A “triadic relation” (or “ternary relation”) is a special case of a polyadic or
finitary relation, one in which the number of places in the relation is three.
One may also see the adjectives 3-adic, 3-ary, 3-dimensional, or 3-place being
used to describe these relations.
Mathematics is positively rife with examples of triadic relations
and the field of semiotics is rich in its harvest of sign relations,
which are special cases of triadic relations. In either subject, as
Peirce observes, the multitude of forms is truly terrific, so it's best
to begin with concrete examples just complex enough to illustrate the
distinctive features of each type. The discussion to follow takes up
a pair of simple but instructive examples from each of the realms of
mathematics and semiotics.
Resources
=========
• Relation Theory
https://oeis.org/wiki/Relation_theory
• Triadic Relations
https://oeis.org/wiki/Triadic_relation
• Sign Relations
https://oeis.org/wiki/Sign_relation
• Survey of Relation Theory
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2021/11/08/survey-of-relation-theory-5/
Regards,
Jon
Yes please. You guys need another list as this one is CG (Conceptual Graphs / Conceptual Structures). Thanks, Simon
From: Mary Keeler <mkeeler(a)uw.edu>
Sent: 28 November 2021 19:33
To: cg(a)lists.iccs-conference.org
Subject: [CG] Re: Complex Adaptive Systems as Semiosic Systems
Auke, thank you. Yes, we need to fix this list operation — and change its name!
Looking forward to your response,
Mary
On Sun, Nov 28, 2021 at 9:46 AM Auke van Breemen via CG <cg(a)lists.iccs-conference.org<mailto:cg@lists.iccs-conference.org>> wrote:
Mary,
I have the impression that currently if we want to address the list only we always have to delete the sender, as I had to delete your address with my reply to all, and as you can see a 'reply to' only adresses mkeeler as the writer of the mail, not the list.
I hope to respond to your initial mail, the one with article references. You have some interesting points.
best,
Auke van Breemen
Op 28 november 2021 om 0:48 schreef Mary Keeler <mkeeler(a)uw.edu<mailto:mkeeler@uw.edu>>:
Edwina, would you please send your messages to the List without adding your address? When I "reply to" it gives me only your address, and when I "reply to all" it still sends to you, with the list as a "cc."
We seem to be "talking past one another"? I completely agree with your point about Peirce's theory of the continuity between Mind and Matter in evolving habits. And that other forms of life probably benefit from what we can recognize and formulate as "the capacity for that pragmatic result of an If-Then choice" — but without the crucial capability to represent, examine, and criticize this process that humans have.
We cannot account for the intelligent capability to create symbolic tools that allow us to examine and correct our habits without (as you say) "the capacity for symbolic semiosis" (analyzable in terms of sign, object, interpretant) — and then we can identify the grades of clarity, which we need in order to deal with metaphysical issues. Here is a sample of Peirce's late (never published) view.
Excerpt from MS 498 (1906):
By real, I always mean that which is such as it is whatever you or I or any generation of men may opine or otherwise think that it is. There must not be any confusion between reality and existential,— that is real which is as it is no matter what one may think about it, the existential is that which is as it is whatever one may think about anything. No doubt there are grades of reality, meaning that objects of signs may yield with more or less resistance to opinion or representation. According to the definition, absolute resistance is essential to reality. But an approach to reality, something that is not in the slightest of the nature of a pretense is found wherever an object of thought is sufficiently obstinate to enable us to say, it has not those characters but it does have these, there is already a lesson in logic. Namely, that one may lay down the very best of definitions, going to the very heart of things; and yet there will be, as it were, a little living mouse of a quasi exception which will find or make a hole to get in when all seemed hermetically closed. This mouse will not be a mere pest to be got rid of and forgotten. It will be a fellow being to be remembered and to be appraised. [pp. 32-33]
Without those grades of clarity, how can account for art or science, which give us the power of hypothetical ideas to study as if they were real — for improved clarity in semiosis? Here is Peirce's partially published early account.
Excerpt from 1893 "A Guess at the Riddle"
CP 1.383 … The work of the poet or novelist is not so utterly different from that of the scientific man. The artist introduces a fiction; but it is not an arbitrary one; it exhibits affinities to which the mind accords a certain approval in pronouncing them beautiful, which if it is not exactly the same as saying that the synthesis is true, is something of the same general kind. The geometer draws a diagram, which if not exactly a fiction, is at least a creation, and by means of observation of that diagram he is able to synthesize and show relations between elements which before seemed to have no necessary connection. The realities compel us to put some things into very close relation and others less so, in a highly complicated, and in the [to?] sense itself unintelligible manner; but it is the genius of the mind, that takes up all these hints of sense, adds immensely to them, makes them precise, and shows them in intelligible form in the intuitions of space and time. Intuition is the regarding of the abstract in a concrete form, by the realistic hypostatization of relations; that is the one sole method of valuable thought. Very shallow is the prevalent notion that this is something to be avoided. You might as well say at once that reasoning is to be avoided because it has led to so much error; quite in the same philistine line of thought would that be; and so well in accord with the spirit of nominalism that I wonder some one does not put it forward. The true precept is not to abstain from hypostatization, but to do it intelligently. . . . [“Some manuscript pages seem to be missing here.”]
To effectively use our tools for improved semiosis (and to create new ones), we must reach the 4th grade of clarity (the capability to examine how they improve semiosis)? Here is my early study of some detail involved.
The Place of Images in a World of Text
http://conceptualgraphs.org/revelator/web/papers/keelerchum.pdf
(Might be easier to read here.)
https://www.academia.edu/16036312/The_Place_of_Images_in_a_World_of_Text
On page 10, after examining J.J. Gibson's theory of perception, I ask: "Could combining Peirce's and Gibson's metatheories give us a basis for the semiotic study of computer-mediation tool development?" See what you think — don't we need theory beyond what explains semiosis in general?
Meanwhile, see what's happening in AI research!
Generated images from text
https://venturebeat.com/2021/11/22/nvidias-latest-ai-tech-translates-text-i…
That's enough for this week!
Mary
On Fri, Nov 26, 2021 at 5:09 PM Edwina Taborsky < taborsky(a)primus.ca<mailto:taborsky@primus.ca>> wrote:
Mary - just remove my personal name from the list of Reply All in the post. Just send it to the CG list - and it will go to both my emails.
I am not dealing with the grades of clarity -which can be comparable to the Interpretants. [see How to Make Our Ideas Clear and 8.185]. I am not sure if we can conclude that only humans are capable of this 'third grade'. Certainly, only humans have, I think, the capacity for symbolic semiosis. But I do think that the biological realm does have the capacity for that pragmatic result of an If-Then choice. I don't see how adaptation or evolution could function without such a process.
And I certainly do consider that we humans, with our symbolic capacity [within 3ns] , can stray very far from reality [2ns] and live within the disasters of 'magical thinking' [see Robert Marty's Lattice for how this can happen]. Was it the White Queen who said that she had 'believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast'.
I am referring to Thirdness, the cognitive mode of being that develops habits of organization, as a mental process that is found within all 'matter' - including the physico-chemical, biological and human. As such, this suggests to me that the semiosic mental process of habit-formation or model-formation can operate within an indexical manner, i.e., via direct sensate relations. But, Thirdness -as-Secondness remains a mental or logical process.
See David Chalmers - panpsychism and panprotopsychism. And of course, Peirce's famous 4.551 comment
"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals and throughout the purely physical world".
Edwina
On Fri 26/11/21 6:38 PM , Mary Keeler mkeeler(a)uw.edu<mailto:mkeeler@uw.edu> sent:
Edwina, I can't seem to easily change the "reply" to send only to the list — would you please set it up in the form you prefer (right now it includes your two addresses)?
Let me just say, here, that Peirce developed his "grades of clarity" to distinguish between human intelligence as being capable of the 3rd gradel, where we are able to reflect on our reasoning. No other animals have this ability, and it gives us the chance to improve our habits very responsively. However, some anthropologists are beginning to say that we are too adaptive: we keep doing foolish things and then just adapting to the consequences!
But that's why we need to develop reflective foresight (at even the 4rd grade of clarity), as Stango explains here, to improve our methods (or tools) for reasoning!
Stango, M. (2015): “The Pragmatic Maxim and the Normative Sciences: Peirce’s Problematical ‘Fourth’ Grade of Clarity,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: 51 (1) 34-56.
Mary
On Fri, Nov 26, 2021 at 2:55 PM Edwina Taborsky < taborsky(a)primus.ca<mailto:taborsky@primus.ca>> wrote:
No- I don't need three copies; just send posts to the CG list.
As for 'self-corrective control - I consider that the triadic semiosic process is what enables this action. A dyadic process excludes MIND-as-mediation. Once you consider that Mind and Matter are correlates, then, any material action becomes also subject to mental action.
I'm not terribly interested in the human cognitive process, which proceeds largely with the use of symbolic mental mediation. I'm interested in the physico-chemical and biological cognitive processes - which proceed with the use of indexical mental mediation.
That is, these systems can be considered as 'sentient' which means that they are capable of feeling/sensing/perceiving their environment. They do this within the triadic semiosic process, which sets up a mediating analytic process to understand the input data. I refer to this whole process as a function, where f[x]=y, with 'f' understood as mediation. Mediation operates as both a set of evolving [yes, evolving] habits-of-organization AND also includes a number of possible habits. The possible follows the logical path of IF-THEN...ie IF I take this action, THEN, such and such MIGHT occur. The organism can anticipate results of its behaviour. This cognitive process of anticipation reduces RISK - where, if an organism took a certain action without anticipatory thought - it might be disastrous. Anticipation is a vital semiotic process and my point is that an organism will have, in its knowledge base, not merely a 'normal default template' but also, in the more complex organisms, a number of learned optional possibilities. This organism can therefore react to input sensate data by CHOOSING to follow, not its normative habits, but to take one of the optional paths.
I consider that Thirdness-as-Secondness is THE vital cognitive mode that enables this indexical 'feeling out' of the environment and the analytic gathering of new possibilities.
Learning is a pragmatic observation of the results of these actions -
Edwina
On Fri 26/11/21 5:02 PM , Mary Keeler mkeeler(a)uw.edu<mailto:mkeeler@uw.edu> sent:
Edwina, do you want to receive 3 copies?
Good: "All existential entities learn by experience" — and Peiirce's theory of logic and method are to explain how learning by experience (intelligence) can be more efficient (which entails effectiveness).
That is, how self-corrective control can improve learning by experience!
Can we figure out a way to demonstrate this improvement? Here is a passage from Discovering the Future in the Past (pp. 35-41):
While other pragmatists, like Veblen, seek “a complete accounting of the socio-historical origins of human conduct” (or an empirical theory) Peirce is concerned with how inquiry determines the future, and his pragmatic (or normative) theory of logic explains how our natural cognitive urge to conceptualize and form habits of thought, which conveniently "automates behavior" in routines and tools, must be checked by our discriminating sensory capability, through pragmatic conduct that continually conceives and tests these ideas for validity and reliability by observing their implications in experience, to establish self-critical control ("The highest quality of mind involves a great readiness to take habits, and a great readiness to lose them" [CP 6.613 (1893)].) Successful collaboration requires the conscious commitment of researchers to self-critical conduct, and creative cooperation is possible only with the stability provided by progressive coordination of outcomes, representing improvement. Compare this with Griffin and Veblen’s defense of the method of tenacity: “the form of group solidarity in any peaceful, workmanlike community.”
Peirce conceived his theory to explain not a mechanistic “workmanlike community” but a community of inquiry, where “one's purpose lies in the line of novelty, invention, generalization, theory—in a word, improvement of the situation … instinct and the rule of thumb manifestly cease to be applicable” [CP 2.178 (1902)]. His pragmatic theory of research defines “habits of thinking” as beliefs, and distinguishes believing from reasoning, the self-corrective thinking required in learning to improve habits of thought. He clarifies the roles of belief and reasoning:
The best plan, then, on the whole, is to base our conduct as much as possible on Instinct, but when we do reason to reason with severely scientific logic. ... Where reasoning of any difficulty is to be done concerning positive facts, that is to say, not mere mathematical deduction, the aid that logic affords is most important. [CP 2.178 (1902)]
. . .
Peirce advanced his theory of logic as semeotic to explain that capability we so easily take for granted in its routine and pervasive operation: learning by experience through communication [see CP 2.227, from a manuscript fragment (c. 1897)]. Especially in science, we have been able to develop methods that improve (or economize) the natural trial-and-error procedure of learning by experience. Peirce formulated his pragmatic method of logic for refining scientific learning procedures, and he even created a graphical notation tool, Existential Graphs (EG), as a "topology of logic" for observing and demonstrating how the improvement of learning can occur through the process of dialogic reasoning. He concluded that the essence of successful learning of any sort is due not primarily to the sophistication of its measuring instruments or its investigational techniques, although those are essential. Careful observation and ingenious conceptualization generate knowledge only to the extent that they are collaboratively validated by those engaged in learning.
Peirce explains three qualities, "Caution, Breadth, and Incomplexity," as the economic considerations in the intricate evaluation among hypotheses.
In respect to caution, the game of twenty questions is instructive. ... The secret of the business lies in the caution which breaks a hypothesis up into its smallest logical components, and only risks one of them at a time. What a world of futile controversy and of confused experimentation might have been saved if this principle had guided investigations into the theory of light! Correlative to the quality of caution is that of breadth. For when we break the hypothesis into elementary parts, we may, and should, inquire how far the same explanation accounts for the same phenomenon when it appears in other subjects. [CP 7.220-21 (1901)]
He further explains how an incomplex and even rough hypothesis can be more robust and do what a more elaborate one would fail to do [see CP 7.222 (1901)]. And he often identifies incomplexity with the dialogic purpose of his EG in “the central problem of logic, [which is] to say whether one given thought is truly, i.e., is adapted to be, a development of a given other or not" [CP 4.9 (1906)].
To avoid advocacy, inquiry should proceed only from claims that can be subjected to careful scrutiny of their reasons (as evidence), and inquirers should rely on a "multitude and variety" of many claims and reasons that can be conceptually articulated, rather than the apparent conclusiveness of any one claim. As Peirce explains, reasoning in inquiry should not form a "chain of inferences" (which is no stronger than its weakest link) but rather a cable, "whose fibers may be ever so slender, provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected" [CP 5.3 (1902); and see Haack 2009]. The minutest details formulated as claims and reasons can collectively turn out to be crucial contributions in constructing strong arguments. Although this process of inquiry cannot be fully automated, technology augmentation can perform functions of representation, bookkeeping, and logical articulation that are tedious and error-prone for humans, which can be used to clarify and reveal hidden conceptual complexities in modeling and simulation [see Skagestad].
To grasp or understand a concept is to have practical mastery of inferences in a network involving that concept—and its evolving application. Fully grasping complex inferential networks of conditional relations is a significant challenge for inquirers, especially in collaborative inquiry. Asserting a responsible claim requires understanding at least some of its consequences, and realizing what other claims it relates to and what other evidence relates to it. As in playing a game, researchers develop strategies in formulating conjectures that can justify other conjectures, which can be justified by still other conjectures and preclude alternative hypotheses. In this complex reasoning, logical argumentation resembles a game in which researchers economically construct valid inferential articulation—or conceptual content [see Keeler (2004) and (2005); and see Appendix G, for a scenario of players].
Randall Dipert concludes that Peirce made “some of the very few profound contributions in the history of philosophy to the big picture of what logic is, and of the normative dimension of all thought” [(1995): 318]. While a “workmanlike community” can be theoretically represented and analyzed by the usual mechanical (empirical) theories of science, when logic is understood as a general theory of the meaning of signs in deliberate thinking, then pragmaticism as its method should give us the “power of self-controlled thinking” and “self-observation” for “strategic thinking and planning” [see Pietarinen (2012): 179]. We can create habits of self-control to serve some objective, but this capability to predict the future and conduct ourselves toward that aim (of what we determine could or should be) cannot be explained by empirical theory (of what is). In his Economics of Science, James Wible describes, in the broadest sense, Peirce’s contribution to the economics of science: “Peirce rejected the mechanism that flourished in physics and other disciplines during his lifetime. Peirce was an evolutionary indeterminist. Like the mainstream economists, Peirce saw optimization theory as a useful tool of economic analysis. For Peirce optimization took place in the context of a more general evolutionary view of the world, … with an economy of research as an integral part of the conception of scientific inference” [(1998): 82]. Wible finds Peirce’s theory consistent with Michael Polanyi’s “Republic of Science is a Society of Explorers,” who join to move towards achievements that are unknown to any of them [143].
. . .
And finally (from the Conclusions, p. 60)
Without the socially-conducted, belief-evaluation capability provided by inquiry, we automatically (or unconsciously) assume our limited sample of beliefs. And these limited belief-samples can become even more unconsciously adopted when we use tools that have automated them as habits of conduct! Any good tools must be carefully designed to automate effective habits (habits that improve efforts to reach some goal), and designers of tools to improve inquiry must be able to evaluate what habits can and should be automated for that purpose. Arthur Burks explains how mathematics serves as a tool for clarifying and evaluating deductive reasoning: “When, for example, a logician tests a sorites, or chains of reasoning, he is doing essentially what a mathematician does when he deduces a theorem from some postulates” [188]. Similarly, normative science is conceived to serve as a tool for evaluating inquiry, giving us the power to observe, clarify, and test ideas as hypotheses in experiments toward improvement. As Peirce says: "the entire meaning of a hypothesis lies in its conditional experiential predictions," to the extent that its predictions are true, the hypothesis is true [CP 1.29 (1869); emphasis added]. Normative logic can be used to analyze how to economize (or optimize) our socially-based inquiry (or learning) by mapping means-ends relations to keep track of what tools we need in relation to what purpose or goals we determine they must serve.
Not only must intelligence be social, it must be self-controlled (critical), to improve learning by experience.
Mary
On Fri, Nov 26, 2021 at 12:08 PM Edwina Taborsky < taborsky(a)primus.ca<mailto:taborsky@primus.ca>> wrote:
Mary- yes, I'm receiving three copies - but two are sent to two different email addresses.
As for 'learning by experience', my view is that ALL existential entities learn by experience. I include not merely the inorganic but the full organic realm; that is, I don't accept random mutation as the basis for adaptation and evolution but consider that both are semiosic actions within complex adaptive systems.
That is - Mind and Matter are correlates - and as such, a biological organism has a proto-consciousness and interacts with its environment in a pragmatic [intelligent] manner.
Edwina
On Fri 26/11/21 1:45 PM , Mary Keeler mkeeler(a)uw.edu<mailto:mkeeler@uw.edu> sent:
Edwina, thanks for pursuing this significant realm of study.
As complexity grows, coordination and collaboration become more significant, especially for "intelligence capable of learning by experience" (as Peirce defines us). You observe:
How does mediation differentiate between valid and invalid conclusions? Induction is one method....But, entropic rejection of data as 'noise' is another....Both can lead to problems.
Peirce's theory of inquiry proposes abduction, deduction, and induction as the stages required for effective inquiry (or learning) — and these are to be repeated indefinitely.
Humans are well equipped (with perception) for guessing, and we can test those possibilities by induction. But to resolve many possibilities into a good guess (worth testing), we need deduction.
You might think of this as "reducing noise." The idea is to find testable hypotheses, and to test them in order of how easy they are to test (a process of "reducing noise").
That is just where logical formulation and the deduction of computers can help. And graphical logic could help humans observe this process.
But of course I agree with your broader applicability of Peirce's framework!
Mary
P.S. Are you receiving 3 copies of the notes I send to the List?
On Thu, Nov 25, 2021 at 6:48 AM Edwina Taborsky < taborsky(a)primus.ca<mailto:taborsky@primus.ca>> wrote:
Mary- further to your extension of the concept of CAS [complex adaptive systems] to CAR [complex adaptive reasoning] - I certainly agree and consider such a framework to be a basic semiosic triadic process.
That is, complex systems are self-organized in order to be adaptive [aka pragmatic], and this requires a method for such pragmatic activity. This method is the triadic reasoning process, where, given input sensate data, the System can reference this input to its mediative analytic system [Peirce's Representamen/sign] wich acts as an If-Then analytic process. That is, this nodal site holds generalities and input sensate data is referenced to these generalities to produce a conclusion.
I think the triadic method is a vital morphology in the development of CAS ..
On another note, the mediative nodal site holds multiple possibilities for use to analyze input data. A simple system will have very few of these possibilities and therefore, a limited conclusion. This, frankly, provides the larger system with stability -you can't have atoms and molecules changing their format every two minutes]. A more complex system provides many more possibilities - but this can be problematic....How does mediation differentiate between valid and invalid conclusions? Induction is one method....But, entropic rejection of data as 'noise' is another....Both can lead to problems..
Edwina
On Wed 24/11/21 7:04 PM , Mary Keeler mkeeler(a)uw.edu<mailto:mkeeler@uw.edu> sent:
[Let's see if this goes to the list?]
Thank you, Edwina, I have similar interests and agree with your conclusion about the applicability of the Peircean framework.
I met John Holland before he died, and explained my extension of his CAS to CAR, leading to the idea of the "game of pragmatism" — which he called "a flight simulator for the mind"!
Here are a couple of papers that might help to explain (see more at the Revelator site, below)?
Complex Adaptive Reasoning:
Knowledge Emergence in the Revelator Game
http://conceptualgraphs.org/revelator/web/papers/keelerkcap09.pdf
Games of Inquiry
for Collaborative Concept Structuring
http://conceptualgraphs.org/revelator/web/papers/iccs05.pdf
Revelator: Game of Complex Adaptive Reasoning
http://conceptualgraphs.org/revelator/web/research/Papers.php
If pragmatism is essentially the scientific method, and we need that method for experimenting with ideas in order to develop Normative Science as the study of habit-change, then that game might give us a collaborative way to proceed? It could (and should) incorporate graphical logic so that players can keep track of the development of effective arguments.
Here are just a few paragraphs from Peirce in support of this idea (selected from many more).
Mary
CP Vol 8 (1891)
Chapter 6: To Christine Ladd-Franklin, On Cosmology†1
316. My work in philosophy has consisted in an accurate analysis of concepts, showing what is and what is not essential to the subject of analysis. Particularly, in logic, my motive for studying the algebra of the subject, has been the desire to find out with accuracy what are the essential ingredients of reasoning in general and of its principal kinds. To make a powerful calculus has not been my care.
317. I may mention that my chief avocation in the last ten years has been to develop my cosmology.†2 This theory is that the evolution of the world is hyperbolic, that is, proceeds from one state of things in the infinite past, to a different state of things in the infinite future. The state of things in the infinite past is chaos, tohu bohu, the nothingness of which consists in the total absence of regularity. The state of things in the infinite future is death, the nothingness of which consists in the complete triumph of law and absence of all spontaneity.†3 Between these, we have on our side a state of things in which there is some absolute spontaneity counter to all law, and some degree of conformity to law, which is constantly on the increase owing to the growth of habit. The tendency to form habits or tendency to generalize, is something which grows by its own action, by the habit of taking habits itself growing. Its first germs arose from pure chance. There were slight tendencies to obey rules that had been followed, and these tendencies were rules which were more and more obeyed by their own action. There were also slight tendencies to do otherwise than previously, and these destroyed themselves. To be sure, they would sometimes be strengthened by the opposite tendency, but the stronger they became the more they would tend to destroy themselves. As to the part of time on the further side of eternity which leads back from the infinite future to the infinite past, it evidently proceeds by contraries.
318. I believe the law of habit to be purely psychical. But then I suppose matter is merely mind deadened by the development of habit. While every physical process can be reversed without violation of the law of mechanics, the law of habit forbids such reversal. Accordingly, time may have been evolved by the action of habit. At first sight, it seems absurd or mysterious to speak of time being evolved, for evolution presupposes time. But after all, this is no serious objection, and nothing can be simpler. Time consists in a regularity in the relations of interacting feelings. The first chaos consisted in an infinite multitude of unrelated feelings. As there was no continuity about them, it was, as it were, a powder of feelings. It was worse than that, for of particles of powder some are nearer together, others farther apart, while these feelings had no relations, for relations are general. Now you must not ask me what happened first. This would be as absurd as to ask what is the smallest finite number. But springing away from the infinitely distant past to a very very distant past, we find already evolution had been going on for an infinitely long time. But this "time" is only our way of saying that something had been going on. There was no real time so far as there was no regularity, but there is no more falsity in using the language of time than in saying that a quantity is zero. In this chaos of feelings, bits of similitude had appeared, been swallowed up again. Had reappeared by chance. A slight tendency to generalization had here and there lighted up and been quenched. Had reappeared, had strengthened itself. Like had begun to produce like. Then even pairs of unlike feelings had begun to have similars, and then these had begun to generalize. And thus relations of contiguity, that is connections other than similarities, had sprung up. All this went on in ways I cannot now detail till the feelings were so bound together that a passable approximation to a real time was established. It is not to be supposed that the ideally perfect time has even yet been realized. There are no doubt occasional lacunae and derailments.†4
Supposing matter to be but mind under the slavery of inveterate habit, the law of mind still applies to it. According to that law, consciousness subsides as habit becomes established, and is excited again at the breaking up of habit. But the highest quality of mind involves a great readiness to take habits, and a great readiness to lose them [(CP 6.613) 1893].
Pragmatism is the principle that every theoretical judgment expressible in a sentence in the indicative mood is a confused form of thought whose only meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency to enforce a corresponding practical maxim expressible as a conditional sentence having its apodosis in the imperative mood [CP 5.18, Lecture 1, “Pragmatism: The Normative Sciences” (1903)].
CP Vol. 5
What Pragmatism Is [First of three Monist articles, 1905]
1. Experimentalist’s View of Assertion
. . .
412. … The laboratory life did not prevent the writer (who here and in what follows simply exemplifies the experimentalist type) from becoming interested in methods of thinking; and when he came to read metaphysics, although much of it seemed to him loosely reasoned and determined by accidental prepossessions, yet in the writings of some philosophers, especially Kant, Berkeley, and Spinoza, he sometimes came upon strains of thought that recalled the ways of thinking of the laboratory, so that he felt he might trust to them; all of which has been true of other laboratory-men.
Endeavoring, as a man of that type naturally would, to formulate what he so approved, he framed the theory that a conception, that is, the rational purport of a word or other expression, lies exclusively in its conceivable bearing upon the conduct of life; so that, since obviously nothing that might not result from experiment can have any direct bearing upon conduct, if one can define accurately all the conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply, one will have therein a complete definition of the concept, and there is absolutely nothing more in it. For this doctrine he invented the name pragmatism. Some of his friends wished him to call it practicism or practicalism (perhaps on the ground that {praktikos} is better Greek than {pragmatikos}. But for one who had learned philosophy out of Kant, as the writer, along with nineteen out of every twenty experimentalists who have turned to philosophy, had done, and who still thought in Kantian terms most readily, praktisch and pragmatisch were as far apart as the two poles, the former belonging in a region of thought where no mind of the experimentalist type can ever make sure of solid ground under his feet, the latter expressing relation to some definite human purpose. Now quite the most striking feature of the new theory was its recognition of an inseparable connection between rational cognition and rational purpose; and that consideration it was which determined the preference for the name pragmatism.
---------------------
He explains pragmatism as a method that helps us to know what we think, the meaning of which is interpreted as our willingness to act on that thought—in terms of its conceived consequences.
Modern science, with its microscopes and telescopes, with its chemistry and electricity, and with its entirely new appliances of life, has put us into quite another world; almost as much so as if it had transported our race to another planet. Some of the old beliefs have no application except in extended senses, and in such extended senses they are sometimes dubitable and subject to just criticism. It is above all the normative sciences (esthetics, ethics, and logic) that men are in dire need of having severely criticized, in their relation to the new world created by science. Unfortunately, this need is as unconscious as it is great. [CP 5.513 (c.1905) "Consequences of Critical Common-Sensism"]
“Pragmatism is not a system of philosophy. It is only a method of thinking ...” (CP 8.206, c. 1905).
On Mon, Nov 22, 2021 at 9:08 AM Edwina Taborsky < taborsky(a)primus.ca<mailto:taborsky@primus.ca>> wrote:
With the opening of this new site for the open and exploratory discussion of, among other things, the use of Peirce in the analysis of the modern world, I'd like to outline, briefly, my interests in this area.
I consider that the triadic semiosis is both a continuous process in the generation of matter on this planet - and- can also be understood as the morphological form of discrete entities. That is, a cell is both a triadic semiosic unit and an active process of the semiosic processing of matter...connected and networked to other semiosic units/processes. I consider this outline well-documented within Peircean texts.
This view also goes along with my understanding that Peirce's 'objective idealism' is a view that neither Mind nor Matter are primordial but that both are co-evolving correlates. {See 6.24 and other texts].
And as such - I am interested in examining the world as a Complex Adaptive System, which means that both variety and stability are correlates in this generative, adaptive, 'far-from-equilibrium' world - with no final state.
These are major areas of my interest, which means that I consider that the Peircean framework is applicable to the physic-chemical, biological and societal/conceptual realms.
Edwina Taborsky
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BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Mary - just remove my personal name from the list of Reply All in
the post. Just send it to the CG list - and it will go to both my
emails.
I am not dealing with the grades of clarity -which can be comparable
to the Interpretants. [see How to Make Our Ideas Clear and 8.185]. I
am not sure if we can conclude that only humans are capable of this
'third grade'. Certainly, only humans have, I think, the capacity for
symbolic semiosis. But I do think that the biological realm does have
the capacity for that pragmatic result of an If-Then choice. I don't
see how adaptation or evolution could function without such a
process.
And I certainly do consider that we humans, with our symbolic
capacity [within 3ns] , can stray very far from reality [2ns] and
live within the disasters of 'magical thinking' [see Robert Marty's
Lattice for how this can happen]. Was it the White Queen who said
that she had 'believed as many as six impossible things before
breakfast'.
I am referring to Thirdness, the cognitive mode of being that
develops habits of organization, as a mental process that is found
within all 'matter' - including the physico-chemical, biological and
human. As such, this suggests to me that the semiosic mental process
of habit-formation or model-formation can operate within an
indexical manner, i.e., via direct sensate relations. But, Thirdness
-as-Secondness remains a mental or logical process.
See David Chalmers - panpsychism and panprotopsychism. And of
course, Peirce's famous 4.551 comment
"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in
the work of bees, of crystals and throughout the purely physical
world".
Edwina
On Fri 26/11/21 6:38 PM , Mary Keeler mkeeler(a)uw.edu sent:
Edwina, I can't seem to easily change the "reply" to send only to
the list — would you please set it up in the form you prefer (right
now it includes your two addresses)?
Let me just say, here, that Peirce developed his "grades of clarity"
to distinguish between human intelligence as being capable of the 3rd
gradel, where we are able to reflect on our reasoning. No other
animals have this ability, and it gives us the chance to improve our
habits very responsively. However, some anthropologists are
beginning to say that we are too adaptive: we keep doing foolish
things and then just adapting to the consequences!
But that's why we need to develop reflective foresight (at even the
4rd grade of clarity), as Stango explains here, to improve our
methods (or tools) for reasoning!
Stango, M. (2015): “The Pragmatic Maxim and the Normative
Sciences: Peirce’s Problematical ‘Fourth’ Grade of Clarity,”
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: 51 (1) 34-56.Mary
On Fri, Nov 26, 2021 at 2:55 PM Edwina Taborsky wrote:
No- I don't need three copies; just send posts to the CG list.
As for 'self-corrective control - I consider that the triadic
semiosic process is what enables this action. A dyadic process
excludes MIND-as-mediation. Once you consider that Mind and Matter
are correlates, then, any material action becomes also subject to
mental action.
I'm not terribly interested in the human cognitive process, which
proceeds largely with the use of symbolic mental mediation. I'm
interested in the physico-chemical and biological cognitive processes
- which proceed with the use of indexical mental mediation.
That is, these systems can be considered as 'sentient' which means
that they are capable of feeling/sensing/perceiving their
environment. They do this within the triadic semiosic process, which
sets up a mediating analytic process to understand the input data. I
refer to this whole process as a function, where f[x]=y, with 'f'
understood as mediation. Mediation operates as both a set of evolving
[yes, evolving] habits-of-organization AND also includes a number of
possible habits. The possible follows the logical path of
IF-THEN...ie IF I take this action, THEN, such and such MIGHT occur.
The organism can anticipate results of its behaviour. This cognitive
process of anticipation reduces RISK - where, if an organism took a
certain action without anticipatory thought - it might be disastrous.
Anticipation is a vital semiotic process and my point is that an
organism will have, in its knowledge base, not merely a 'normal
default template' but also, in the more complex organisms, a number
of learned optional possibilities. This organism can therefore react
to input sensate data by CHOOSING to follow, not its normative
habits, but to take one of the optional paths.
I consider that Thirdness-as-Secondness is THE vital cognitive mode
that enables this indexical 'feeling out' of the environment and the
analytic gathering of new possibilities.
Learning is a pragmatic observation of the results of these actions
-
Edwina
On Fri 26/11/21 5:02 PM , Mary Keeler mkeeler(a)uw.edu [2] sent:
Edwina, do you want to receive 3 copies?
Good: "All existential entities learn by experience" — and
Peiirce's theory of logic and method are to explain how learning by
experience (intelligence) can be more efficient (which entails
effectiveness).That is, how self-corrective control can improve
learning by experience!
Can we figure out a way to demonstrate this improvement? Here is a
passage from Discovering the Future in the Past (pp. 35-41):
While other pragmatists, like Veblen, seek “a complete accounting
of the socio-historical origins of human conduct” (or an empirical
theory) Peirce is concerned with how inquiry determines the future,
and his pragmatic (or normative) theory of logic explains how our
natural cognitive urge to conceptualize and form habits of thought,
which conveniently "automates behavior" in routines and tools, must
be checked by our discriminating sensory capability, through
pragmatic conduct that continually conceives and tests these ideas
for validity and reliability by observing their implications in
experience, to establish self-critical control ("The highest quality
of mind involves a great readiness to take habits, and a great
readiness to lose them" [CP 6.613 (1893)].) Successful collaboration
requires the conscious commitment of researchers to self-critical
conduct, and creative cooperation is possible only with the stability
provided by progressive coordination of outcomes, representing
improvement. Compare this with Griffin and Veblen’s defense of the
method of tenacity: “the form of group solidarity in any peaceful,
workmanlike community.”
Peirce conceived his theory to explain not a mechanistic
“workmanlike community” but a community of inquiry, where
“one's purpose lies in the line of novelty, invention,
generalization, theory—in a word, improvement of the situation …
instinct and the rule of thumb manifestly cease to be applicable”
[CP 2.178 (1902)]. His pragmatic theory of research defines
“habits of thinking” as beliefs, and distinguishes believing from
reasoning, the self-corrective thinking required in learning to
improve habits of thought. He clarifies the roles of belief and
reasoning:
The best plan, then, on the whole, is to base our conduct as much as
possible on Instinct, but when we do reason to reason with severely
scientific logic. ... Where reasoning of any difficulty is to be done
concerning positive facts, that is to say, not mere mathematical
deduction, the aid that logic affords is most important. [CP 2.178
(1902)] . . .Peirce advanced his theory of logic as semeotic to
explain that capability we so easily take for granted in its routine
and pervasive operation: learning by experience through communication
[see CP 2.227, from a manuscript fragment (c. 1897)]. Especially in
science, we have been able to develop methods that improve (or
economize) the natural trial-and-error procedure of learning by
experience. Peirce formulated his pragmatic method of logic for
refining scientific learning procedures, and he even created a
graphical notation tool, Existential Graphs (EG), as a "topology of
logic" for observing and demonstrating how the improvement of
learning can occur through the process of dialogic reasoning. He
concluded that the essence of successful learning of any sort is due
not primarily to the sophistication of its measuring instruments or
its investigational techniques, although those are essential.
Careful observation and ingenious conceptualization generate
knowledge only to the extent that they are collaboratively validated
by those engaged in learning.
Peirce explains three qualities, "Caution, Breadth, and
Incomplexity," as the economic considerations in the intricate
evaluation among hypotheses.
In respect to caution, the game of twenty questions is instructive.
... The secret of the business lies in the caution which breaks a
hypothesis up into its smallest logical components, and only risks
one of them at a time. What a world of futile controversy and of
confused experimentation might have been saved if this principle had
guided investigations into the theory of light! Correlative to the
quality of caution is that of breadth. For when we break the
hypothesis into elementary parts, we may, and should, inquire how far
the same explanation accounts for the same phenomenon when it appears
in other subjects. [CP 7.220-21 (1901)]
He further explains how an incomplex and even rough hypothesis can
be more robust and do what a more elaborate one would fail to do [see
CP 7.222 (1901)]. And he often identifies incomplexity with the
dialogic purpose of his EG in “the central problem of logic, [which
is] to say whether one given thought is truly, i.e., is adapted to be,
a development of a given other or not" [CP 4.9 (1906)].
To avoid advocacy, inquiry should proceed only from claims that can
be subjected to careful scrutiny of their reasons (as evidence), and
inquirers should rely on a "multitude and variety" of many claims and
reasons that can be conceptually articulated, rather than the apparent
conclusiveness of any one claim. As Peirce explains, reasoning in
inquiry should not form a "chain of inferences" (which is no stronger
than its weakest link) but rather a cable, "whose fibers may be ever
so slender, provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately
connected" [CP 5.3 (1902); and see Haack 2009]. The minutest details
formulated as claims and reasons can collectively turn out to be
crucial contributions in constructing strong arguments. Although
this process of inquiry cannot be fully automated, technology
augmentation can perform functions of representation, bookkeeping,
and logical articulation that are tedious and error-prone for humans,
which can be used to clarify and reveal hidden conceptual complexities
in modeling and simulation [see Skagestad].
To grasp or understand a concept is to have practical mastery of
inferences in a network involving that concept—and its evolving
application. Fully grasping complex inferential networks of
conditional relations is a significant challenge for inquirers,
especially in collaborative inquiry. Asserting a responsible claim
requires understanding at least some of its consequences, and
realizing what other claims it relates to and what other evidence
relates to it. As in playing a game, researchers develop strategies
in formulating conjectures that can justify other conjectures, which
can be justified by still other conjectures and preclude alternative
hypotheses. In this complex reasoning, logical argumentation
resembles a game in which researchers economically construct valid
inferential articulation—or conceptual content [see Keeler (2004)
and (2005); and see Appendix G, for a scenario of players].
Randall Dipert concludes that Peirce made “some of the very few
profound contributions in the history of philosophy to the big
picture of what logic is, and of the normative dimension of all
thought” [(1995): 318]. While a “workmanlike community” can be
theoretically represented and analyzed by the usual mechanical
(empirical) theories of science, when logic is understood as a
general theory of the meaning of signs in deliberate thinking, then
pragmaticism as its method should give us the “power of
self-controlled thinking” and “self-observation” for
“strategic thinking and planning” [see Pietarinen (2012): 179].
We can create habits of self-control to serve some objective, but
this capability to predict the future and conduct ourselves toward
that aim (of what we determine could or should be) cannot be
explained by empirical theory (of what is). In his Economics of
Science, James Wible describes, in the broadest sense, Peirce’s
contribution to the economics of science: “Peirce rejected the
mechanism that flourished in physics and other disciplines during his
lifetime. Peirce was an evolutionary indeterminist. Like the
mainstream economists, Peirce saw optimization theory as a useful
tool of economic analysis. For Peirce optimization took place in the
context of a more general evolutionary view of the world, … with an
economy of research as an integral part of the conception of
scientific inference” [(1998): 82]. Wible finds Peirce’s theory
consistent with Michael Polanyi’s “Republic of Science is a
Society of Explorers,” who join to move towards achievements that
are unknown to any of them [143].
. . .And finally (from the Conclusions, p. 60)
Without the socially-conducted, belief-evaluation capability
provided by inquiry, we automatically (or unconsciously) assume our
limited sample of beliefs. And these limited belief-samples can
become even more unconsciously adopted when we use tools that have
automated them as habits of conduct! Any good tools must be carefully
designed to automate effective habits (habits that improve efforts to
reach some goal), and designers of tools to improve inquiry must be
able to evaluate what habits can and should be automated for that
purpose. Arthur Burks explains how mathematics serves as a tool for
clarifying and evaluating deductive reasoning: “When, for example,
a logician tests a sorites, or chains of reasoning, he is doing
essentially what a mathematician does when he deduces a theorem from
some postulates” [188]. Similarly, normative science is conceived
to serve as a tool for evaluating inquiry, giving us the power to
observe, clarify, and test ideas as hypotheses in experiments toward
improvement. As Peirce says: "the entire meaning of a hypothesis lies
in its conditional experiential predictions," to the extent that its
predictions are true, the hypothesis is true [CP 1.29 (1869);
emphasis added]. Normative logic can be used to analyze how to
economize (or optimize) our socially-based inquiry (or learning) by
mapping means-ends relations to keep track of what tools we need in
relation to what purpose or goals we determine they must serve.
Not only must intelligence be social, it must be self-controlled
(critical), to improve learning by experience.Mary
On Fri, Nov 26, 2021 at 12:08 PM Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Mary- yes, I'm receiving three copies - but two are sent to two
different email addresses.
As for 'learning by experience', my view is that ALL existential
entities learn by experience. I include not merely the inorganic but
the full organic realm; that is, I don't accept random mutation as
the basis for adaptation and evolution but consider that both are
semiosic actions within complex adaptive systems.
That is - Mind and Matter are correlates - and as such, a biological
organism has a proto-consciousness and interacts with its environment
in a pragmatic [intelligent] manner.
Edwina
On Fri 26/11/21 1:45 PM , Mary Keeler mkeeler(a)uw.edu sent:
Edwina, thanks for pursuing this significant realm of study.
As complexity grows, coordination and collaboration become more
significant, especially for "intelligence capable of learning by
experience" (as Peirce defines us). You observe:
How does mediation differentiate between valid and invalid
conclusions? Induction is one method....But, entropic rejection of
data as 'noise' is another....Both can lead to problems.
Peirce's theory of inquiry proposes abduction, deduction, and
induction as the stages required for effective inquiry (or learning)
— and these are to be repeated indefinitely. Humans are well
equipped (with perception) for guessing, and we can test those
possibilities by induction. But to resolve many possibilities into a
good guess (worth testing), we need deduction. You might think of this
as "reducing noise." The idea is to find testable hypotheses, and to
test them in order of how easy they are to test (a process of
"reducing noise").
That is just where logical formulation and the deduction of
computers can help. And graphical logic could help humans observe
this process.
But of course I agree with your broader applicability of Peirce's
framework!MaryP.S. Are you receiving 3 copies of the notes I send to
the List?
On Thu, Nov 25, 2021 at 6:48 AM Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Mary- further to your extension of the concept of CAS [complex
adaptive systems] to CAR [complex adaptive reasoning] - I certainly
agree and consider such a framework to be a basic semiosic triadic
process.
That is, complex systems are self-organized in order to be adaptive
[aka pragmatic], and this requires a method for such pragmatic
activity. This method is the triadic reasoning process, where, given
input sensate data, the System can reference this input to its
mediative analytic system [Peirce's Representamen/sign] wich acts as
an If-Then analytic process. That is, this nodal site holds
generalities and input sensate data is referenced to these
generalities to produce a conclusion.
I think the triadic method is a vital morphology in the development
of CAS ..
On another note, the mediative nodal site holds multiple
possibilities for use to analyze input data. A simple system will
have very few of these possibilities and therefore, a limited
conclusion. This, frankly, provides the larger system with stability
-you can't have atoms and molecules changing their format every two
minutes]. A more complex system provides many more possibilities -
but this can be problematic....How does mediation differentiate
between valid and invalid conclusions? Induction is one
method....But, entropic rejection of data as 'noise' is
another....Both can lead to problems..
Edwina
On Wed 24/11/21 7:04 PM , Mary Keeler mkeeler(a)uw.edu sent:
[Let's see if this goes to the list?]
Thank you, Edwina, I have similar interests and agree with your
conclusion about the applicability of the Peircean framework.
I met John Holland before he died, and explained my extension of his
CAS to CAR, leading to the idea of the "game of pragmatism" — which
he called "a flight simulator for the mind"!Here are a couple of
papers that might help to explain (see more at the Revelator site,
below)?
Complex Adaptive Reasoning:
Knowledge Emergence in the Revelator Game
http://conceptualgraphs.org/revelator/web/papers/keelerkcap09.pdf
[3]
Games of Inquiry
for Collaborative Concept Structuring
[4]http://conceptualgraphs.org/revelator/web/papers/iccs05.pdf [5]
Revelator: Game of Complex Adaptive
Reasoninghttp://conceptualgraphs.org/revelator/web/research/Papers.php
[6]
If pragmatism is essentially the scientific method, and we need that
method for experimenting with ideas in order to develop Normative
Science as the study of habit-change, then that game might give us a
collaborative way to proceed? It could (and should) incorporate
graphical logic so that players can keep track of the development of
effective arguments.
Here are just a few paragraphs from Peirce in support of this idea
(selected from many more).MaryCP Vol 8 (1891)
Chapter 6: To Christine Ladd-Franklin, On Cosmology†1
316. My work in philosophy has consisted in an accurate analysis of
concepts, showing what is and what is not essential to the subject of
analysis. Particularly, in logic, my motive for studying the algebra
of the subject, has been the desire to find out with accuracy what
are the essential ingredients of reasoning in general and of its
principal kinds. To make a powerful calculus has not been my
care.317. I may mention that my chief avocation in the last ten years
has been to develop my cosmology.†2 This theory is that the
evolution of the world is hyperbolic, that is, proceeds from one
state of things in the infinite past, to a different state of things
in the infinite future. The state of things in the infinite past is
chaos, tohu bohu, the nothingness of which consists in the total
absence of regularity. The state of things in the infinite future is
death, the nothingness of which consists in the complete triumph of
law and absence of all spontaneity.†3 Between these, we have on our
side a state of things in which there is some absolute spontaneity
counter to all law, and some degree of conformity to law, which is
constantly on the increase owing to the growth of habit. The tendency
to form habits or tendency to generalize, is something which grows by
its own action, by the habit of taking habits itself growing. Its
first germs arose from pure chance. There were slight tendencies to
obey rules that had been followed, and these tendencies were rules
which were more and more obeyed by their own action. There were also
slight tendencies to do otherwise than previously, and these
destroyed themselves. To be sure, they would sometimes be
strengthened by the opposite tendency, but the stronger they became
the more they would tend to destroy themselves. As to the part of
time on the further side of eternity which leads back from the
infinite future to the infinite past, it evidently proceeds by
contraries.
318. I believe the law of habit to be purely psychical. But then I
suppose matter is merely mind deadened by the development of habit.
While every physical process can be reversed without violation of the
law of mechanics, the law of habit forbids such reversal. Accordingly,
time may have been evolved by the action of habit. At first sight, it
seems absurd or mysterious to speak of time being evolved, for
evolution presupposes time. But after all, this is no serious
objection, and nothing can be simpler. Time consists in a regularity
in the relations of interacting feelings. The first chaos consisted
in an infinite multitude of unrelated feelings. As there was no
continuity about them, it was, as it were, a powder of feelings. It
was worse than that, for of particles of powder some are nearer
together, others farther apart, while these feelings had no
relations, for relations are general. Now you must not ask me what
happened first. This would be as absurd as to ask what is the
smallest finite number. But springing away from the infinitely
distant past to a very very distant past, we find already evolution
had been going on for an infinitely long time. But this "time" is
only our way of saying that something had been going on. There was no
real time so far as there was no regularity, but there is no more
falsity in using the language of time than in saying that a quantity
is zero. In this chaos of feelings, bits of similitude had appeared,
been swallowed up again. Had reappeared by chance. A slight tendency
to generalization had here and there lighted up and been quenched.
Had reappeared, had strengthened itself. Like had begun to produce
like. Then even pairs of unlike feelings had begun to have similars,
and then these had begun to generalize. And thus relations of
contiguity, that is connections other than similarities, had sprung
up. All this went on in ways I cannot now detail till the feelings
were so bound together that a passable approximation to a real time
was established. It is not to be supposed that the ideally perfect
time has even yet been realized. There are no doubt occasional
lacunae and derailments.†4
Supposing matter to be but mind under the slavery of inveterate
habit, the law of mind still applies to it. According to that law,
consciousness subsides as habit becomes established, and is excited
again at the breaking up of habit. But the highest quality of mind
involves a great readiness to take habits, and a great readiness to
lose them [(CP 6.613) 1893].
Pragmatism is the principle that every theoretical judgment
expressible in a sentence in the indicative mood is a confused form
of thought whose only meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency to
enforce a corresponding practical maxim expressible as a conditional
sentence having its apodosis in the imperative mood [CP 5.18, Lecture
1, “Pragmatism: The Normative Sciences” (1903)].
CP Vol. 5
What Pragmatism Is [First of three Monist articles, 1905]
1. Experimentalist’s View of Assertion
. . .
412. … The laboratory life did not prevent the writer (who here
and in what follows simply exemplifies the experimentalist type) from
becoming interested in methods of thinking; and when he came to read
metaphysics, although much of it seemed to him loosely reasoned and
determined by accidental prepossessions, yet in the writings of some
philosophers, especially Kant, Berkeley, and Spinoza, he sometimes
came upon strains of thought that recalled the ways of thinking of
the laboratory, so that he felt he might trust to them; all of which
has been true of other laboratory-men.
Endeavoring, as a man of that type naturally would, to formulate
what he so approved, he framed the theory that a conception, that is,
the rational purport of a word or other expression, lies exclusively
in its conceivable bearing upon the conduct of life; so that, since
obviously nothing that might not result from experiment can have any
direct bearing upon conduct, if one can define accurately all the
conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial of
a concept could imply, one will have therein a complete definition of
the concept, and there is absolutely nothing more in it. For this
doctrine he invented the name pragmatism. Some of his friends wished
him to call it practicism or practicalism (perhaps on the ground that
{praktikos} is better Greek than {pragmatikos}. But for one who had
learned philosophy out of Kant, as the writer, along with nineteen
out of every twenty experimentalists who have turned to philosophy,
had done, and who still thought in Kantian terms most readily,
praktisch and pragmatisch were as far apart as the two poles, the
former belonging in a region of thought where no mind of the
experimentalist type can ever make sure of solid ground under his
feet, the latter expressing relation to some definite human purpose.
Now quite the most striking feature of the new theory was its
recognition of an inseparable connection between rational cognition
and rational purpose; and that consideration it was which determined
the preference for the name pragmatism. ---------------------
He explains pragmatism as a method that helps us to know what we
think, the meaning of which is interpreted as our willingness to act
on that thought—in terms of its conceived consequences.
Modern science, with its microscopes and telescopes, with its
chemistry and electricity, and with its entirely new appliances of
life, has put us into quite another world; almost as much so as if it
had transported our race to another planet. Some of the old beliefs
have no application except in extended senses, and in such extended
senses they are sometimes dubitable and subject to just criticism.
It is above all the normative sciences (esthetics, ethics, and logic)
that men are in dire need of having severely criticized, in their
relation to the new world created by science. Unfortunately, this
need is as unconscious as it is great. [CP 5.513 (c.1905)
"Consequences of Critical Common-Sensism"]
“Pragmatism is not a system of philosophy. It is only a method of
thinking ...” (CP 8.206, c. 1905).
On Mon, Nov 22, 2021 at 9:08 AM Edwina Taborsky wrote:
With the opening of this new site for the open and exploratory
discussion of, among other things, the use of Peirce in the analysis
of the modern world, I'd like to outline, briefly, my interests in
this area.
I consider that the triadic semiosis is both a continuous process in
the generation of matter on this planet - and- can also be understood
as the morphological form of discrete entities. That is, a cell is
both a triadic semiosic unit and an active process of the semiosic
processing of matter...connected and networked to other semiosic
units/processes. I consider this outline well-documented within
Peircean texts.
This view also goes along with my understanding that Peirce's
'objective idealism' is a view that neither Mind nor Matter are
primordial but that both are co-evolving correlates. {See 6.24 and
other texts].
And as such - I am interested in examining the world as a Complex
Adaptive System, which means that both variety and stability are
correlates in this generative, adaptive, 'far-from-equilibrium' world
- with no final state.
These are major areas of my interest, which means that I consider
that the Peircean framework is applicable to the physic-chemical,
biological and societal/conceptual realms.
Edwina Taborsky
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Links:
------
[1] mailto:taborsky@primus.ca
[2] mailto:mkeeler@uw.edu
[3] http://conceptualgraphs.org/revelator/web/papers/keelerkcap09.pdf
[4] http://conceptualgraphs.org/revelator/web/papers/iccs05.pdf
[5] http://conceptualgraphs.org/revelator/web/papers/iccs05.pdf
[6] http://conceptualgraphs.org/revelator/web/research/Papers.php
