Cf: Theme One Program • Motivation 1
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/08/16/theme-one-program-motivation-1-2/
All,
The main idea behind the Theme One program is the efficient use
of graph-theoretic data structures for the tasks of “learning”
and “reasoning”.
I am thinking of “learning” in the sense of learning about an environment,
in essence, gaining information about the nature of an environment and
being able to apply the information acquired to a specific purpose.
Under the heading of “reasoning” I am simply lumping together all the
ordinary sorts of practical activities which would probably occur to
most people under that name.
There is a natural relation between the tasks. Learning the character of an
environment leads to the recognition of laws which govern the environment and
making full use of that recognition requires the ability to reason logically
about those laws in abstract terms.
Resources
=========
• Theme One Program • Overview
https://oeis.org/wiki/Theme_One_Program_%E2%80%A2_Overview
• Theme One Program • Exposition
https://oeis.org/wiki/Theme_One_Program_%E2%80%A2_Exposition
• Theme One Program • User Guide
https://www.academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One_Program_User_Guide
• Theme One Program • Survey Page
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/06/12/survey-of-theme-one-program-4/
Regards,
Jon
Cf: Higher Order Sign Relations • 1
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/08/01/higher-order-sign-relations-1/
All,
When interpreters reflect on their own use of signs they require an
appropriate technical language in which to pursue their reflections.
For this they need signs referring to sign relations, signs referring
to elements and components of sign relations, and signs referring to
properties and classes of sign relations. The orders of signs developing
as reflection evolves can be placed under the description of “higher order
signs” and the extended sign relations involving them can be referred to as
“higher order sign relations”.
Continue Reading at “Inquiry Driven Systems • Higher Order Sign Relations”
https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_12#Higher_Order…
I’ve been working apace to format my old dissertation proposal on Inquiry Driven Systems
( https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Overview )for the web but I was
reminded of this part when the subject of “signs about signs” came up recently on the
Peirce List.
Regards,
Jon
Cf: Inquiry Into Inquiry • Understanding 1
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/07/26/inquiry-into-inquiry-understanding…
All,
Another passage from Russell further illustrates what I see as a critical
juncture in his thought. The graph-theoretic figure he uses in analyzing
a complex of logical relationships brings him to the edge of seeing the
limits of dyadic analysis — but he veers off and does not make the leap.
At any rate, that's how it looks from a perspective informed by Peirce.
Here's the first part of the passage.
Excerpt from Bertrand Russell • “Theory of Knowledge” (The 1913 Manuscript)
===========================================================================
<QUOTE BR:>
Part 2. Atomic Propositional Thought
Chapter 1. The Understanding of Propositions
(4). We come now to the last problem which has to be treated in
this chapter, namely: What is the logical structure of the fact
which consists in a given subject understanding a given proposition?
The structure of an understanding varies according to the proposition
understood. At present, we are only concerned with the understanding
of atomic propositions; the understanding of molecular propositions
will be dealt with in Part 3.
Let us again take the proposition “A and B are similar”.
It is plain, to begin with, that the complex “A and B being similar”,
even if it exists, does not enter in, for if it did, we could not
understand false propositions, because in their case there is no
such complex.
It is plain, also, from what has been said, that we cannot understand
the proposition unless we are acquainted with A and B and similarity
and the form “something and something have some relation”. Apart from
these four objects, there does not appear, so far as we can see, to be
any object with which we need be acquainted in order to understand the
proposition.
It seems to follow that these four objects, and these only, must be
united with the subject in one complex when the subject understands the
proposition. It cannot be any complex composed of them that enters in,
since they need not form any complex, and if they do, we need not be
acquainted with it. But they themselves must all enter in, since if
they did not, it would be at least theoretically possible to understand
the proposition without being acquainted with them.
In this argument, I appeal to the principle that, when we understand,
those objects with which we must be acquainted when we understand,
and those only, are object-constituents (i.e. constituents other than
understanding itself and the subject) of the understanding-complex.
(Russell, TOK, 116–117).
</QUOTE>
Reference
=========
Bertrand Russell, “Theory of Knowledge : The 1913 Manuscript”,
edited by Elizabeth Ramsden Eames in collaboration with
Kenneth Blackwell, Routledge, London, UK, 1992.
First published, George Allen and Unwin, 1984.
Resources
=========
Notes on Russell's “Theory of Knowledge” • Note 1
https://oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey/Philosophical_Notes#RTOKhttps://oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey/Philosophical_Notes#RTOK_1
Regards,
Jon
JFS> Scientists who work with animals (AKA rat psychologists) have a short
summary of how their subjects behave: "Under carefully controlled
experimental conditions, the subject will do whatever the hell it wants
to."
Ricardo S> I think this points to the fundamental issue: What is "want"?
Animals vs machines: wanting vs not wanting. My impression is that we use
"want" when the origin of the behavior is mysterious to us. If it is well
known to us -as when programmed- it ceases to be mysterious and then stops
being "wanting". This is an epistemological issue of us as observers. Not a
differential property of the systemus observed
That's an important issue, and I admit that the verb 'want' is rather
complex. But there is a large collection of tests that any life form from
bacteria on up can pass, but no non-living thing (other than a human
invention) can pass.
Simplest example: A bacterium swimming upstream in a glucose gradient. A
ship can go upstream, but only because humans designed it to do so.
But you can't find any phsycial or chemical process in the universe that
can perform the kinds of goal-directed prpcesses that living things do,
Even bacteria do immensely complex processes, especially colonies of
bacteria, such as the plaque on your teeth.
A single bacterium, swimming by itself, is extremely fragile, and it will
be swallowed up by something bigger very quickly. But bacteria in a colony
have very complex signaling systems for protecting themselves against the
toothbrush monster or the mouthwash poison or excesive heat, cold, or
whatever. Some of the outer ones may be killed, but the colony will
survive and recover.
For more about these issues, see "Biological and Psycholinguistic
influences on Architectures for Natural Lnguage Processing",
https://jfsowa.com/talks/bionlp.pdf
Slide 45 has the comment about bacteria.
John
Tom, Jerry, and Helmut,
The fact that I put Semeiotic at the center means that I assume a Peircean foundation. I don't believe that it's possible to show the full implications of that Venn diagram and its interrelationships without a framework such as Peirce's or something very similar.
Tom G> . I can go along with your categorizations, but only if "reality" refers to the reality of Secondness, or more specifically to the dynamic object. Otherwise - if for instance "reality" refers, or also refers, to the reality of Thirdness as in what the scientific community is fated to agree upon - it seems to me we'll have a lot of disambiguating to do with regard to these categories.
By reality, I mean what Peirce defined: Everything that exists independently of whatever we may think of it. That includes the laws of nature that govern the universe. Without those laws, there would be chaos. We couldn't exist, and neither could our thoughts or language. Mathematics is also independent of whatever we may say about it.
Mathematicians discover new kinds of structures. Since different mathematicians frequently converge on equivalent structures, it is reasonable to say that those structures are independent of what anybody might think or say about them
Jerry LRC> What is the syntax of your suggestions?
The three original labels are nouns: Reality, Thought, and Language. I chose nouns or noun phrases for the intersections.
The NP "perception and action" includes all the aspects of reality that are perceived as thoughts or generated by thoughts that trigger changes to reality.
The noun "semantics" refers to those aspects of reality that serve as the referents of words, phrases, and sentences.
The noun "imagination" refers to those referents of language that happen to be referents of thoughts that have not yet been related to reality and might never be relatable to reality. But I have to admit that the semantics of language, as it is normally used, can and does refer to imaginary things.
The NP 'semeiotic"" refers to everything that Peirce calls formal semeiotic. That includes everything might be represented by a sign, including all the formal terms discussed in his theory of signs.
Helmut> isn´t language a subset of thought, meaning, nothing can be said that hasn´t been a thought first?
It's true that the referents of the linguistic signs are a subset of thought signs. But I was responding to the problem that Beziau posed in https://sites.google.com/view/reality-thought-language/mixed-zones .
Perhaps we should discuss the issues that Jerry raised in initial response to that diagram. The three labels on that diagram, lreality, thought, and language,refer to three very different kinds of things. That would imply that all the intersections would be empty.
In my interpretation, I assumed that the word 'reality' refers to everything that Peirce might call real in any sense. The word 'language' includes all the things that language might refer to. And the word 'thought refers to anything that might be thought.
John
My suggested labels for the intersections:
Reality and thought: Perception and action.
Reality and language: Semantics
Thought and language: Imagination
All three: Semeiotic
John
----------------------------------------
From: "jean-yves beziau" beziau100(a)gmail.com
We can build a Venn diagram with three circles:
reality, thought and language.
It it not clear what names can be given to the mixed zones:
https://sites.google.com/view/reality-thought-language/mixed-zones
Does anyone have some answers?
Best Wishes
Jean-Yves
>------------------------------------------------------------------
Prof. Dr. Dr. Jean-Yves Beziau
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
https://www.philpeople.org/profiles/jean-yves-beziau
Cf: Inquiry Into Inquiry • Flash Back
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/07/23/inquiry-into-inquiry-flash-back/
| The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars,
| But in ourselves …
|
| Julius Caesar • 1.2.141–142
All,
Signs have a power to inform, to lead our thoughts and thus our actions
in accord with reality, to make reality our friend. And signs have
a power to misinform, to corrupt our thoughts and thus our actions
and lead us to despair of all our ends.
For now I'll just post a clean copy of a text for later discussion.
Excerpt from Bertrand Russell • “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism” (1918)
==========================================================================
<QUOTE BR:>
4. Propositions and Facts with More than One Verb: Beliefs, Etc.
4.3. How shall we describe the logical form of a belief?
I want to try to get an account of the way that a belief is made up.
That is not an easy question at all. You cannot make what I should
call a map-in-space of a belief. You can make a map of an atomic fact
but not of a belief, for the simple reason that space-relations always
are of the atomic sort or complications of the atomic sort. I will try
to illustrate what I mean.
The point is in connexion with there being two verbs in the judgment
and with the fact that both verbs have got to occur as verbs, because
if a thing is a verb it cannot occur otherwise than as a verb.
Suppose I take ‘A believes that B loves C’. ‘Othello believes that
Desdemona loves Cassio’. There you have a false belief. You have this
odd state of affairs that the verb ‘loves’ occurs in that proposition and
seems to occur as relating Desdemona to Cassio whereas in fact it does not
do so, but yet it does occur as a verb, it does occur in the sort of way
that a verb should do.
I mean that when A believes that B loves C, you have to have a verb
in the place where ‘loves’ occurs. You cannot put a substantive in
its place. Therefore it is clear that the subordinate verb (i.e. the
verb other than believing) is functioning as a verb, and seems to be
relating two terms, but as a matter of fact does not when a judgment
happens to be false. That is what constitutes the puzzle about the
nature of belief.
You will notice that whenever one gets to really close quarters
with the theory of error one has the puzzle of how to deal with
error without assuming the existence of the non-existent.
I mean that every theory of error sooner or later wrecks itself
by assuming the existence of the non-existent. As when I say
‘Desdemona loves Cassio’, it seems as if you have a non-existent
love between Desdemona and Cassio, but that is just as wrong as
a non-existent unicorn. So you have to explain the whole theory
of judgment in some other way.
I come now to this question of a map. Suppose you try such a map as this:
[Figure 1.] Othello Believes Desdemona Loves Cassio
https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/07/o-believes-d-loves-c…
This question of making a map is not so strange as you might suppose because
it is part of the whole theory of symbolism. It is important to realize where
and how a symbolism of that sort would be wrong: Where and how it is wrong is
that in the symbol you have this relationship relating these two things and in
the fact it doesn’t really relate them. You cannot get in space any occurrence
which is logically of the same form as belief.
When I say ‘logically of the same form’ I mean that one can be obtained
from the other by replacing the constituents of the one by the new terms.
If I say ‘Desdemona loves Cassio’ that is of the same form as ‘A is to the
right of B’. Those are of the same form, and I say that nothing that occurs
in space is of the same form as belief.
I have got on here to a new sort of thing, a new beast for our zoo, not another
member of our former species but a new species. The discovery of this fact is
due to Mr. Wittgenstein.
(Russell, POLA, 89–91).
</QUOTE>
Reference
=========
Bertrand Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism”, pp. 35–155
in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, edited with an introduction by
David Pears, Open Court, La Salle, IL, 1985. First published 1918.
Resources
=========
Notes on Russell’s “Philosophy of Logical Atomism” • Note 25
https://oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey/Philosophical_Notes#POLAhttps://oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey/Philosophical_Notes#POLA_25
Regards,
Jon
Cf: Inquiry Into Inquiry • In Medias Res
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2022/07/21/inquiry-into-inquiry-in-medias-re…
Re: Dan Everett
<QUOTE DE:>
I am trying to represent two readings of the three juxtaposed sentences in English. The first reading is that the judge
and the jury both know that Malcolm is guilty. The second is that the judge knows that the jury thinks that Malcolm is
guilty.
Figure 1
https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/07/daniel-everett-e280a…
Figure 2
https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2022/07/daniel-everett-e280a…
Do these purported EGs of mine seem correct to you?
</QUOTE>
Dear Dan,
Apologies for the delay in responding … I won't have much of use to say about those particular graphs as I've long been
following a different fork in Peirce's work about how to get from Alpha to Beta, from propositional to quantificational
logic via graphical syntax.
But the examples raise one of the oldest issues I've bothered about over the years, going back to the days when I read
PQR (Peirce, Quine, Russell) in tandem and many long discussions with my undergrad phil advisor. That is the question
of intentional contexts and ”referential opacity”. The thing is Peirce's pragmatic standpoint yields a radically
distinct analysis of belief, knowledge, and indeed truth from the way things have been handled down the line from
logical atomism and empiricism to analytic philosophy in general. As it happens, there was a critical branch point in
time when Russell almost got a clue but Wittgenstein bullied him into dropping it, at least so far as I could tell from
a scattered sample of texts.
At any rate, I fell down the Wayback Machine rabbit hole looking for things I wrote about all this on the Peirce List
and other places around the web at the turn of the millennium …
I'd almost be tempted to start a blog series on this, probably simulcast on the Facebook Peirce Matters page if you're
into discussing it online … I have enough off the cuff to start an anchor post or two, but it might be the middle of
August before I could do much more.
Regards,
Jon
