Jon, Cecile, List,
Jon, in your first paragraph you wrote about inference. I agree. Therefore I find it a bit problematic to say, that the sign determines the interpretant, because the sign doesn´t infere, it is the interpreter, who does the inference. But ok, I guess we might say, that Peirce prescinds the semiosis from the interpreter, so, ok, the flow of determination goes from the sign to the interpretant, because it is the interpreter, who receives the sign, and then forms the interpretant, and, if you donot mention the interpreter, well, then you just skip her/him/it. But I think, that this skipping is only justified, if the interpretant is true, because then it (the interpretant) is a subset of the final interpretant, and not a misinterpretation. But: Can we take that for granted?
Talking about precission: The sign anyway is prescinded from the, in reality not reducible, sign triad. If we say, that something prescinded determines something else, this determination too is prescinded. Prescission might be seen as an error, so this is error propagation. That, i guess, is the reason, why this whole determination affair is somehow confusing. It surely is, if we take "determination" too literally, I mean, if we take it too muchly for real. Do you agree? You see, I have been trying very hard to not contradict Peirce.
Best, Helmut