Edwina, Gary, Jon, List,

As Peirce frequently pointed out, he had a solid understanding of all the methods of reasoning from the ancient Greeks to the medieval Scholastics to the methods from the Renaissance to the early 20th C.

In general, the "proper way" depends very much on the theorem proving algorithms.  Peirce did not invent the method of transforming a sentence to make 'is' the verb that connects subject and predicate.  That method was invented by Aristotle and systematized by Boethius.  It was widely used in 19th c textbooks,
which were the ones that everybody, including Peirce, had studied .

For the differences between Plato and Aristotle, see slides 13 to 24 of https://jfsowa.com/talks/patolog1.pdf .  For Aristotle's syllogisms and the methods for transforming sentences to make 'is' the main verb, see slides 25 to 32.   The remainder of patolog1 discusses other patterns of logic from the middle ages to modern times, including those by Frege and Peirce.  For more about modern methods, including Peirce's influence on them, see patolog2, 3, 4, and 5.

Fundamental principle:  The methods of transforming formal logics are reversible.  Anything represented in one format can be translated back and forth without loss of information.  But transformations to and from natural languages and other formats -- formal, informal, linguistic, or graphic -- can lose information (or even worse DISTORT or CORRUPT Information).

When Peirce wrote anything on logic, he assumed that his readers were familiar with the kind of material summarized in patolog1.pdf.  It's helpful to read that in order to distinguish Peirce's innovations from his sources and his assumptions about his readers.   Modern methods of reasoning often transform the logic to different formats to adapt them to various algorithms.  Those transformations are reversible (provided that both formats have equal expressibility).

Re dicisigns:  Stjernfelt emphasized the trichotomy of rheme, dicisign, and argument because he was developing methods of reasoning with sources in natural languages.

But Peirce moved to the more general triad of seme, pheme, and delome, which allow diagrams and images as representations.  He made that switch in 1904-5 when he was mapping images in the phaneron to existential graphs.  Note that he continued to use the term 'phemic sheet' up to the end.  But he never used the word 'dicisign' after he introduced the word 'pheme'.  That is an indication of the way his theories were developing.  And I believe that his correspondence with Lady Welby had a strong influence on that development.

John
_______________________________________
 
From: "Edwina Taborsky" " style="box-sizing: border-box; color: rgb(0, 102, 147); text-decoration: underline; user-select: auto;"><taborsky@primus.ca>

Gary, list 

Thanks - that book however, is from ten years ago. My point is that current research in information dynamics in the ’natural realms’  - which, very often, doesn’t use Peircean terms but is obviously working within the same analytic framework of morphological formation,  information generation, transmission and transformation, and the nature of ‘objective idealism’ [ the integration of matter and mind] …is extensive. I’d say that these are all analyses well within the notion of the dicisign- ie, the concept that information generation, processing etc is not dependent on language or even consciousness but is a basic process in the biological and physico-chemical realms. ..operative within sensate rather than symbolic networking. And - I’d say that these fit the definition of a dicisign propositional interaction, where meanings [Interpretants]  are in direct or factual connection to the object. The problem is - as noted - this research doesn’t use Peircean terminology!

Edwina

On Feb 11, 2024, at 11:39 AM, Gary Richmond <gary.richmond@gmail.com> wrote:

Edwina, List,

ET: I’m a bit surprised by your  request - since surely you are aware of the focus in science of Peircean principles in the biological, physic-chemical and artificial worlds.

Yes, I'm well aware of that focus and have read extensively in the literature. Thank you, though, for providing some recent examples, none of which I knew.

My question, however, specifically pointed to Stjernfelt's work on dicisigns. I wrote: "I've been wondering how this move of Peirce [throwing everything possible into the subject] might figure, if it plays a part at all, in consideration of what Stjernfelt called 'Natural Propositions',"  the dicisign being a generalization of the proposition. Helmut Pape called Stjernfelt's book "an inter- and transdisciplinary study that discusses and criticizes theories and uses examples coming from psychology, biology, anthropology, neuroscience, biosemiotics etc."

So, mine was not a general question as to the influence of Peirce in fields other than logic -- there is no question of that -- but of this particular matter which Jon discusses at length and which may nor may not extend beyond logic as we generally think of it.

Btw, here is another book I'd highly recommend for discussions of Peirce's influence in biosemiotics in particular, edited by two fine Peirce scholars.

Peirce and Biosemiotics: A Guess at the Riddle of Life 

Vinicius Romanini (Editor), Eliseo Fernández (Editor)


The table of contents suggests the depth of the scholarship both by distinguished Peirce scholars and equally distinguished biosemioticians.

Table of Contents

Introduction; V. Romanini, E. Fernández.- 1. The Intelligible Universe; N. Houser.- 2. The Continuity of Life: On Peirce’s Objective Idealism; I.A. Ibri.- 3. Peircian Semiotic Indeterminacy and Its Relevance for Biosemiotics; R. Lane.- 4. Peircean Habits, Broken Symmetries, and Biosemiotics; E. Fernández.- 5. Semeiotic Causation and the Breath of Life; M. Hulswit, V. Romanini.- 6. The Ineffable, the Individual, and the Intelligible: Peircean Reflections on the Innate Ingenuity of the Human Animal; V. Colapietro.- 7. Instinct and Abduction in the Peircean Informational Perspective: Contributions to Biosemiotics; L.F. Barbosa da Silveira, M.E. Quilici Gonzalez.- 8. The Life of Symbols and Other Legisigns: More than a mere Metaphor?; W. Nöth.- 9. Signs without Minds; J. Collier.- 10. Dicent Symbols and Proto-propositions in Biological Mimicry; J. Queiroz.- 11. Semeiosis as a Living Process; V. Romanini.

Best,

Gary Richmond

On Sun, Feb 11, 2024 at 10:34 AM Edwina Taborsky <taborsky@primus.ca> wrote:
Gary R,list

I’m a bit surprised by your  request - since surely you are aware of the focus in science of Peircean principles in the biological, physic-chemical and artificial worlds.

A few quick examples: 

Homeostasis and Information Processing: Eduardo Mizraji. Biosystems 2024 February

"Teleonomic objects are purpose-oriented entities lacking a creator (Igamberdiev, 2023).

"What is the nature of the various types of information that different living beings, at different scales of their organization, use to inform their regulatory systems? This information is the result of the simultaneous existence of patterns and receptors capable of detecting these patterns. In this context, information is an emergent property of the interaction of two categories of entities, patterns and receptors.

This duo of conditions, thermodynamic openness and the need for homeostatic regulatory systems, are inherent to all forms of life that we know."
———————
Computation in Biological Systems as a quantum mechanical simulation .
Ron Cottam. Biosystems April 2022. 

This article actually references Peirce.
——————————————————

The Information Continuum Model of Evolution BioSystems November 2021 R.Skern Mauritzen

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 The Biosystems journal  is a major site for the examination of informational processing within the natural world.  That is - the focus is on information processes - and this, after all, is what Peircean semiotics is all about. [And there are other journals tha examine information processing]...

As I’ve kept saying, you don’t have to use Peircean terms to examine the same outlines Peirce was writing about …Unfortunately, the tendency of many Peircean scholars, to insist, almost with a religious and even cult-like fervour,  on the use of exact and specific Peircean terms, obscures the fact that the same objective processes are being outlined in many papers - but- using different terms.

It is no secret that the difficulty of both accessing Peircean texts AND the obscure terminology [AND, I’ll add, the isolationism of the Peircean scholarly set]  has hindered the widespread use of Peircean theories. But -once past these Walls  - it is clear that the Peircean analysis is a fundamental outline of both the natural and human worlds of information processing.  

Edwina



On Feb 11, 2024, at 12:23 AM, Gary Richmond <gary.richmond@gmail.com> wrote:

Jon, List,

Thanks for these additional comments and examples as they further clarify Peirce's bold logical move. As you noted:

JFS: Throwing everything possible into the subject recognizes the indexical nature of most words--functioning much like proper names, since one must already be acquainted with their objects in order to understand them--and leaves only the pure/continuous predicate as the iconic part of the proposition.

Since you mentioned Frederik Stjernfelt, I've been wondering how this move of Peirce might figure in consideration of what Stjernfelt called "Natural Propositions." In his extraordinary book, Natural Propositions: The Actuality of Peirce's Doctrine of Dicisigns, Stjernfelt takes Peirce at his word, so to speak, and generalizes the meaning of proposition well beyond the logical-linguistic into the natural world, that which biosemioticians naturally have a particular interested in. I don't know what lasting impact -- if any -- his book has had in that community since, as far as I can tell, it has been somewhat resistant to Peircean thinking. This antipathy was suggested to me when I attended a Biosemiotics Gathering at Roosevelt University in NYC some years ago (I was asked by Vinicius Romanini to read a paper he himself could not deliver since officials refused to allow him to board a plane to the USA because he'd brought his Italian, rather than his Brazilian, passport to the airport) as the several Peircean-inspired biosemioticians present seemed to be contradicted at every turn.

Be that as it may, Stjernfelt argues in Natural Propositions that Peirce's generalization of the logical concept of proposition to dicisign as to include semiosis that occurs in the natural world, is of the greatest consequence for our understanding of reality beyond our specie's intellectual/logical conception of it. For dicisigns do not necessarily require human language, thought, and logic -- not human consciousness -- whatsoever. 

I'm not a biosemiotician -- although I find the field of considerable interest -- and I know that you aren't either, Jon. But I'd be most interested in what you or others on the List might think regarding the generalization of Peirce's furthest thinking as regards propositions into the natural world. 

Best,

Gary Richmond


























On Sat, Feb 10, 2024 at 9:35 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschmidt@gmail.com> wrote:
Gary, List:

GR: It makes clear why you titled this new thread "The Proper Way in Logic," which, when I first read it, sounded quite shocking.

Of course, that characterization is Peirce's own, again written in late 1908 (NEM 3:885) when he evidently adopted it rather suddenly and decisively. Throwing everything possible into the subject recognizes the indexical nature of most words--functioning much like proper names, since one must already be acquainted with their objects in order to understand them--and leaves only the pure/continuous predicate as the iconic part of the proposition. By contrast, standard first-order predicate logic goes the other way, throwing everything possible into the predicate and leaving only quantified variables as the subjects. Peirce himself endorses that approach in some earlier writings.

CSP: The most perfectly thorough analysis throws the whole substance of the Dicisign into the Predicate. (CP 2.318, 1903)

CSP: It has been shown that in the formal analysis of a proposition, after all that words can convey has been thrown into the predicate, there remains a subject that is indescribable and that can only be pointed at or otherwise indicated, unless a way, of finding what is referred to, be prescribed. (CP 5.525, c. 1905)

CSP: Take the proposition "Burnt child shuns fire." ... On this view, the predicate is, "is either not a child or has not been burned, or has no opportunity of shunning fire or does shun fire"; while the subject is "any individual object the interpreter may select from the universe of ordinary everyday experience." (CP 5.473, 1907)

"Cain killed Abel" becomes "there exists an x and there exists a y such that x is Cain and y is Abel and x stands in the relation of killing to y." It is an interesting historical fact that the usual abbreviated notation for such formulations is derived from one developed by Peirce--for these two examples, ∀x (¬Cx ∨ ¬Bx ∨ Sx) = ∀x ((Cx ∧ Bx) → Sx) and ∃x ∃y (Cx ∧ Ay ∧ Kxy). Still, notice how compact the natural language expressions are, by virtue of utilizing syntax that iconically matches the flow of causation instead of spelling everything out with symbols. Likewise, as Frederik Stjernfelt observes on pages 138 and 172 of his 2022 book, Sheets, Diagrams, and Realism in Peirce, EGs are more iconic than the corresponding algebraic expressions in the specific sense that each indefinite individual--now a line of identity instead of a variable--always appears exactly once, instead of at least twice; in these cases, four and three times, respectively.

<image.png>

Technically, in "burnt child shuns fire," shunning is a dyadic relation whose additional correlate is fire. That makes the algebraic notation ∀x ∀y (¬Cx ∨ ¬Bx ∨ ¬Fy ∨ Sxy)) = ∀x ∀y ((Cx ∧ Bx ∧ Fy) → Sxy). Throwing everything possible into the predicate, there are now two subjects (lowercase letters) and four predicates (uppercase letters). Throwing everything possible into the subject, there are six subjects--four general concepts (names) and two indefinite individuals (lines of identity)--and a single pure/continuous predicate (syntax).

<image.png>

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

On Sat, Feb 10, 2024 at 4:12 PM Gary Richmond <gary.richmond@gmail.com> wrote:
Jon, 

Your post sheds light on both associated matters that you discussed in it. This snippet of a quotation -- and which I've reflected on a number of times previously -- represents for me something of a succinct summary of the matter, especially as emphasizing the need for collateral knowledge.

CSP: A proposition can be separated into a predicate and subjects in more ways than one. But the proper way in logic is to take as the subject whatever there is of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the proposition itself, but collateral experience on the part of its interpreter is requisite. ... The result is that everything in a proposition that possibly can should be thrown into the subjects, leaving the pure predicate a mere form of connection, such as 'is,' 'possesses (as a character),' 'stands in the dyadic relation ___ to ___ ,' 'and' = 'is at once ___ and ___ ,' etc. 

It makes clear why you titled this new thread "The Proper Way in Logic," which, when I first read it, sounded quite shocking. But it becomes understandable that "a proposition may have any number of subjects but can have but one predicate which is invariably general, namely, a pure or continuous predicate that cannot be analyzed further and expresses the logical relations between the subjects."    

As to your question: JAS: "Where do these different constituent signs within a proposition fit into Peirce's late taxonomies? 

You answered: JAS: They are distinguished in his trichotomy according to the mode of presentation of the immediate object, as he explains in another late 1908 writing."

This will require a bit more study on my behalf. But this summary sentence is clear enough:

JAS: When a proposition is expressed linguistically in a sentence, the subjects that denote its objects are either descriptive names or designative pronouns or gestures, while the pure/continuous predicate that signifies its interpretant is often a copulant sign.

Equally clear is the question of "a sentence like "Cain killed Abel," which includes no words except those serving as its subjects," Peirce's answer, given in this lovely passage, explains it quite nicely (within the context of the entire quotation, of course).

CSP: What, then, is left to serve as Predicate? Nothing but the flow of causation. It is true that we are more acquainted even with that in Experience. When we see a babe in its cradle bending its arms this way and that, while a smile of exultation plays upon its features, it is making acquaintance with the flow of causation. So acquaintance with the flow of causation so early as to make it familiar before speech is so far acquired that an assertion can be syntactically framed, and it is embodied in the syntax of every tongue.

Finally, the whole matter is tied up in your concluding paragraph which begins with this idea.

JAS: Pure/continuous predicates are sometimes conveyed entirely by syntax, which in natural languages tends to reflect "the flow of causation."

In conclusion: Jon,  I did not expect such a complete response to my request for an explication of this comment in your last post:

JAS: The necessity of collateral experience/observation for any sign to be understood is one of Peirce's most notable insights. It leads to the recognition that every name in a proposition is a subject that indexically denotes one of its objects, while its syntax is the pure predicate that iconically signifies its interpretant as the general form of their logical relations. (I've added the emphasis I put in this quotation as a kind of "more iconic" diagram for the purpose of studying your post today. GR).

Again, much appreciated. Thank you for taking the time and making the effort to explain at length that which was succinctly -- albeit abstractly -- posited in that single sentence I just added emphasis to above. As usual, quotations and examples proved extremely helpful.

Best,

Gary Richmond